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ABSTRACT 
!
!
This study aims to analyze the separatist terrorism problem of Spain and 
Turkey in order to highlight the similarities and differences. The countries 
different as Spain and Turkey have been affected by the separatist terrorist attacks. 
The comparative study of these two terrorist idiosyncratic phenomena puts the 
debate on the argument that even in different territories and with different 
historical backgrounds, similar problems could occur. The focus of the thesis 
based on the study of two historical problems from 19th century, which later 
emerged the armed terrorist organizations. It also includes a brief analyze of the 
issue of IRA in Northern Ireland in order to see what had been done in the United 
Kingdom to solve the terrorism problem, which have taken into account as a 
reference point for the cases of Turkey and Spain. The thesis studies the actual 
situations of the problems and their possible future in both countries. 
!
Keywords: Terrorism, ETA, PKK, IRA, Turkey, Spain 
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RESUMEN 
!
!
Este estudio pretende analizar el problema del terrorismo separatista en 
España y en Turquía con el fin de loner de relieve las similitudes y diferencias. 
Diferentes países como España y Turquía se han sido afectados por los ataques 
terroristas separatistas. El estudio comparativo de estos dos fenómenos 
idiosincrásicos terroristas plantea el debate sobre la question de que, incluso en 
territorios diferentes y con diferentes antecedentes históricos, pueden darse 
problemas similares. El enfoque de la tesis esta basado en el estudio de dos 
problemas históricos del siglo XIX y XX tras los cuales surgieron más tarde las 
dos organizaciones terroristas armadas objeto de estudio comparado. También 
incluye un breve análisis de la cuestión de IRA en Irlanda del Norte con el fin de 
analizar y comparar el proceso de resolución del conflicto en Reino Unido en 
relation con el Ulster y cotejandolo con los casos de Turquía y España. La tesis 
estudia la situación actual de los dos conflictos así como las perspectivas de futuro 
en los dos países. 
 
Palabras claves: Terrorismo, ETA, PKK, IRA, Turquía, España 
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!
NOTES ON TERMS AND TURKISH PRONUNCIATION 
!
As Turkey both with its political history and being the recent homeland of 
Alevism is the central focus of this study, official names have been used with 
abbreviations regarding their Turkish version, with inclusion of their translation to 
the first usage of related names. Besides, private names of people have been kept 
as they are in Turkish in terms of special letters (ç, ğ, ı, ö, ş, and ü.), those do not 
exist in English language.  
!
For the pronunciation of aforementioned additional letters, the information 
below will be beneficiary: 
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Letter International Phonetic Alphabet  
(IPA) Value
Example
c /ʤ/ As j in jump
ç /ʧ/ As ch in church
ğ N/A, although /ɣ/in some dialects Lengthens preceding vowel
ı /ɯ/ As e in happen
j /ʒ/ As s in pleasure
ö /ɶ/ As oo in soot
ş /ʃ/ As sh in ship
u /u/ As oo in root
ü /y/ As ü in über
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AKP : Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi)
AP : Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) 
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SODEP : Social Democracy Party (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi) 
SHP : Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı 
Parti)
TBMM : Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi)
TİP : Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)
 xvi
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
TRT : Turkey Radio and Television Corporation (Türkiye Radyo 
ve Televizyon Kurumu)
TV : Television
UK : United Kingdom
UN : United Nations
USA : United States of America
YTP : New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi)
WW I : World War One 
WW II : World War Two
 xvii
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 xviii
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
!
!
!
LIST OF TABLES 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Table I - Victims of PKK by Year …………………………………….. 80
Table II - Death and Wounded State Forces by Type …………………. 81
Table III - Seats per Political Parties …………………………………… 132
Table IV - ETA Victims by Year ……………………………………….. 206
Table V - ETA Victims by Location …………………………………… 207
Table VI - ETA Victims by Type ……………………………………….. 207
 xix
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
!!!!!
 xx
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
!
!
!
1. INTRODUCTION ! !
The concepts of "terror" and "terrorism" are two of the major problems of 
every day life. Throughout history, terrorism has become a broad-based violence 
that shows no respect for ethnicity, social status, geographic location and 
demographic characteristics, such as sex, age or occupation. With its historical 
background and multiple perceptions of each state, terrorism has been a difficult 
term to define. However, understanding these two concepts might pave the way 
for finding a solution to threat of terrorism, which is one of the biggest problems 
that every nation faces. 
!
After the 9/11 Events, perception of terrorism has evolved one more time, 
and the world faced that even the developed countries could become the target of 
terrorism and might suffer from terrorist attacks. It is true that every terrorist 
organization and every terrorist attack have different backgrounds, reasons and 
goals; hence, seeking a complete analysis over terrorism in wide-perspective 
would make any research project more complicated. However, with the 
globalization - the integration of countries - the borders started to fade away; 
consequently, any terrorism problem started to become a problem for the whole 
world. It will not be wrong to argue that, a terrorist attack in Western part of the 
world can be heard in Eastern part within a few minutes and can spread fear to the 
populations, who do not have direct relation with that attack. Briefly, in today’s 
world, one country’s problem can easily affect another. Consequently, the fights 
against terrorism require international cooperation among different nations, which 
lead us to the necessity of understanding every single case in wide-perspective. 
!
Throughout history, idea of nationalism has spread out to the countries, 
especially with French and American revolutions. Consequently, the idea of 
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nationalism has paved the way for creation of nation-states. However, while 
nation states were built over the idea of having common elements, like religion, 
ethnic background or shared history, having a common identity did not solve the 
problem of existence of different identities. For instance, nation-states like Iraq, 
Great Britain, Turkey, Spain, France and so on, have internal problems whether 
related to religion or ethnicity among their diverse populations.  
!
Each problem of daily or political life is not related with terrorist attack; 
nevertheless, one can see that recent terrorist attacks and terrorist groups could be 
divided into two different groups: religion based terrorism and ethnic terrorism. 
As the religion based terrorism is not the focus of this thesis; for ethnic terrorism, 
it is possible to say that it has often targeted nation states and had political goals 
with outcomes. Hence, with its political goals, ethnic terrorism has transformed 
itself into political terrorism, which is the center point of this thesis. 
!
The reason why this topic was selected for the thesis comes from the idea 
that we live in an insecure world, where the terrorism might affect anyone in a 
way or another. As a Turkish citizen, I grew up by hearing about terrorist attacks 
and seeing funerals those were brought by the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party) terrorism. On the other side, my current residence is 
Spain, where ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom) 
terrorism took place for many years. I would like to use my academic background 
to understand the reality of terrorism and connectedness of Turkish and Spanish 
experiences. In fact, for the Turkish case of terrorism, Spanish experience is often 
given as an example both for the fight against terrorism and for a possible 
solution. All these facts made me more curious about the similarities and 
differences of these two cases of political terrorism.  
!
The methodology for this thesis is highlighting the common and different 
elements between two cases with the help of historical information concerning the 
history of countries and ethnic groups; Kurds and Basques. The British experience 
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on political terrorism was also taken into account in order to see the evolution of a 
terminated terrorism problem of the United Kingdom. This thesis takes the 
historical information and connects the reality of political terrorism with actuality 
of each cases up until the writing time. Written sources were used to gather related 
information throughout the history for each cases. Apart from relevant books; 
articles, legal documents and newspapers were also used for the purpose of this 
thesis. Necessary reading was made in Turkish, English, Spanish, Catalan and 
French. During the time period of doctorate, a mobility study was carried out in 
Paris in the Institut Geopolique Français for three months. As the terrorism 
problem of Spain has connection with France, this mobility study had become 
advantageous to see the French perception of the problem.  
!
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that even the cases of Spain and 
Turkey have different historical backgrounds, ETA’s and PKK’s arguments, 
methods and goals have similarities in the sense of political terrorism. Each of 
them have pursued a political goal for many years with the intention of creating 
independent states for Basques and Kurds. Each case affected the daily life of 
citizens, and each state have fought against the political terrorism for many years. 
In addition to terrorist attacks, terrorist organizations had, and still have, links 
with political parties, and these relations made them illegal players in the game of 
democracy. While differentiating each case, this thesis points out common 
elements of political parties’ relation with political terrorism by arguing that 
terrorist organizations with political goals use political parties in order to reach 
more people and to start a process of their legalization in a way.  
!
During the reading process of political science and history bibliography, it 
comes to my attention that while books and articles are making limited 
comparison between ETA and PKK, majority of them gives neither historical 
background nor their relation with political parties. This thesis tries to fill this gap 
and to bring out a necessary contribution as an academic source on this subject.  
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In order to reach the conclusion, this thesis explains the cases in four main 
chapters apart from introduction and conclusion. As this thesis argues that 
understanding the concept of terrorism is essential to evaluate each case, first 
chapter gives information about terrorism with its historical transformation. After 
the attempt of describing the terrorism, this thesis explains both Kurdish and 
Basque nationalisms and consequent emergence of terrorism. Since the existence 
of inevitable connection between terrorist organizations and political parties is one 
of the arguments of this thesis, third part describes the relation between Basque 
political parties and ETA; and Kurdish political parties and PKK; also, gives the 
IRA (Irish Republican Army)-Sinn Fein connection in order to understand the 
British perception. The fourth part tries to give actuality of both ETA and PKK 
problems and gives reasonable solution proposals to Spain and Turkey with the 
help of British experience. This thesis highlights the similarities and differences 
between the cases of Spain and Turkey as conclusion. 
!!
  
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!
!
!
2. DEFINING TERRORISM !
!
The politics may be the most ancient art in world history. From the 
beginning of humankind, people need to communicate among themselves, and 
need to manage their life, and properties. This lack of power management or 
institutions is the main reason of creation of the State. After the French 
Revolution, the world faced with the meaning of modern states as known today.  
!
 After the formation of modern states, the way of governance has changed; 
and a single person had lost his/her power that makes him/her the main actor of 
the state. Instead, a group of people/population has formed, and still forms, 
political parties in order to possess the power of governance. Hence, the most 
fundamental tool to gain the power of the state became the elections. 
!
 In modern day political life structure, political parties are in charge of 
making their policies and making promises to population to take their vote. 
Meanwhile, voters demand rights from the party in power, in a democratic way. 
As legitimacy of political parties is based on public opinion, they have to take into 
account what their electorates demand. In this context, after the World War Two 
(WWII), the destruction of external players gave European states a chance to look 
into their internal problems.   
  
 A new era has begun after the WWII. Within time and more experience, 
political parties got used to learn the way to attract the attention of population. 
Mostly they made propaganda campaigns before the elections, and tried to 
express their policies and ideas about governance in order to gain more support. 
To win the elections, political parties need population’s approval. 
!
 5
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In democratic states, the rule of the game is defined by the laws, and 
basically it is formed around societies’ needs and public opinion. Every 
government is free to choose and pursue its policies. Within these rules of game, 
every group can demand their rights in democratic way, and when the party that 
they voted for comes in power, they may achieve their demands. In today’s 
democratic world, the only way to achieve demands is forming a political party 
and participation to the elections. 
!
In context of democratic states, one often sees the term of “terrorism” in 
newspapers in the same page among political news. In some cases, a group of 
people uses terrorism to attract the public attention and to force governments to 
accept their existence. Therefore, terrorism was used, and is still being used by 
these kinds of groups as a tool of politics; however, in terms of democracy, 
terrorism cannot be accepted as a tool or a way to achieve any demand or goal. 
!
When one considers democracy as the best system of governance, at least 
it is the best one that the human race has experienced so far, where should 
“terrorism” be put in this context of democracy? What exactly is terrorism? Who 
uses the terrorism for what? How does the state acts against terrorism? etc. There 
might be many questions. However, the main questions for this part of thesis are; 
what terrorism is and how it affects daily life. 
!
!
2.1. Terrorism as a concept 
!
The concepts of terror and terrorism were significant problems that the 
world faces. Today, the violence has extended and transformed into a new form, 
which is called terrorism, regardless of ethnicity, social status, and geographical 
location or any particular characteristics in demography such as sex, age, or 
occupation. This extensive form of violence targets a significant portion of the 
world population. In order to define such a forceful concept, it is important to 
 6
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understand its etymology as a word with its background and history of the words 
terror and terrorism.  
!
The word “terror” has originated from the Latin word “terrere”, which 
means “to frighten”, but it also has relationship with the Greek word “trein”, with 
the meaning of “to be afraid”. Moreover, the usage of this word is related to the 
French word “L’terreur”. Apart from all these, a basic explanation of terror 
mechanism can be taken from an old Chinese proverb: “Kill one, frighten ten 
thousand”.   1
!
The well known source on the English language, Oxford English 
Dictionary defines terrorism as following; 
!
“Terrorism: A system of terror. 1. Government by intimidation as directed 
and carried out by the party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-94; 
the system of `Terror'. 2. gen. A policy intended to strike with terror those against 
whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of 
terrorizing or condition of being terrorized.”   2!
Additionally, according to the Collins Cobuild Dictionary,   this definition 3
includes “something that makes you very frightened”. Like Collins Cobuild, 
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary also defines the term with respect to the “political 
aspect” of terror. “Violence (as bombing) committed by groups in order to 
intimidate a population or government into granting their demands.”   These two 4
definitions show the political evolution of this word over time. According to that 
evolution, it will not be wrong to claim that the word “terrorism” indicates the 
usage of terror or unpredictable violence against a government, public, or 
individuals as a tool, in order  to obtain certain objectives. According to some 
sources, the word terror is indicated as “Extreme fear, that agitates body and 
 7
!  Sun Tzu.1
!  Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006 p. 2.2
!  Collins Cobuild Dictionary, 2001, p.1760.3
!  Merriam-Webster dictionary online,  4
<http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=terrorism&x=5&y=18>, site 
visited on 24 March 2010.
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mind, violent dread, fright.”   In the same source, “that, which excites dread; a 5
cause of extreme fear” is listed as a second meaning. Moreover, “a period 
characterized by political executions, as during the French Revolution” is also 
included to the meanings.   6
!
 With these definitions, one finds a somewhat linguistic-related description 
rather than learning what terrorism is, at first glance. The other definitions might 
be more beneficial, but again, it concerns the meaning of the word, not the term. 
While all definitions indicate the meaning of the word, they give a broad 
understanding of the term, which can be applied to nearly any actions that spread 
fear among society, in other words terrorize the population. Even tough, 
constructing an understanding from the definition of the word terrorism can be 
considered prematurely helpful, it is still insufficient for  the purpose of this 
thesis. 
!
Despite these dictionary definitions of the term, terrorism is a word that is 
in use in daily life. When one turns on the TV or reads newspapers, (s)he can see 
the usage of terrorism; however, most of the time (s)he never tries to define it. 
Because the public opinion believes that they already know the meaning of this 
term. However, terrorism is a term, which is hard to explain just with the help of 
dictionaries. The meaning of the term has evolved within time. 
  
!
2.2. Evolution of Terrorism 
!
According to related sources on history of terrorism, one of the earliest 
examples of terrorist acts was carried out by the radical Zealots, a Jewish sect 
active during the Roman occupation of the first century in the Middle East. The 
Zealots’ main objective to Roman Empire’s rule by attacks, involving 
assassinations. With their actions, Zealots wanted to send a message to the public, 
 8
!  Webster’s International Dictionary.5
!  Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary.6
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which was their target audience. Hence, the Zealots launched attacks to any place, 
where people would be able to see their actions and receive the message that they 
were trying to give. Walter Laqueur states about Zealots as; 
  
“The sources telling of their activities are sparse and sometimes contradictory 
but it is known from Josephus that Zealots used unorthodox tactics such as attacking 
their enemies by daylight, preferably on holidays when crowds congregated in 
Jerusalem”.    7!
Between the years of 1090 and 1272, the Assassins, an Islamic group, used 
similar tactics like the Zealots in combat against Seljuq Empire and Christian 
Crusaders.   Moreover, the Assassins used self-sacrifice and suicidal attacks as 8
Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations often use today. A clear example is 
September 11 attacks in 2001 in the United States of America. Terrorists who 
have motivated with religion commonly believes that violence is a divine act to 
reach and have a place in the heaven. As written in the “Almanac of Modern 
Terrorism”, some authors argue that these Islamic Assassins were first example of 
religion motivated terrorism, even the ancestors of modern terrorists.    9
!
Religion kept its place as being a common motivation point on the usage 
the terror until the French Revolution. After King Louis XVI’s execution, the 
Jacobins, launched terrorism period that the term “reign of terror” refers an 
example of state terrorism in the last decade of the 18th century.   In that time of 10
terror, many French citizens were killed because of their opposition to the 
revolutionary regime.   In fact, this period of terror was made for political reasons 11
to protect enlightenment ideas, which changed interest from religion to the ideas 
like nationalism and democracy. 
!
 9
!  Walter Laqueur,  A History of Terrorism, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 2001, p.7.7
!  Ibid. p.8-9.8
!  Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, Gregory E.J. Scott, Almanac of Modern Terrorism, New York, 9
Facts on File, 1991.
!  The French term regime de la terreur originated the English word ‘terrorism’.10
!  Linton, Marisa, “The Terror in the French Revolution”, Kingston University, <http://11
www.port.ac.uk/special/france1815to2003/chapter1/interviews/filetodownload,20545,en.pdf>, site 
visited on 10 April 2012.
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With the nationalism, anarchism, Marxism, and other secular political 
movements effected the meaning of terrorism during the 19th century. These term 
were the motivations to challenge the rule of monarchs and even rule of Church. 
Most of the people in European countries challenged the Church in order to 
decrease its role in political life, and construct new societies around secular ideas. 
Walter Laqueur argues that the terrorism of the 19th century was majorly anti-
monarchical and gained its concrete meaning by “Narodnoya Volya” of Russia.    12
!
As Walter Laqueur states; 
!
 “...of all these movements, Narodnoya Volya was the most important by 
far, even though its operations lasted only from January 1878 to March 1881”.    13!
Even though Narodnoya Volya assassinated many governmental officials 
and effected the political system of Russia then, its most successful action was the 
assassination of Tsar Alexander II on 1 March 1881.   After the assassination 14
group of political radicals attended to anarchist conference in London to discuss 
how to achieve revolutionary change. One can see that usage of violence, or as 
the world called it today; terrorism seen as a tool to achieve unfair rules of 
monarchs. The main idea of the conference was to establish a larger organization - 
Anarchist International-, which was also called “Black International” after they 
adopted black flag, to support and to coordinate terrorism for defeating 
monarchies and elected governments around the World.   15
!
 Bruce Hoffman claims that; 
!
 “this idea, like most of their ambitious plans, came to nought, the publicity 
generated by even a putative “Anarchist International” was sufficient to create myth 
of global revolutionary pretensions and thereby stimulate fears and suspicions 
disproportionate to its actual impact or political achievements”.    16
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!  Laqueur, op.cit., p.11.12
!  Ibid., p.12.13
!  Ibid.14
!  Hoffman, op.cit., p.19.15
!  Ibid.16
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Like-minded anarchists who were pursuing similar objectives around the 
globe carried out operations as small cells, which made them hard to detect and 
capture. Eventually, this method became the main way of act in order to spread 
intense fear among public. For revolutionary ideas or not, the usage of violence, 
the implementation of terror has been used as a tool for groups and organizations, 
which were motivated differently. 
!
On one side secular terms were motivating groups and individuals on the 
western part of world, on the other hand, in 1930s and 1940s, religious terrorism 
found its place in the Middle East by organizations those were influenced by 
Islamic fundamentalism to gain independence for their countries from colonialist 
states. In this context, it is possible to say that Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
fought against British Imperial rule and Front Liberation Army   battled against 17
France in Algeria. 
!
After the end of WWII, the motivation of terrorism changed once more. 
During 1940s and 1950s, nationalist and anti-colonialist organizations raised in 
the Middle East, Asia, and Africa in order to gain independence from European 
domination. While some of them motivated with religious ideas, others were 
motivated with western concepts. Countries like Algeria gained their 
independence with their nationalist movements that used terrorism against 
continued rule of colonial powers.   As Hoffman indicates, it was also during this 18
period that usage of title of “freedom fighters” became popular, because of the 
international community’s support and sympathy to struggles for national 
liberation and self-determination. Newly independent states argued that anyone or 
any movement that fought against colonial powers and/or Western domination 
should not be described as “terrorists”, but they might be considered as “freedom 
fighters”. This moment was also the start of the discussion on what is really 
terrorism. It is not wrong to argue that with the introduction of the term freedom 
fighters, one’s terrorist started to become another one’s heroes. 
 11
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Terrorism continued to be viewed in revolutionary context during the late 
1960s and 1970s. However, within time nationalist and ethnic separatist groups, 
which were not in fight with colonial powers also started to defend the 
revolutionary ideas and to try become freedom fighters of their target audiences. 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Québec Liberation Front,   Basque 19
Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, ETA), employed terrorism to 
attract international community’s attention to their causes. On 22 July 1968, three 
armed terrorists of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which became 
one of the six groups that constituted Palestine Liberation Organization later and 
fought to regain Palestine territories occupied by Israel, hijacked an Israeli plane 
en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. This incident drew significant attention from 
international community to Palestinian struggles. Hoffman argues that even 
though there had been several commercial aircraft hijackings before, this incident 
was the first political hijacking that started the process of the internationalization 
of terrorism. Besides, this hijacking was the first example with its international 
character seems similar to the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. 
!
In 1972, Munich Olympic Games was the scene of terrorism. The Black 
September Organization,   attacked on Israeli athletes. The attack resulted with 20
death of 11 Israeli athletes. Despite international community’s condemnation of 
Munich massacre, it generated spectacular publicity that the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. Two years after Munich events, Yasser Arafat, the leader of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, was invited to the United Nations to address 
General Assembly and the organization subsequently gained the observer status in 
the main international political area.   During his address Yasser Arafat, defended 21
the idea: 
!
“The difference between the revolutionary and terrorist lies in the reason for 
which each fights. For whoever stands by just a cause and fights for freedom and 
 12
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liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and colonialists, cannot 
possibly be called terrorist…”   22!
Within this atmosphere, other nationalist groups such as Quebec Liberation 
Front, French-Canadian separatists effective at Quebec region of Canada, and 
Irish Republican Army in United Kingdom, started to follow the Palestinian 
example to get international publicity. 
!
The internationalization process of terrorism in the late 1960s and 1970s 
was not only the product of Palestinian success, but also the activities of other 
movements. During these years, political extremists started to disagree the 
occupation of Vietnam by the United States of America and economic, social 
unfair rules of modern capitalist liberal-democratic state. The Red Army Faction  23
in Germany, and Red Brigades   in Italy were another examples of this 24
movement. Red Brigades’ famous act was the murder of former Italian Prime 
Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, which tried to establish socialist regimes by 
destroying their capitalist governments. In the beginning of the 1980s, the right-
wing terrorism, started in response to left-wing movements that arose in some 
parts of the European countries and in the United States of America. The most 
famous actions of these groups were the bombing of Munich Octoberfest 
Celebration in 1980, killed 14 and injured 215 people; Bologna rail station 
bombing in 1980, killing 84 and injured 180; track bombing of Alfred Paul 
Murrah building in Oklahoma City by a Gulf veteran in 1995, killing 168 and 
injured over 800 people which was the most lethal terrorist attack in the United 
States of America’s borders before the September 11 terrorist attacks.    25
!
!
!
!
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!  Yasser Arafat quoted in Hoffman, op. cit., p.26.22
!  Also known as Baader-Meinhof Gang.23
!  In Italian; Brigate Rosso.24
!  Adrian Guelke, The Age of Terrorism and International Political System, London, Tauris 25
Academic Studies, 1995,  pp. 61-63.
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2.3. Terrorism in International Law 
!
International attempts to define terrorism began on 1920s; however, the 
questions about some states, whether their actions were labeled as “terrorism” or 
the actions of the operating groups were labeled with this word prevented a 
consensus until today. As a result, an academic approach was adapted to define 
terrorism in international area.    26
!
 According to this approach, international scholars tried to list some 
specific events within the concept of terrorism, such as plane hijacking, taking of 
hostages, bombings and so on, instead of explaining the term in a general 
perspective. As a result, there are twelve international conventions such as; the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons,   including Diplomatic Agents, the International Convention 27
against the Taking of Hostages  , and the International Convention for the 28
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings  . 29
!
Lately, this approach started to be questioned. As a result, a general 
definition of terrorism within a wider perspective started to be searched by the 
international community. In 1999, a concrete attempt to give a definition of 
terrorism was made in the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. With this attempt, first, a definition made by referring to 
international conventions and listed acts were mentioned in these conventions. 
Secondly, a definition within a wider perspective was conducted. It refers to: 
!
 14
!  George Williams, and Ben Golder, “What is Terrorism: Problems in Legal Definition”, UNSF 26
Law Journal, vol. 27, no. 2, 2004, p. 273.
!  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 27
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature on 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 
167 (Entered into force on 20 February 1977), <http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cppcipp/
cppcipp_e.pdf>, site visited 6 June 2011.
!  International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature on 17 December 28
1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (Entered into force on 3 June 1983), <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/
conventions/Conv5.pdf>, site visited 7 June 2011.
!  International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature on 15 29
December 1997, 2149 UNTS 284 (Entered into force on 23 May 2001), <http://www.un.org/law/
cod/terroris.htm>, site visited on 8 June 2011.
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“Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or  to 
any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act.”   30!
More recently, as a response to the September 11 terrorist action, the Sixth 
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly attempted to give a 
comprehensive general definition of terrorism. Article 2 of the Draft 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism states a relatively clear 
definition of terrorist actions; 
!
“(1) Any person commits an offense within the meaning of this Convention, if that 
person,by any means, unlawfully and intentionally causes: 
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a 
state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility 
or the environment; or 
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of 
this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of 
the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”   31!
When one looks at the positive and negative parts of the specific and 
general definitions, obviously, both have certain advantages and disadvantages. 
On the other hand, listing the crimes including acts of terrorism may not be 
adequate to clearly separate ordinary crime and terrorist action. This issue brought 
a confusion on examining every single case. While aforementioned actions may 
be useful to identify terrorist actions, they certainly does not give a definition on 
general understanding of terrorism. If listed actions are taken as a general 
definition, then general definition of terrorism might be expended to a wide range 
of activities, which may not be considered as terrorism. For instance, actions like 
 15
!  International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Opened for 30
signature on 9 December 1999. 2178 ILM 229. (Entered into force on 10 April 2002), <http://
www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm>, site visited on 8 June 2011.
!  Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism states,  <http://www.ilsa.org/31
jessup/jessup08/basicmats/unterrorism.pdf> site visited on 8 June 2011.
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civil disobedience, public protest etc. may become the examples of activities, 
which could be considered as terrorism. Another example can be given from the 
universities, where are common places of protests. A manifestation of students 
about tuition fees against university authority or government may also be 
considered as terrorist action. Moreover, if the students start a fire or let off 
fireworks around a university buildings, authorities might interpret these actions 
as “serious damage to property”.    32
!
As the Western world, Eastern part also tried to define the terrorism 
according to their perception. In Arab Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorism, which was accepted in Cairo in April 1998, terrorism defined as; 
!
“Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs 
in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to 
sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, 
liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to 
public or private installations or property or to occupying and seizing them, or 
seeking to jeopardize national resources.”   33!
!
2.4. Terrorism in National Laws 
!
National laws need a proper description due to the nature of the legal 
system of every single country. In lack of absolute definitions of acts and actions, 
it will not be easy to separate a criminal, a terrorist, or a victim. Therefore, 
definition made by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the 
United Nations; “What looks, smells, and kills like terrorism is terrorism.”   is not 34
useful in any legislative system in today’s world. On the other hand, The Texas 
Penal Code, section 22.07 could be a useful example to define a terrorist act in 
legal framework. 
 16
!  Williams, and Golder, op.cit.,p. 288.32
!  “The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism”, Al-Bab, 18 June 2009, <http://33
www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm>, site visited on 2 May 2011.
!  Senior British Representative Iraq 2003-2004. British Ambassador to the United Nations, 34
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In this code, terrorism is defined as: 
!
“(a) A person commits an offence if he threatens to commit any offence 
involving violence to any person or property with intent to: 
(1) cause a reaction of any type to this threat by an official or volunteer agency 
organized to deal with emergencies; 
(2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or 
(3) prevent or interrupt the occupation or use of a building; room; place of 
assembly; place to which the public has access; place of employment or occupation; 
aircraft, automobile, or other form of conveyance; or other public place; or 
(4) cause impairment or interruption of public communications, public 
transportation, public water, gas, or power supply or other public service.”   35!
As one see that Texas Panel Code tries to identify the “terrorist” by listing 
and describing actions of individuals. Another example can be given from the 
United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism Act. Aforementioned act states; 
!
“Section 1 
(1) In this Act, “terrorism” means the use of threat of action where 
(a) The action falls within subsection (2) 
(b) The use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate 
the public or a section of the public; and 
(c) The use of threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause. 
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it 
(a) involves serious violence against a person, 
(b) involves serious damage to property, 
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the 
action, 
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of 
the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system. 
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of 
firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied....]    36!
 17
!  “Texas Penal Code, Section 22.07”, Baker’s Legal Pages, <http://www.bakers-legalpages.com/35
pc/2207.htm> site visited on 11 May 2011.
!  The complete act can be found in: “Terrorism Act 2000”, The National Archive of United 36
Kingdom, 16 February 2009, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1>, site 
visited on 10 October 2011.
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As stated earlier, the term terrorism evolved through history. In the age of 
Internet, virtual acts and actions started to be considered as actions may be in  the 
framework of terrorism. Therefore, one can see that actions against electronic 
systems found its place in United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism Act.  Actions and 
attacks against certain electronic system with the intention of disrupt started to be 
called as “Cyber-Terrorism”, which is a term to label the online acts and actions; 
however, there is no clear definition of them. When and how an online act could 
be accepted as terrorist action? This cyber-terrorism concept may be quite new for 
some countries even for the ones who are accustomed to fight against terrorism. 
!
When one takes a look at countries legal documents, it is possible to say 
that they adopt more nationalistic approach on defining terrorism. For instance, 
the Indian Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance in 2001 gives a definitions made by 
terror experts, and limits actions inside national borders regardless of international 
concern. In the said ordinance there is no complete definition of terrorism, but it 
tries to define the acts and actions; 
!
“An act done by using weapons and explosive substances or other methods in 
a manner as to cause or likely to cause death or injuries to any person or loss or 
damage to property or disruption of essential supplies and services or by any other 
means necessary with intent to threaten the unity and integrity of India or to strike 
terror in any section of the people.”   37!
On European perspective, the European Union has common policies about 
political and terror crimes among its member and with third party states. 
However, every state has its proper legal system, in which a dedicated part to 
terrorism can be found. For the purpose of this thesis, in following paragraphs 
Turkish and Spanish legislations on terrorism will be given as a source for the 
upcoming chapters. 
!
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The Spanish Penal Code Book II, Title XXII, Chapter V, Section II   is 38
dedicated to terrorist crimes, in which the definition of terrorist act, the 
precautions that state can apply, etc., can be found. According to Article 571, 
terrorist act would be punished as; !
 “person who is serving as officers or collaborating with terrorist 
organizations or groups whose purpose is to subvert the constitutional order or 
seriously disturbing public peace, commit crimes under article 346   and 351  , 39 40
respectively, will be punished with imprisonment of fifteen to twenty years, subject 
to penalties attached to them if there is injury on physical or health of people.”  !
Again, one can see that the Spanish legislation tries to identify the terrorist 
by listing the actions and acts one by one. In the case of Turkey, the Turkish 
National Anti-Terrorist Law also indicates how a nation tries to take necessary 
precautions legally to protect itself from terrorism. In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism 
Law, both the effects of political, ideological and religious aims of terrorists and 
the effects of violence, intimidation and damage to private and governmental 
property can be clearly seen. In this law, which was adopted in 1991, terrorism is 
defined as: 
!
 “[Terrorism] is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an 
organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as 
specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, 
damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and Nation, endangering 
the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing 
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other circumstances of the act."
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging 
the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by 
means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.”    41!
It is possible to say that, in these definitions, the main focus point is about 
endangering or damaging the State and its authority. It can be also accepted that, 
Turkish law uses more broad terminology to protect the State and its organs. 
!
!
2.5. Different types of Political Terrorism 
!
As mentioned earlier, various attempts have been made to define terrorism 
and to clarify its difference from regular crimes, political violence or violence 
related with a revolution. However, members of terrorist organizations try to 
legitimize their terror attacks. Generally, terrorists see themselves as they are 
revolutionaries and are convinced that they are fighting against  the evil. As they 
deeply believe in their cause and do not respect the laws of certain state, they do 
not see themselves that they are criminals before the laws. Aforementioned 
information about the history of terrorism makes clear that in every age, terrorists 
have seen themselves as heroes, but the authorities label them as rebels, bandits 
or terrorists.    
!
A common understanding about terrorism has been emerged through the 
history that usage of any violence by groups or individuals for achieving political 
goals and objectives cannot be legitimized , and it is basically an unjustifiable use 
of force and violence against legitimate and/or elected authorities in states. In 
modern democracy, terrorist acts and actions are considered as crimes against 
individuals and states rather than political offences to authorities.   Conor Cruise 42
O’Brien argues; “the force violence of the terrorist is not legitimate”;   and that 43
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terrorist groups’ claims to be revolutionary movements or groups engaged in 
“guerrilla” warfare are often attempts to introduce themselves as terrorist groups 
with some kind of legitimacy in their audiences’ minds.   A guerrilla warfare 44
basically defines irregular attacks of small groups against certain targets with 
wide range of actions including ambush, sabotage or raids. The common way to 
attack is using the elements of surprise, conducting an unexpected terrorist attacks 
with hit and runs. 
!
 Laqueur argues that the difficulty of defining terrorism lies in the fact that 
its character has considerably changed over the last century. For him; 
   
  “Terrorism is not an ideology but an insurrectional strategy that can be 
used by people of very different political convictions… [it] is not merely a 
technique doctrine. It is truly all-purpose and value-free.”    45!
 Meantime Brian Michael Jenkins argues that terrorism is; 
!
 “The threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence 
designed primarily to instill fear-to terrorize…Terrorism is violence for effects; not 
only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect on the actual victims of the terrorists. In 
fact the victim may be totally unrelated to the terrorists’ cause. Terrorism is a 
violence aimed at people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the by-product of 
terrorism.”     46!
 However, even if this notion of terrorism is accepted and one claims that 
terrorism is a theatre or public spectacle to frighten and attract attention, it must 
be remembered that this is not its sole objective. Moreover, terrorists like power 
and to be respected by others, they have goals over attracting media coverage for 
their activities, spreading fear among the public, support of their target audiences. 
!
 21
!  Ibid., p. 72.44
!  Walter Laqueur, Terrorism, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977, pp. 4-5.45
!  Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, Los Angeles, 46
Crescent, 1975, p. 1.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
 In a similar meaning, Wolf argues that; 
!
 “[the terrorist’s] strategic intent is to destroy the confidence a particular minority 
has in its government by causing it act outside the law…to bring about the moral 
alienation of the masses from government until its isolation has become total and 
irreversible…to make life unbearable for a democratic government as long as 
terrorist demons remain unsatisfied.”    47!
As Wolf stated, terrorists often attack to governments assets and officials 
in order to show them weak before the public. Secondly they try to create a 
disobedience or rebellion against authorities. Juliet Lodge states that, the main 
goal for terrorists has been “to register a calculated impact on a target population 
and on other groups for the purpose of altering the political balance in favor of the 
terrorist”   and discrediting the authorities. 48
!
 As the governments often think that the effective way to deal with 
violence is counter violence, terrorists tries to convince the target audiences that 
governments uses violence, so that their acts can become legitimate against states’ 
violence. On the other hand, while the governments fight against terrorism, they 
basically deny to accept terrorism as an internal problem that terrorists try to 
undermine the state authority in some part of the country or entirely. It is possible 
to say that, governments always have concern about their vision among society, 
and try to avoid giving an impression that they are not capable of defending the 
legal system, their citizens and unity of the country and territory. 
!
It is true that terrorist acts may be aimed at specific goals, such as the 
release of imprisoned members of organizations, taking of hostages, and so on. 
However, where terrorist demands are based in broader terms and linked with 
ideas of revolution, the question of whether terrorism was guerrilla warfare or 
takes a “revolutionary” or “sub-revolutionary” form is raised.   Paul Wilkinson 49
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indicates three types of terrorism: “revolutionary-terrorism”, aimed at political 
revolution; “sub-revolutionary terrorism”, having political motives other than 
revolution; and “repressive terrorism”, aimed at restraining certain groups, 
individuals or forms of behaviour deemed to be undesirable.    50
!
 Lodge suggests that “revolutionary” terrorism aims at effecting a complete 
revolutionary change within a certain political system, while “sub-revolutionary” 
terrorism aims at changing various aspects in a particular political system, in a 
political structure. Instead of “repressive” terrorism, he refers to “establishment 
terrorism”, and he argues that it may be applied externally by the government 
against other nation-states and internally “to repress various forms of domestic 
opposition/unrest and/or move the populace to comply with [the] programs/goals 
of the state”.    51
!
 A different attempt to classify terrorism and to differentiate its various 
forms from each other by mentioning the goals was done by Bowyer Bell. He 
pointed out several aspects, which he contributed to “revolutionary” terrorism by 
highlighting the internal and external dimensions of “revolutionary” terror, and 
according to him, elements such as; main goal, loyalty of militants, targeting large 
or specific targets in pursuit of terrorist goals, make difference within 
revolutionary terrorism concept. Bell refers to the first aspect of “revolutionary” 
terror as “organizational terror”. With this, he refers organizational structure of a 
terrorist group with its internal discipline, strict rules and punishing members.   52
!
The second aspect, “allegiance terror”, he argues “a less restrained variant 
of organizational terror” involving the use of violence to create major “support” 
in the financial base, “support” among society or certain part of population in the 
form of actions like strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience obtained by threats of 
vengeance”.    53
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The third aspect he describes as “functional terror” that involves actions to 
gain strategic advantages over authorities, even by killing state officials the aim is 
discrediting the virtue of victims.   54
!
 The forth aspect is defined as “provocative terror” concentrating on 
“exploiting the deed and escalating its impact’;   while the fifth, “manipulative 55
terror” is characterized as “the creation of a bargaining situation”, in which threats 
are made to destroy assets or kill hostages unless certain demands are granted. 
Manipulative terror rests on the dread, if not the certainty, that such threats are 
real.”   As final aspect, he uses “symbolic terror”, with the explanation of why the 56
target selected. According to him, the target becomes a victim because he or she 
“represents the epitome of the enemy”.   For Bell, terrorism can take forms other 57
than “revolutionary” terrorism. He refers to “psychotic” terrorism, which involves 
“ostensibly political actions with uncertain or irrational outward motivations” 
committed for personal, internal reasons.   58
  
 While Bell categorize terrorism by aspects of it, John Richard Thrackrah 
tries to make a simple categorization on terrorism by involving parties; 
!
 “Academically, terrorism is categorized according to the parties involved, 
as follows: terrorism directed by a state against another state; terrorism directed by 
the state against its citizens; terrorism directed by an individual against another; and 
terrorism directed by an individual against the state.”   59!
The discussion on defining and categorizing on terrorism still goes on today. 
However, one topic is clear and common in definitions; most terrorist activities 
have political and/or ideological aims. Therefore, terrorism should be dealt within 
political frame along with criminal laws of modern world. Nevertheless, lack of a 
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common definition of terrorism delays the development of international 
cooperation in struggle against it. As Colin S. Gray mentions;  
!
“Political difficulties cannot usefully be denied or evaded by the elementary 
expedient of treating all candidate terrorist activity simply as the commission of 
criminal acts”.   60!
Meantime, Laqueur argues; 
!
“Terrorism is not, as is frequently believed, a subspecies of guerrilla warfare 
and its political function today is also altogether different; the difference between 
guerrilla and terrorism is not one of semantics but of quality.”   61!
Today, terrorism is defined differently almost in every country. European 
Countries see terrorism as a problem to be resolved politically, while United 
States of American think it should be resolved by military measures. 
!
During the International Conference on International Terrorism and 
Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, academics from Eastern world also suggested 
some ideas on defining terrorism. Professor Zhao Weiming argued for a universal 
definition of terrorism depending on political aims and targets of terrorism, rather 
than talking about subjects of terrorism and its methods. He also mentioned that 
determining what constitutes international terrorism would be the solution to the 
problem of a common definition of terrorism, may sweep away the double 
standard understanding on terrorism.   Professor Liu Hua of the Shanghai 62
Academy of Social Sciences pointed out; 
!
“the current international and regional conventions against terrorism 
include over one hundred different legal definitions of terrorism and the lack of a 
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comprehensive definition of the problem clearly impedes further development of 
international antiterrorism cooperation”.   63!
In condition of lack of consensus on definition of terrorism, regional 
definitions of terrorism are commonly in use. Laqueur claims that; 
!
 “The way states, organizations or integrated structures such as the 
European Union define terrorism and the concept related to it displays how they 
perceive the threat and what measures they would take to eliminate it”.     64!
At the same time, there are some problems within the Western perspective 
regarding the issue of definition. European states aim at protecting the individual 
and individual rights within their definition of terror. According to LaPorte; 
!
 “The Union views terrorism as mainly a police problem, not a military 
problem as Americans do, and the response to increased terrorism in the Union is to 
increase European cooperation.”    65!
It is possible to say that the Western and the Eastern parts of the world are 
not in position of finding a common understanding of terrorism, therefore 
international cooperation on fighting against terrorism is not very well 
established. In order to solve the problem of a definition of terrorism in a common 
legitimate way, the definitions and objectives of terrorism need to be redefined 
within the framework of international community. 
!
Defining terrorism also depends on point of view of a person, who 
attempts to define. As commonly known, terrorism is a violence against civilians 
or military targets, which is the most popular, brief and basic definition of a 
difficult term; however, a common discourse is also popular among social 
scientists; one’s terrorists is another man’s freedom fighters or heroes. 
Nevertheless, taking into account that terrorism is a crime against humanity by 
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killing man and disrupting the public order and political structure, makes the 
angle of this thesis very clear. There is no way to justify unlawful acts of terrorists 
in democratic state structures.  
!
If one tries to find a single, unique, but insufficient definition of terrorism, 
Andreas Armborst’s quotation from Louise Richardson will be helpful;  
!
“If there is one single explanation it is that terrorism is a tactic and 
people use it because they think that, at some level, it works”   66!
Despite the lack of general definition of terrorism, a common element is 
always pointed out in every attempt to define the term; a terrorist action has 
always goals, basically spreading fear among society in an audience larger than 
real target group, in other words the point is to kill one or few to terrorize a larger 
group. Terrorist organizations and its members like to be respected or be accepted 
as an actor in politics. All their actions intend to produce public support by fear 
for their cause and/or public pressure over legitimate authorities.  !
All aforementioned information shows how difficult to define terrorism is, 
especially political terrorism which is the gravity point of this thesis. Upcoming 
parts, with the help of case studies, will be beneficial to see the big picture about 
political terrorism. 
!
The case studies of this thesis, PKK and ETA, which are terrorist 
organizations with separatist aims and goals, will be examined in dedicated parts. 
Separatist actions of terrorist organizations use violence against unarmed citizens, 
who are not directly related to the conflict; however, they become the victims of 
constructed terrorism. Among social scientists, PKK and ETA are considered as 
different types of organizations in terms of their methods and terrorist attacks. For 
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this reason, a brief information about PKK’s and ETA’s methods that they use in 
political terrorism actions will be helpful for upcoming parts. 
!
Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca give ETA and PKK as 
examples of distinct groups as organization, while one uses terrorist methods, the 
other uses guerrilla warfare. According to them, ETA is a terrorist organization 
which holds no territorial control in Spain and attacks clandestinely. From 1970s, 
ETA has perpetrated numerous attacks against security forces through shootings 
and selective killings aimed at informers, drug dealers, entrepreneurs, politicians 
and public officials; and it has majorly concentrated on bombings. On the other 
side, they claim that, PKK is a terrorist organization, which has base in the 
mountains in the southeastern of Turkey, attacks military targets and officials by 
guerrilla warfare, in other words by hit-and-run tactics.    67
!
Calling them guerrilla or terrorist, and the difference in terms of methods 
do not make any distinction on the purpose of this thesis. The unequivocal truth 
is, they have an element in common, both of them are illegal separatist 
organizations, which uses dirty terror tactics such as killings, bombings, 
assassinations, and commit crime against humanity. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!
!
!
3. HISTORY OF EACH CASES 
!
!
As mentioned earlier, terrorism is hard to explain but deeply related to our 
lives. A regular citizen of any country, who follows international or national 
media, for sure (s)he has seen the usage of term. The term itself may have 
different meanings and definitions in every country; however, its goal is common; 
terrorizing regular people.  
!
Apart from definition of word terrorism and its explanations based on its 
definition, understanding the meaning of terrorism is important; nevertheless, it is 
only one part of the equation to understand what people live with. The second 
part of the equation, which has an equal importance as the definition and meaning 
of the terrorism, is history of each cases. As terrorist attacks often are not 
individual acts and a group is always behind the actions, examining and knowing 
these groups are essential to understand what is happening and why. 
!
For the purpose of this thesis, selected study cases are the separatist 
terrorist groups of Spain and Turkey, which are quite important in the 
contemporary history of the 20th century. The members/leaders and supporters of 
ETA in Spain and PKK in Turkey, believe that they have or had reasons to use 
armed struggle against their states. Maybe these two groups, ETA and PKK, are 
today’s main security problem of Spain and Turkey, but the problems that they 
had/have in their own histories, is still shaping today’s policies and political 
agendas.  
!
On this part of the thesis, history of aforementioned terrorist groups, ETA 
and PKK, which are already labeled as terrorist organizations by the European 
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Union and the United States of America Government, and history of Basque and 
Kurdish nationalism will be examined in order to understand the reasons behind 
terrorist attacks against the Spanish and the Turkish states. A proper examination 
of the history of each case will be helpful for the upcoming parts of this thesis.  
!
!
3.1. History of Kurdish Nationalism, the Roots of PKK 
!
In today’s Turkey, the main discussion goes on the subject is: who came 
the region first. Kurdish writers and thinkers often claim that the Kurdish 
presence goes through the history of Mesopotamia, the territory corresponding to 
modern-day Iraq, the northeastern section of Syria and smaller parts of 
southwestern Iran.   İsmail Beşikçi, a Kurdish writer, claims that tribal families of 68
Mesopotamia were Kurdish.   Others also claim that the historical Medes or 69
Median Empire, also known as the ancient Iranian people, was the ancient of 
Kurds ethnic origin. According to the book of Safiye Dündar, most of the Russian 
historians, who work on Kurdish issue, defense and promote this idea, and even 
Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of PKK, points out the Iranian Medes as ancestors 
of Kurdish people.    70
!
On the other hand, Turkish historians and writers often claim that the 
people known as Kurdish held Turkish ethnic origin. Turkish writers claim that 
the Kurdish people migrated with Hun Turks from Khazar region to the West, 
until today’s region of Turkey and the Middle East.    71
!
As one can see, there is no accurate information about the origin of 
Kurdish people; however, their presence in the Middle East is unequivocally true. 
The reason behind the discussions about origin of Kurds in Turkish literature is 
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that Kurdish problem is deeply related with political questions of today’s Turkey. 
As Kurdish authors claims that Kurdish people were in the region of Turkey even 
before the Turks and others, they identify Kurds as real owner of the region. On 
the other side, Turkish authors claim that Kurdish people are Turks in ethnic 
origin. With this assertion, they try to avoid the Kurdish problem.  
!
The Kurds in the Middle East, historically, lived in mountainous areas and 
valleys. That made them exposed to different waves of invaders, who passed over 
the region, like Mongols, Safavid etc.; however, they always managed to have 
some relative autonomy and preserved their traditions. As Kurds lived as tribal 
large families, they ruled themselves not as big states, but just as tribal families.  
!
After aforementioned information about Kurdish origin and discussions in 
Turkey on the subject of ‘who was the first one in the region’, this section of 
thesis focuses on the Ottoman Era of the region. As today’s modern Republic of 
Turkey founded over the Ottoman heritage in terms of territory and population, 
the Kurdish presence in Ottoman history and first rebellion movements under the 
Ottoman rule can be taken as roots of armed struggle and the Kurdish desire for 
an independent state. 
!
3.1.1. Kurdish Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire !
The Ottoman Empire lasted from 1299 until 1922, the year of the 
abolishment of the Ottoman Monarchy. The Ottoman Empire was founded as 
tribal family state by Osman Bey, in north-western Anatolia.   With the conquest 72
of Istanbul in 1453, at that time the name of the city was Constantinople, the tribal 
monarchic Ottoman State started to control of Byzantium population of the city, 
which was Christian. With the conquest of Istanbul, Christians started to live 
under the Ottoman rule, this meant that Ottoman had become more than a tribal 
family, this is to say, the Ottoman Empire. 
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When the Ottoman Empire continued to enlarge in the area, the first 
relation happened with Kurds under the rule of Sultan Selim I, in 1514. The 
Kurds played an important role within the Persian-Ottoman dispute, and managed 
to use the situation in their favor. The advisor of Sultan Selim I, Idrissi Bitlissi, 
had the idea of gaining Kurdish agas’   support with recognizing their rights and 73
privileges. As Kurds accepted the Ottoman supremacy, they enjoyed their wide 
autonomy, and the Ottoman Empire was protected by Kurdish tribes against the 
Persian threat on borders.   For a while, Kurds did not have problem on ruling 74
themselves under the Ottoman supremacy.  
!
American and French Revolutions brought the idea of nationalism to the 
world politics, and in the early 18th century, the Ottoman Empire had difficulties 
on controlling the territories of large scale. The Sultan Mahmud II, who was 30th 
Sultan of the Empire and ruled between 1808 and 1839, saw the centralization 
reforms as the way of the salvation of the Empire. These reforms brought the end 
of Kurdish landowners’ tribal autonomies in Kurdish populated areas. The end of 
power of the Kurdish agas made a significant transformation of the power and 
leadership from agas to sheikhs in the region.   75
!
The modernization and centralization reforms, known as the Tanzimat 
reforms period, started with Sultan Mahmud II, and lasted until the declaration of 
the first constitution in 1876. The declaration of the first constitution aimed to 
secure the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire against nationalist 
movements., which were affected by ideas of French Revolution. With the 
constitution, the religious minorities had certain rights under the Ottoman Empire 
rule. After the Tanzimat period, the new administrative system, which gave 
privileges to Ottoman Sultan’s non-Muslim subjects, started to be called as Millet 
System.  
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Within the Millet System, people who lived under the same Ottoman flag, 
were divided into different groups in terms of religious identities. Each of them 
formed a single millet -can be translated as nation-. Under this new administrative 
system, millet was an autonomous religious group, which had rights to self-
govern under its own laws and headed by their religious leader. The religious 
leader of every group had responsibilities to the central government, such as 
collecting and paying taxes and maintaining internal security.   76
!
According to this definition of the Millet System, Muslims, Jews, 
Armenians and Rums composed different millets in the Ottoman Empire. While 
the Millet System used to define the people regarding their religion inside the 
Ottoman Empire; as Bernard Lewis states, the Europeans started to call Ottoman 
Empire as Turkey and its population as Turks, but Turks identified themselves as 
Muslims.   This was natural result of the Millet System. As Ottoman’s Muslim 77
population was not conscious about their ethnic identity, calling one as Turk 
meant that all Muslims in Ottoman Empire were Turks. 
!
As the Kurds were Muslims, they had been accepted as ‘one’ with the rest 
of the Muslim population. According to Safiye Dündar, Kurds did not have any 
discrimination under the Ottoman Empire rule. The writer indicates that non-
Muslim population were not obliged to be drafted, because they were paying a 
sum of money instead of going to the military service; however, Kurds were 
subjects to the military service, and this was one of the evidences of equal 
treatment to the Kurds under the Ottoman Empire rule.    78
!
The centralization reforms and defining the population regarding their 
religion, Millet System, made power shift on Kurdish society from agas to 
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sheikhs. The role of sheikhs and their importance in Muslim societies are 
important to understand the new type of this leadership among society.   
!
 In Muslim culture, a sheikh is frequently identified as the servant of God 
and even in some societies, he is accepted as the voice of God. On this point, a 
sheikh simply distinguishes himself as leader of his followers (murids), who are a 
group of people who listens and frequently follows what sheikh says. On his book 
Robert Olson says that a sheikh has strong personality, which is supported by his 
charismatic appearance. He indicates that in Muslim groups, sheikhs have 
responsibilities among the society, such as to settle disputes among followers. The 
high reputation of sheikh is deeply related on his family’s saintly genealogy, 
sagacity, and charisma. Briefly, Olson states that a sheikh simply carries all the 
abilities of a modern politician.   79
!
 The followers of certain sheikh also believe that their leader is capable of 
performing miracles, such on medical problems. As because of their miracles, 
sheikhs have been respected by his followers during their lifetime, and also the 
belief that sheikhs even capable of performing miracles after death, which makes 
their tombs as special places for his followers. The importance of worship at the 
tombs of death sheikhs makes them iconic personalities, heroes after their death. 
In this sense, in a rural Muslim community, a sheikh briefly serves during their 
lifetime and even after death as doctor, lawyer, priest and even psychiatrist.   This 80
importance of sheikhs made them natural leaders among society, and capable of 
mobilizing their followers easily. As their followers would listen to sheikhs’ 
words as ultimate advices or even orders on a certain subject, a single sentence 
can create a huge effect over their followers.  
!
 After the disappearance of agas on Kurdish populated areas, the Ottoman 
Empire was not able to control the region. The disappearance of agas resulted in 
increased lawlessness, banditry. Briefly, one can say that political situation and 
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the high importance of religion among society made the shift of power possible to 
the sheikhs.     81
  
 When the agas had been eliminated on the Kurdish populated areas, the 
lands started to be granted to the new leaders, sheikhs. Olson states that the 
Ottoman Land Code of 1858 helped sheikhs to gain more land and, as a 
consequence, more power among the society. With large landowners, tribal 
leaders, the officials, sheikhs were the  beneficiary ones of this law code. The idea 
behind this code was the desire of the Ottoman Empire to have more centralized 
power in the region.   Another way to gain power for the sheiks was through the 82
marriage with the daughters of villages’ authorities. On this condition of the 
Kurdish populated region, a Kurdish sheikh, Sheikh Ubeydullah, made his name, 
first as a religious leader then the political leader of the Kurdish population. 
!
 Apart from the land that he owned, Sheikh Ubeydullah gained more power 
because of the marriages. Many of tribal family leaders had been in allegiance 
with Sheikh Ubeydullah through marriages. His family name, his charisma, lands; 
alliances through marriages and having a large number of followers gave Sheikh 
Ubeydullah a higher power and bring a valuable respect. According to Olson, 
some tribal family leaders called Sheikh Ubeydullah as Your Highness,   which 83
was the form of address to the kings and sultans.   
!
 The importance of Sheikh Ubeydullah for the Ottoman Empire showed 
itself during the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. The Ottoman Empire provided 
weapons and Sheikh Ubeydullah entered the war with his followers.   The war 84
ended with the Berlin Treaty in 1878.   During the aftermath of the Russian-85
Ottoman War of 1878, Sheikh Ubeydullah did not give back the weapons those 
were provided by the Ottoman Empire and the Empire did not provide 
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compensations for the destruction of the war in the region, which created hunger 
in the Kurdish populated areas. Sheikh Ubeydullah made demands from the 
Empire and, meantime, he started to collect more weapons and people for his 
campaign against the Ottoman Empire.   He even created the first Kurdish 86
alliance in the region, Kurdish Tribal League.   The Kurdish League was 87
relatively supported by the Ottoman Empire with the idea that Kurds could be 
used against Armenian nationalist movements and had a success for short time.    88
!
 Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt movement had finished with his surrender in 
1882, he exiled to Mecca where he died.   89
!
 What made Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt unique and famous is the letter 
that he sent to British Vice Consul in Başkale in July 1880; 
  
 “The Kurdish nation is a people apart. Their religion is different (to that of others), 
and their laws and customs are distinct. They are known among all nations as 
mischievous and corrupt… The chiefs and rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or 
Persian subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan (the Christians) one and all are 
united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on this way with two governments, 
and necessarily something must be done so that the European governments having 
under-stood the matter shall enquire into our state… We want our affairs to be in our 
hands… Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, 
as they are unable to put up with these continued evil deeds, and the oppression 
which they suffer at the hands of the two governments of impure intentions.”   90!
 Because of the existence of this letter, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s intention is 
often considered as that he was seeking to create an independent Kurdish State, 
not a kingdom or tribal governance. According to Olson, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s 
letter to British Vice Consul was an evidence of Sheikh’s aim to create an 
independent Kurdish State, which made his movement the first Kurdish 
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nationalist movement. Olson also stated that Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt was a 
great example of the role of sheikhs in the region, and also it is an evidence of 
Kurdish nationalism, in which the nationalist ideas and religion became nested.    91
!
 Attempts of the Ottoman Empire to control the region continued after the 
following years of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt. Sultan Abdülhamid II established 
a new army from the people of eastern Anatolia; Hamidiye Light Cavalry 
Regiments. The Hamidiye Light Cavalry named by Sultan Abdülhamid II himself, 
and the word Hamidiye literally means ‘belonging to Hamid’. The process of the 
creation of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments began in 1890 and finished in 
1891.    92
!
 After Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt, there were other revolts in smaller 
scale. Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt experience showed potential danger for another 
large-scale rebellion against the central Ottoman authority. As the Kurdish tribes 
were living in the region, they were recruited as soldiers to the Hamidiye Light 
Cavalry Army. Briefly, tribes provided soldiers for the army and they constructed 
the main body of the new army of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments.   At first, 93
most of the tribes, but not all, accepted to enter the army. The main mobilizing 
power was again the use of religion, as the army was created against non-Muslim 
powers; Russians and Armenians.   94
!
 In the creation of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army, the tribes of the region 
submitted population figures, which showed all men between 17 and 40. The 
selected ones who were to become the officers of each regiments, were sent to a 
special school (Hamidiye Süvari Mektebi), which was created to serve just for the 
Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army. As Olson stated that a Kurd could rise to rank of 
colonel in the army; however, his assistant had to be regular Ottoman soldier.   95
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 Hamidiye Regiments had been created mainly to be used against a 
possible threat from Armenians and Russians; however, Sultan Abdülhamid II 
also wanted to establish more central power by controlling tribes. As tribes were 
already armed to protect their assets and lands, taking them into the army was the 
logical way to make connection with the central Ottoman Government. As the 
Ottoman Empire gave tribes official statues (large tribes made a single regiment 
by themselves), and individuals could hold the colonel rank in the army, it 
succeeded to keep them away from any idea of rebellion against the central 
authority.  
!
 Apart from controlling the tribes by creating an army from them, 
Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army was a way of creating a new social-political 
balance to make government more effective in Kurdish populated areas, and the 
implementation of religion, Islam, as common point between Kurds and other 
Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.   96
!
 One can call Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments as regional army, 
because of the recruitment of local people, but some regiments also fought under 
the Ottoman Empire flag in the Balkan Wars. The regiments, which had been in 
Balkan Wars, experienced warfare and exposed the nationalist ideas in Balkans. 
By this experience, they started to question their nationalist feelings about being 
Kurds, and tried to spread the idea among Kurdish society.   Briefly, the creation 97
of Hamidiye Regiments, the education that the Kurdish officers had in Istanbul, 
and the Balkan experience gave chance to question their ideas on nationalism. 
!
 The Young Turks movement in 1908, which composed by young 
individuals who had education at abroad, mostly in France, brought a new era to 
the Ottoman Empire politics. The movement started as opposition against the 
Sultan Abdulhamid II. The driven idea for Young Turks was to form a government 
and to put back in force the constitution of 1876, which was abolished by 
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Abdülhamid II in 1878.   With the efforts of Young Turks, Sultan Adbülhamid II 98
re-installed the constitution in 1908, which created a public sphere for political 
organizations.    99
!
 The Young Turks movement created the Committee of Union and Progress 
(İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) which served as political party and ruled the state 
until the World War I ended in 1918.   As the Young Turks movement opened the 100
way of creation of political organization by the Committee of Union and Progress, 
Kurds also created a similar organization in 1908;   Kurdish Society for Progress 101
and Mutual Aid (Kürt Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti).   This society was the first 102
Kurdish organization, which had members from famous Kurdish families. The 
political organizations started to be created in that time; however, the sheikhs 
were still effective among the society. Right after the Young Turks came into 
power and formed a government, sheikhs made a petition of following seven 
articles; !
         “(1) Adopt Kurdish administration in five Kurdish kazas (administrative 
districts). 
 (2) Adopt Kurdish as the language of instruction in the Kurdish  
areas.  
 (3) The appointment of Kurdish-speaking kaymakams and müdürs  
(both administrative officials) as well as other officials. 
 (4) Administration of law and justice should be according to the  
Sharia.  
 (5) The positions of kadı (religious judge) and mufti (canon law  
Lawyer responsible for delivering formal legal opinions) to be filled  
by adherents of the şafii school of law.  
 (6) Taxes to be levied in accordance with the Sharia.  
 (7) Taxes collected for the exemption from labor service to remain  
in effect, provided they were set aside for the repair and maintenance of roads in the 
five Kurdish towns.”   103
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 As the activities of Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid 
increased, Young Turks saw no advantage of having it open, and shut it down in 
1909. A second Kurdish political organization, Kurdish Hope Society (Hevi-i Kürt 
Cemiyeti) was founded in the beginning of 1912, but not lasted very long and 
closed in very short time.   104
!
 According to Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, in World War I, 
Kurdish tribes majorly remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire.   The World War I 105
was ended for Ottoman Empire by the Armistice of Mudros. It was signed on 30 
October 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies of World 
War I.   However, aftermath of the World War I brought interesting 106
developments both for the upcoming Turkish Republic, and for Kurds. Olson 
states that the Armistice of Mudros was the time that the dilemma of autonomy or 
independence for Kurds started.   Kirişçi and Winrow indicate that while some 107
tribes wanted to create their kingdoms, other supported the resistance movement 
in Anatolia. The Kurds were not completely conscious of their ethnic identity, and 
as a consequence they were defending the idea of preservation of their tribal 
power and autonomy for their tribes, not in Kurdish nationalism.   108
!
 After the Armistice of Mudros, the negotiations for further peace treaties 
started in January 1919, in Paris. During the series of conferences, various 
discussions took place between the Ottoman Empire representatives and 
representative of Allies. While the negotiations were continuing in Paris, Mustafa 
Kemal (Atatürk) started the resistance movement against Western powers to 
defend the homeland.   Mustafa Kemal was a General of the Ottoman Army, 109
who started the revolt against Western powers and became the founder of the 
Republic of Turkey. 
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 Şerif Paşa, who was the leader of the Ottoman Empire representative 
group in peace negotiations that started in January 1919 in Paris, made an 
agreement on 20 November 1919 with Boghos Nubar, head of Armenian 
delegation, about Armenians and Kurds.   According to this agreement, Şerif 110
Paşa accepted the formation of an Armenian State in some part of Kurdish 
populated areas, and had the guarantee for an independent Kurdish State.   As the 111
agreement would split the Kurdish populated areas in favor of Armenians, 
Kurdish tribal leaders sent telegrams to central power of the Ottoman Empire 
stating that they were not accepting Şerif Paşa’s agreement.   Moreover, some 112
tribal leaders sent another telegram to the French Commissioner in Istanbul 
expressing that Kurds and Turks were brothers in terms of race and 
religion.   Şerif Paşa’s actions brought Mustafa Kemal and Kurds closer to fight 113
for resistance against others. Some Kurds supported the resistance movement in 
Anatolia.   114
!
 On 10 August 1920 the Treaty of Sevres was signed between the Ottoman 
Empire and Allies of the World War I. The treaty was basically a sharing plan of 
Empire territories by the Allies. Total article number of treaty was 433; however, 
only two of them held importance for Kurds. The Koçgiri Rebellion, which broke 
out in 1920, took following articles of Treaty of Sevres as reasons; 
  
 Article 62: A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three 
members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively 
shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a 
scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the 
Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter 
determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as 
defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3). If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, 
it will be referred by the members of the Commission to their respective 
Governments. The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the 
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Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and 
with this object a Commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and 
Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and decide what 
rectifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier where, under the 
provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia. !
Article 64: If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the 
Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to 
the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of 
the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council 
then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends 
that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a 
recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. The detailed 
provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate agreement 
between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey.If and when such renunciation takes 
place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary 
adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of 
Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet.   115
  
 Right after the World War I ended on 11 November 1918, Kurds founded a 
new political organization with the name Society for the Progress of Kurdistan 
(Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti) based in Istanbul, which was active in Koçgiri 
rebellion, on 17 December 1918.   The Society opened branches in other cities 116
and started to promote Kurdish nationalism among the people.   According to 117
Olson, while Mustafa Kemal was forming his resistance movement in Anatolia, 
he became aware of the actions of Society for the Progress of Kurdistan and 
talked with one of the Kurdish organizers. The Kurds stated that they had the 
intention to create Kurdistan to Mustafa Kemal, by suggesting the Wilson’s 
Principles   (also known as President Wilson’s Fourteen Points). Mustafa 118
Kemal’s response was that the Wilson’s Principles were meaningless for the 
peoples of East, and Kurds should stand beside him in his fight against 
invaders.   119
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 When the Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920, the resistance 
government (Ankara Government) was already in power in Ankara. As the 
resistance movement started on 19 May 1919, Ankara Government took over the 
control of movement by 1920 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa 
Kemal organized two important congresses for the resistance movement; Erzurum 
Congress between 23 July-7 August 1919, and Sivas Congress between 4-11 
September 1919. According to Olson, Kurds were invited by Mustafa Kemal and 
Mustafa Kemal gave the guarantee that Kurds and Turks would have equal rights 
in the new structure of state, if the resistance brought success.    120
!
 Meantime, some Kurds were gathering up support with the help of 
aforementioned Society for the Progress of Kurdistan and its branches.   121
According to Kirişçi and Winrow, between 1919 and 1921, Ankara Government 
had to deal with 23 rebellions, which were all against the efforts and actions of 
Ankara Government.   However, only the Koçgiri Rebellion held importance. 122
!
 The Koçgiri Rebellion originally started in 1918 with the help of Society 
for the Progress of Kurdistan. As movements were organized in different areas of 
the region, it had three leaders; Nuri Dersimi (leader in Dersim area), Alişan Bey 
and Haydar Bey.   The rebellion started to spread fast and even attack Ankara 123
Government’s soldiers.   According to Olson, Ankara Government appointed 124
leaders Alişan Bey and Haydar Bey as governor and mayor to defuse the rising 
rebellion; however, they did not stop gathering more and more tribes on their 
side.   Even some of the Kurdish tribes started to say that they were eager to 125
have independence. As the number of Kurds who participated in the rebellion 
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rose, they straightened their political position and continued to attack on Ankara 
Government's forces in the region.   126
  
 In November 1920 (the exact day of November differs from one source to 
another) tribal leaders had a meeting and made a list of their demands from 
Ankara Government. An immediate response was demanded for the followings; 
!
 “1) The Ankara Government should state whether or not it accepted officially the 
promise of Kurdish autonomy as agreed. 
 2) The Ankara Government should inform the leaders of the Dersim who wrote the 
declaration of their attitude toward the administration of an autonomous Kurdistan.  
 3) All of the Kurdish prisoners in jail at Elazig, Malatya, Sivas, and Erzincan 
should be freed.  
 4) Turkish officials must be withdrawn from all areas with a Kurdish majority.  
 5) The Turkish military forces sent to the Koçgiri region should be withdrawn.”   127!
 As a response to these demands, Ankara Government sent its 
representatives to Dersim from Elazig; however while they were on their way, 
Kurdish tribes sent a telegram to Ankara stating “If an independent Kurdistan will 
not be established in the vilayet of Diyarbakir, Elazig, Van, and Bitlis as stipulated 
in the Treaty of Sevres, the tribal chiefs of western Dersim will take armed 
action”.   The imminent response of Ankara Government was that to consider the 128
demands. As the month passed to December, heavy winter conditions came to the 
region, and tribal leaders considered to hold off the armed actions until the spring 
of 1921. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal issued an arrest order for Nuri Dersimi with 
the charge of creating an armed groups of 1200 men against Ankara Government. 
Eventually, on 20 December of 1920, Dersimi was arrested.    129
!
 The arrest of Dersimi did not stop the rebellion. Ankara Government's 
forces and Kurds started to attack each other in January 1921. More Ankara 
Government's forces were deployed to areas, where the rebellion broke out, and 
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Government demanded an immediate and unconditional surrender of the Kurds; 
however, they did not receive any response as they hoped and expected.   By the 130
March of 1921, clashes between Ankara Government’s forces and Kurds rose. 
Kurdish tribes killed one of the commanders of Ankara Government's forces, took 
most of their guns, ammunitions, and horses.   With the thought that they were 131
victorious, rebels sent a telegram to Ankara with demand of a creation of quasi-
autonomous vilayet (province, large town) staffed by Kurds, and received a 
negative response.   Ankara Government, first declared martial law in Elazig, 132
Erzincan and Sivas, then sent more troops to the region. Eventually, by the April 
1921, the rebellion was mostly suppressed.   The rest of the rebels either 133
surrendered or were captured and the rebellion finished in June 1921.    134
!
 As already mentioned, by 1920, Ankara Government was functioning and 
active in the region of Turkey on controlling the resistance movement. The period 
between 19 May 1919 (starting day of the resistance) and 24 July 1923 (the day 
that Treaty of Lausanne was signed) called as ‘Turkish Independence War’. 
During this time, Musfata Kemal and his companions started to form a new state 
model, rights for people etc. With this intention, Ankara Government announced 
the first constitution, 1921 Constitution (Teşkilat-I Esasiye), of the new era of 
Turkey. The 1921 Constitution was quite short, containing 23 articles;   however, 135
it was the base of future constitutions in Turkey. The said constitution was 
accepted in January 1921, by the Grand National Assembly.    136
!
3.1.2. Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey 
  
 The 1921 Constitution attempted to define certain points of the new state 
structure such as the definition of nation, name of the assembly and so on. The 
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first article   of the constitution made a reference to a nation for the first time. It 137
is important to point out that the usage of nation was significant, because all 
people under the Ottoman rule were the subjects of Sultan. Hence, calling them as 
nation was the premier evidence of the goal of the new movement. 
Article three   called the assembly as ‘Grand National Assembly’ and the State as 138
‘State of Turkey’. This was an unofficial rejection of the Ottoman Sultanate and 
adaptation of the first label for a new state: the State of Turkey. According to 
Kirişçi and Winrow, the usage of these two terms, Turkey and the nation, paved 
the way for the usage of ‘Nation of Turkey‘ by Mustafa Kemal to describe all 
population who were living in the region of Turkey as a nation.   The new partial 139
description of the state and the nation used for a while without further 
explanation. One can say that the population under the new state’s jurisdiction 
called as sole nation without giving any reference neither the race nor the 
religion. The importance of the use of this new nation description, might be 
interpreted as a reference to solidarity among Kurds and Turks.   140
   
 The process of the foundation of republic continued with the abolishment 
decision of the Ottoman Sultanate. On 2 November 1922, the Sultanate of the 
Ottoman Empire was officially abolished with a decision of the Grand National 
Assembly.   In his speech, Mustafa Kemal used the terms ‘Turkish Nation’ (Türk 141
Milleti) and ‘Turkish Government (Türk Hükümeti)’.    142
!
 The importance of this shift from the Nation of Turkey to Turkish Nation 
was quite significant on the way to identify the new nation. One can say that, 
while the use of ‘Nation of Turkey’ was addressing the people without any ethnic 
background references, the use of ‘Turkish Nation’ was understood as a reference 
to the Turkish race, which was interpreted as a denial of other ethnic backgrounds 
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except Turks. In fact, as the land that the new state was rising called Turkey, usage 
of ‘Nation of Turkey’ made sense with respect to refer all nations in Turkey, not 
just Turks. On this shift, Kirişçi and Winrow indicate that the usage of these new 
terms was the beginning of ‘Turkishness’, which is the identity concerning the 
Turkish ethnicity. They also state that all these terms, ‘Nation of Turkey’, 
‘Turkish Nation’, and even the ‘People of Turkey’ were used all together without 
any knowledge on which term means exactly what.   143
  
 When the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished, Ankara Government started 
to act as sole government, and unique authority in Turkey. As already mentioned, 
the Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920; however, has never been put 
in force as Ankara Government declared that the Ottoman Empire’s Government 
was insufficient.  
!
 After the Treaty of Sevres, Kurds expected to gain certain autonomy as the 
aforementioned Article 62 referred to a need for ‘local autonomy for the 
predominantly Kurdish Areas’, while the Article 64 pointed out the possibility that 
the Kurds might be granted with independence. Since the Treaty of Sevres has 
never been put in force, the provisioned Kurdish rights stayed disused. 
Nevertheless, the expectation about independence or autonomy continued under 
the new state.  
  
 The resistance movement in Anatolia against Western powers became 
successful in 1923, and as there were no binding treaties for Ankara Government, 
it was able to sign peace treaties. The Treaty of Lausanne, which was the 
founding treaty of the State of Turkey, was signed on 24 July 1923.   With this 144
treaty, the foundation of the State of Turkey was completed, and it was officially 
recognized in international area. 
!
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 As stated before, some Kurdish tribes revolted during the Turkish 
Independence War (1919-1923); however, Ankara Government continued the 
resistance and won the war against Western powers and signed the Treaty of 
Lausanne. Kurds expected to be mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne; however, 
there was not an article concerning them.    145
!
 While the Treaty of Lausanne stated official basis of the new state, it only 
mentioned non-Muslims in Turkey. With respect to the Treaty, non-Muslims were 
accepted as minorities of Turkey, and Part I, Section III  (Articles from 37 to 
45)   of the Treaty of Lausanne explained minority rights and their protection. As 146
the dedicated section of the Treaty of Lausanne did not mention Kurds, all the 
expectation of Kurdish tribes about a possible autonomy, as provisioned in the 
Treaty of Sevres, fell into the void. Some tribes and sheikhs were furious about 
the situation and the reforms of new state. 
!
 Mustafa Kemal and his companions declared the form of the state as 
Republic on 29 October 1923. This declaration made the official name of the state 
as Republic of Turkey as it is today. 
!
 The abolishment of the Ottoman Sultanate made Ankara Government the 
only authority in administration of state affairs, and the Treaty of Lausanne 
brought the international recognition of the State; however, the Caliphate was still 
in force. The Caliph was the leader of all Muslims in the World, and Ottoman 
Sultans were called as Caliph from the beginning of the 16th century. The duality 
in the new state order, Ankara Government and the Caliph (although the sultan 
title was already abolished), was considered as an obstacle for planned 
reforms.   For further reforms, which were in mind of Mustafa Kemal, the 147
Caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924, and in April in the same year National 
Law Court Organization Regulation abolished the Sharia courts.   Both 148
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abolishment of office of Caliph and sharia courts made transformation possible to 
a laic state structure. 
!
 After the official foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal 
and his companions started to apply series of reforms to transform the new state. 
First, the National Assembly of Turkey adopted a new constitution. For the first 
time, the 1924 Constitution tried explain what Turkish (Turk) is. Article 88 of the 
said constitution said; 
  
 “The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, to be called Turk in 
terms of citizenship. Every child born in Turkey or in a foreign land from a Turkish 
father; any person whose father is a foreigner established in Turkey, who resides in 
Turkey, and who chooses upon attaining the age of consent to become Turkish 
subject; and any individual who acquires Turkish Nationality by the law, is a Turk. 
Turkish citizenship may be forfeited or lost in certain circumstances specified by 
law.   149
  
 Regarding this definition of Turk, one can say that the term was used in 
order to name the citizenship, not the ethnicity. When one accept the term Turk as 
a name of common citizenship, this also means that Kurds called as Turks, which 
indicates a single nation, the Turks or Turkish Nation. However, as Turk is one of 
many ethnicities in Turkey, using it to define every person regardless of his/her 
ethnicity can cause the sentiment of denial among others except ethnic Turks. 
!
 The new state structure and the abolishment of Caliphate were reasons for 
rebellion under the rule of the Republic of Turkey. According to Andrew 
McGregor, the Office of Caliph was the source of the religious bond between 
Kurds and Turks, and its elimination was not welcomed by Kurds.   Because of 150
the abolishment of Caliphate, some Kurdish tribal leaders and sheikhs accused the 
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Republic of Turkey of not having a religion.   This accusation was made; 151
although, the second article of the 1924 Constitution made a clear statement about 
religion of state;  
!
 “Article 2: The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the official language is 
Turkish; the seat of government is Ankara.” !
 The Treaty of Lausanne did not mention Kurds, either an independent 
state for them. According to Olson, conditions of the Treaty of Lausanne forced 
Kurds to revolt and claim rights with armed struggle.   The major rebellion in the 152
new republic was Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925. However, scholars suggest that 
the root of this rebellion may go back to 1923, the Kurdish political organization 
called Azadi.   153
!
 The organization was established first with the name Ciwata Azadi Kurd 
(Society for Kurdish Freedom), then was named as Ciwata Kweseriya Kurd 
(Society for Kurdish Independence) but it was always called as Azadi as 
abbreviation.   Azadi, the nationalist Kurdish political organization was 154
established in May 1923.    155
  
 British Intelligence Service reported the activities of Azadi and the 
preparations for the rebellion with following eleven points; 
!
“1)A new law regarding minorities already applied to Christians; it is Turkish 
Government intention to transplant all the Kurdish population of the Eastern 
Vilayets to Western. 
2) The abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Government, which has 
broken one of the few remaining bonds between the Turks and Kurds.   
3) Limitation of language to Turkish in the law courts and schools and 
prohibition of Kurdish being taught in the latter. These measures are stated 
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to have rendered education among Kurds practically nonexistent, a state of 
affairs which is favored by the Turks. The latter have also closed down 
religious institutions which were the only remaining source of education for 
the Kurdish race. 
4) The word "Kurdistan"was omitted from all educational books and Turkish 
geographical names are gradually being substituted for Kurdish throughout 
the country.  
5) The senior government officials in Turkish Kurdistan, are practically 
without exception Turks and Kaymakams (administrative officer) about 
half Turk and half Kurd. Although the majority of the minor officials are 
Kurdish, the Turks are extremely careful as to whom they employ and 
exclude all suspected Kurdish nationalists. 
6) General absence of benefit from Government from any of the taxes paid, 
though these are not infrequently demanded more than once a year. No 
justice in the courts could be attained except through bribery.  
7) Government interference in election of deputies to the Turkish National 
Assembly from the Kurdish Vilayets (large towns), resulting in almost all 
deputies being "elected" by Turkish Government orders and not in 
accordance with the free vote of the people. 
8) Turkish policy of setting one Kurdish tribe continually against another to 
prevent racial unity and consequent power of resistance to Government 
exactions. 
9) Military raids on Kurdish Villages, commandeering of animals, and 
corruption connected with receipts and payments for supplies requisitioned. 
10) Abuse and ill-treatment of Kurdish rank and file in the army and the habit 
of selecting them for rough and unpleasant duties.  
11)  Attempts by Turkish Government to exploit Kurdish mineral wealth with 
the aid of German capital.”   156!
 According to Olson, Azadi had three objectives; to free Kurds from 
Turkish oppression, to lead the way to the creation of independent state and as the 
Kurds did not stand alone in this struggle, and to obtain British assistance.   The 157
rebellion was named after Sheikh Said, who was a respected religious leader 
among Kurds; however, Mesut Yeğen indicates that even the Sheikh Said was the 
leader of rebellion, all preparation and plans were made by Azadi 
organization.   Sheikh Said travelled on the region to promote his idea, to select 158
local leaders and to gather more support for rebellion by denouncing Ankara 
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Government and its policies, and also by saying that he came to restore the 
religion.   159
!
 In Azadi congress in 1924, Sheikh Said was present and Azadi decided 
over a detailed plan for rebellion, which later took place in 1925.   As the leader 160
and face of the rebellion, Sheikh Said made his propaganda around Islam to 
gather more support. Consequently, followers of Sheikh Said walked at the center 
of towns carrying green flags (the flag of Sheikh Said, which represents Kurdish 
nationalism as well as the symbol of Islam)   and Qurans (the Holy Book for 161
Muslims).    162
  
 In February 1925, the clashes between Kurds and Ankara Government's 
forces started in Piran (today known as Dicle in Diyarbakır city). In Piran, 
Turkish forces tried to arrest five fugitives, who came to seek Sheikh Said 
support. Sheikh Said’s brother ordered to attack to Turkish forces, this incident 
made Sheikh Said to announce the rebellion earlier than planned.   Then Sheikh 163
Said arrived Piran with nearly one hundred supporters.   After the incident, first 164
clashes happened in Piran, and similar actions were quickly spread to other towns. 
While clashes were continuing between Sheikh Said’s followers and Turkish 
forces, Sheikh Said continued to call other tribes to join rebellion in order to 
support Kurdish nationalism by putting his goal as restoration the Caliphate.    165
  
 The clashes continued until middle of April. As more Turkish forces 
deployed to the region, the circle narrowed for Sheikh Said and he tried to escape 
to Iran.   On 14 or 15 April Sheikh Said surrendered to Turkish forces.   On 16 166 167
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April, most of the Sheikh Said’s followers, who were close to sheikh, were 
captured.   They were all sent to the Independence tribunal (Istiklal Mahkemesi, 168
War Tribunal) for trials, then were executed on 29 June 1925.   169
!
 According to Olson, Ankara Government pacified the areas, where the 
rebellion broke out, by disarming Kurds, burning houses and entire villages, and 
drove some tribes to Anatolia. Some Kurdish tribal leaders tried to revolt these 
pacification actions of the Government.   170
!
 After the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the Government continued on applying 
reforms in order to modernize the new ‘nation’. With calling the population as 
‘Turkish Nation’ and defining the citizenship as being Turk, government policies 
were centralized around the Turkish language.  
!
 Kirişçi and Winrow gave the Settlement Law of 1934 as an example to 
government policies centralized around the usage of Turkish language. The law 
took Turkish language as base and divided population into three groups; those 
who spoke Turkish and were of Turkish ethnicity; those who did not speak 
Turkish, but were considered to be part of Turkish culture; and those who neither 
spoke Turkish nor belonged to the Turkish culture.   One can see that, Turkish 171
language accepted as a fundamental base of the new nation. With the Settlement 
Law, non-Turkish speakers were re-located to other regions of Turkey with 
intention of ‘integration’. The importance of the Settlement Law for Kurds was 
also the re-localization. Under the Settlement Law, Kurdish tribes were re-located 
in western part of the country. 
   
 The idea of creating a nation state required a common base among society, 
and the government officials tried to place the Turkish Language as a common 
point among population; however, scholars considered the aforementioned law as 
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a tool for assimilation of Kurds in Turkish society.   One can say that the main 172
idea behind the law was integration, nevertheless; it is clear that forcing people to 
change their homeland and to immigrate to other regions without their desire can 
also be considered as assimilation. 
!
 While new regulations were being applied during the 1925-1938, the 
revolts of Kurds also continued. Small-scale rebellions against government 
policies took places in Kurdish populated areas. For the purpose of this thesis 
only large and significant uprisings have been described. With this intention, 
another significant revolt, which took place during Mustafa Kemal’s lifetime, will 
be explained in upcoming lines. 
!
 Dersim (Tunceli) rebellion took place in Turkey in 1937-1938. Martin van 
Bruniessen states that Dersim has always had its complex relation with 
governments. He cited that tribal Kurdish families of Dersim never totally 
accepted the law of governments, for them; only law was traditional tribal law, 
they always refused to pay taxes to central government.   173
!
 After the suppression of Koçgiri Rebellion in 1921, military implied more 
security measures on the region where they thought that there was always a 
potential of a probable uprising.   Against this fear of a potential uprising, the 174
Grand National Assembly of Turkey put in force a special law for Dersim in 
December 1935. With respect to the law, city of Dersim went under military 
governor’s control, which had power to arrest individuals indefinitely and to 
deport families and persons.   In 1936, under the military government, 175
construction of roads, bridges, and police posts were completed.   While the 176
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government brought a series of construction to the city, Seyyid Rıza, a religious 
leader in town, started to make calls for an uprising against government by saying 
that all these infrastructure constructions would take away sheikh’s and large land 
owners authorities on the region, and these constructions would eventually 
destroy the tribal tradition.   The rebellion started on 21 March 1937 by the burn 177
of a bridge.   The first troops entered to the region, but rebels did not give their 178
leader; consequently, more troops arrived.   City of Dersim was surrounded by 179
outside to cut the help, which might come from other cities, and on 10 September 
1937, Seyyid Rıza, who did not receive any help, surrendered.   180
!
 The surrender of Seyyid Rıza did not finish the rebellion, the operations 
against rebels continued through 1938.   According to Bruinessen, during the 181
Rebellion, almost 10% of entire population of Dersim was killed. He also states 
that Kurds often claim that total loss of Kurdish people was even higher than 
10%.   182
!
 The Dersim Rebellion came into the political discourse of Turkey during 
the year of 2011. As it occurred during the time of single party governance of 
founder Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), Prime 
Minister (PM) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that CHP was responsible of the 
deaths during the Rebellion, he said that today’s chairman of CHP, Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu, should apologize for the deaths of Dersim. He also added, “If the 
State should apologize for certain incidents like Dersim, if there is a tradition like 
this, I, the Prime Minister of State of Turkey, apologize.”       183
!
 55
!  Dündar, op. cit., p. 156.177
!  Ibid.178
!  Bruinessen, op. cit.179
!  Dündar, op. cit., p. 157.180
!  Ibid., pp. 157-158.181
!  Bruinessen, op. cit. 182
!  “Erdoğan Dersim için Özür Diledi”, Milliyet, 23 November 2011,  183
<http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-dersim-icin-ozur-diledi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/
23.11.2011/1466430/default.htm>, site visited on 23 November 2011.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
 As in the example of Dersim Rebellion, the history itself is a common tool 
on political discourses. For the Kurdish issue, the history always comes on the 
political scene of Turkey.  
!
 The first Kurdish rebellion, Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion, hold the 
importance for Kurdish history as it happened during the Ottoman era and led the 
way to the creation of a new army from Kurdish population. Sheikh Ubeydullah 
was the first person, who tried to act with pre-nationalist Kurdish ideas. At that 
time Kurds did not clearly aware of their ethnic identity; however, they had the 
common life style, tribal interest, even language among them. He defined the 
Kurdish population as ‘distinct people’. Because of all these reasons, as already 
explained, scholars accept the Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion as the first attempt to 
create an independent Kurdish State.  
!
 Koçgiri, Sheikh Said, and Dersim rebellions were also important on the 
history of Kurdish nationalism. These three rebellions took place during the 
lifetime of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. One can see certain common points between 
these three rebellions; the importance of religion and the role of religious leaders, 
the importance of tribal tradition among Kurds, and idea of nationalism. Another 
common point was that all rebellions stayed local, and none of them created 
solidarity among the entire Kurdish population. Maybe some tribes acted 
together; however, they also had oppositions against their actions from Kurds.  All 
rebellions happened against the policies and reforms of newborn republic.  
!
 As the Kurds were tribal society, their weakness to gather together for sole 
goal played significant part on why rebellions did not reach success. According to 
Olson; because of this weakness, tribal and religious leaders played an important 
role to mobilize people, not the goal or greater nationalism idea.   While these 184
rebellions were accepted as early stages of Kurdish nationalism by scholars, the 
common state policy was to reject their nationalist roots. According to Mesut 
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Yeğen, the State has never accepted the Kurdish element on these rebellions, and 
depending on the time of rebellion, chose to label them as; tribal problems, 
banditry, reactionary actions, games of foreign states.    185
!
 One can clearly see that after each rebellion, central power applied new 
measures, for instance; special laws, deploying special forces, creating an army, 
and so on. Nevertheless, uprisings among Kurdish population continued. Every 
rebellion brought more problems and more death.   
!
 Almost a decade after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death on 10 November 
1938, in 1946 the State of Turkey adopted multi-party political system, which 
gave chance to population to enter politics and found political parties. 
!
 In it's early stages the Republic of Turkey was ruled by the founding 
group. During the single party period (1923-1946), there was no opposition party, 
and the Republican People’s Party was the main and the only political party. After 
the WWII, the United States of America and other Western states criticized 
Turkey about having a single party system.   In 1946, first multi-party general 186
election took place, and the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) entered to the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey as opposition party. Since CHP won the 
elections of 1946, single party rule period lasted for another four years but this 
time within democracy.  
!
 The founders of the new Democrat Party were also former members of 
CHP. Four years after the first multi-party election of 1946, Democrat Party won 
the general elections of 1950 and took the power from CHP for the first time. 
According to Kirişçi and Winrow, for that period, it is possible to say that Kurds 
began to gain consciousness on their ethnic identity.   187
!
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 Until the foundation of DP, it is possible to say that tribes were 
collaborating with the Republican People’s Party. First multi party election did 
not make any changes on this cooperation, and the alliance between tribal leaders 
and CHP continued until the elections of 1950.   Being party in power, gave DP 188
more popularity, as a consequence Kurdish local leaders started to become 
member of DP. Existence of more than one political party provided more political 
sphere for Kurdish tribes.    189
!
 Between 1950-1960, government policies changed, and there were 
economic problems and political instability in Turkey.   The rule of Democrat 190
Party lasted until 1960, when military took over the power by a Coup D’Etat. 
Military tried to re-form the State with a new constitution and even introduced a 
law to give Turkish names to Kurdish villages.    191
!
 The constitution of 1961 was more liberal than the previous ones, which 
gave more civil rights to people, autonomy to the universities, chance to students 
to organize their own organizations and associations.   Within the liberal 192
atmosphere of 1961 Constitution, more political parties were founded, students’ 
organizations were created. The students’ organizations were majorly created 
around Marxist-Leninist ideas. Meantime in Kurdish areas, voting for 
independent candidates started to increase.   193
!
 One of the political parties which was effective on the creation of Kurdish 
awareness of ethnic identity was The Turkish Worker’s Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 
TIP). TIP was founded in 1961, within the liberal political atmosphere of 1961 
Constitution. Their target group was, majorly, villagers. In 1967, TIP started a 
series of conferences in eastern part of the country under the name of ‘meetings of 
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East (Doğu Mitingleri)’.   The main goal of these meetings was to draw attention 194
to the problems of eastern part of Turkey and to gain supporters for the 
party.   According to Kirişçi and Winrow, these meetings reached the goal and 195
draw public attention to the problems in the region; although, the government 
called organizers and participants as traitors, and accused them of seeking a way 
to divide the country.   However, the participants declined that and said that 196
during these meetings only the problems of the region were talked.  
!
 The student members of the Turkish Worker’s Party started to see the 
party as incapable of forcing the Government to recognize Kurdish existence and 
to accept Kurdish language. Hence, they founded another organization in 1969, 
under the name of Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (Devrimci Doğu 
Kültür Ocakları).   The organization adopted the ideas of Marxist-Leninist 197
approach. As Mustafa Akyol indicated, Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of PKK 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), was working in the organization and as the 
organization adopted ‘revolutionary’ ideas instead of religion for the first time, 
that became the difference of the new organization model of Kurdish nationalism 
from previous rebellions.   The Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East was 198
closed with its branches on 12 March 1971.     199
!
 Turkish Workers’ Party was the first party that accepted the Kurdish 
reality in the history of Turkey. During its fourth congress in 1970, TIP accepted 
the Kurdish issue as a problem to be solved, and as a solution, they proposed that 
Kurds needed to be recognized as a separate nation, and the State’s regime needed 
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to be changed to federation.   The Constitutional Court closed the Turkish 200
Workers’ Party on 20 July 1971.    201
!
 According to Kirişçi and Winrow, the Marxist-Leninist ideas and 
movements against fascism and imperialism were the common points between 
Turkish and Kurdish revolutionaries.    202
!
 As stated earlier, the Constitution of 1961 gave the freedom of creating 
organizations. Another association in Marxist-Leninist line was Ankara Higher 
Education Society and Abdullah Öcalan was a member of it, where he met others, 
who later would become the founding group of PKK.   203
!
3.1.3. The Creation of PKK and Terrorist Attacks !
 Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, was founded around one man, Abdullah 
Öcalan in 1978. As Abdullah Öcalan was, and still is, the heart of the 
organization, brief information about him will be helpful to understand the PKK 
organization. 
!
 Abdullah Öcalan was born in a small village in Şanlıurfa, southeastern of 
Turkey, in 1949.   The village was the hometown of Kurds, Turks and 204
Armenians. Abdullah Öcalan grew up in this environment of diverse people, and 
according to Aliza Marcus, he stated that his grandmother was Turk, even his 
mother was, possibly, a Turk; however, Abdullah Öcalan learnt Turkish in 
elementary school.   After the elementary school, Abdullah Öcalan wanted to go 205
the military school but he was not old enough;   consequently, he went to 206
vocational high school in Ankara, which trains students to work for the state 
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affairs in land registry offices.   During his vocational high school education, 207
Öcalan had chance to observe the state, attend meetings and conferences in 
Ankara, read books about Marxism.   One can say that Ankara years were the 208
time that Öcalan started to form an idea of ‘revolution’ around Marxist ideology.  
  
 Abdullah Öcalan graduated from high school in 1968, and was appointed 
as public officer to Diyarbakır, where he attended the aforementioned ‘Meetings 
of East’ and shaped his idea.   In 1970, Abdullah Öcalan was appointed to 209
Istanbul as public officer, where he took university exams and enter Istanbul 
University and became the member of Revolutionary Cultural Society of the 
East.   Then, Abdullah Öcalan was transferred to Ankara and continued 210
university education at Ankara University. During his time in Ankara, Öcalan 
became an active member of Ankara Higher Education Society in 1974, and even 
participated demonstrations.    211
!
 During 1975, Öcalan started to organize meetings with his friends to 
discuss ideas about ‘revolution’ that he was planning.   In one of these meetings 212
(Dikmen meeting) he and his friends decided to give up university education and 
focus on planning the organization. Their main goal was to create a Marxist-
Leninist organization, which could fight for independence of Kurds.   Their 213
preparation lasted for three years; meanwhile, Abdullah Öcalan wrote the ‘The 
Path of Kurdish Revolution’ manifesto by himself, which later become the 
program of the PKK.    214
!
 The first result of three years preparation was the creation of a magazine, 
Serxwebun, in October 1978, in order to promote the ideas of the 
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organization.   Then regular meetings continued, and the PKK was founded in 215
the meeting on 27 November 1978, in Diyarbakır; and that meeting was accepted 
as the first congress of the organization.   Abdullah Öcalan and his friends 216
decided not to make a public announcement after PKK’s foundation. PKK made 
the public announcement in 1979, with attempted assassination of Kurdish tribal 
leader, Bucak tribe, who was also Member of Parliament (MP). PKK left signed 
leaflet, which contains the following sentences; 
!
“Forward to an independent, united, democratic Kurdistan!  
Down with imperialism and colonialism!  
Long live independence and proletariat internationalism!  
Long live the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)!!”   217!
 The PKK’s first activities were recruiting sympathizers and small-scale 
armed attacks; however, with the ‘public announcement’ of PKK, it increased its 
attack against other Kurdish groups and also the Turkish Armed Forces. Between 
its foundation and military intervention of 1980, PKK killed 354 and wounded 
366.   218
!
 On 12 September 1980, Turkish history witnessed once again a military 
intervention. Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country trough the National 
Security Council for three years. A new constitution was written in 1982, and the 
country returned to the democracy in 1983. 
!
 Öcalan and some of his friends left Turkey before the military 
intervention. This action brought about rumors that Abdullah Öcalan knew that 
the military intervention would take place; and consequently, he ordered most of 
PKK militants to stop actions inside Turkey and to leave the country.   The 219
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leadership of PKK chose Bekaa Valley in Syria/Lebanon border as a base for the 
trainings and management. 
!
 After the military intervention, the National Security Council took over 
the governance of Turkey and, literally, closed all political parties and 
organizations, applied martial laws in the eastern part of Turkey. Many Kurds 
were arrested with the accusation of being traitors and helping to terrorists. In the 
meantime, the usage of Kurdish language was banned by the Military.    220
!
 Prison in Diyarbakır became the main gathering place for arrested Kurds. 
According to Hasan Cemal, many Kurds were tortured and humiliated; and 
soldiers treated them as they already stood trail and convicted.   Prison of 221
Diyarbakir was the place that Kurdish population was treated in worst conditions 
and they started to hate the State of Turkey.  
!
 The military measures forced PKK to take its leadership to 
abroad;   however, its terrorist actions never completely stopped. While Turkey 222
was under the military rule, PKK’s priority changed and they focused on 
militants’ training. The training period in Bekaa Valley started with the help of 
Democratic Front For the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).   Bekaa Valley was 223
also the training area for DFLP, and as a result of the cooperation between 
Democratic Front of Liberation Palestine and PKK, PKK militants learnt guerrilla 
warfare. The Palestinian militants educated PKK about ‘militia tactics’ to collect 
information about troop movements, arranging food and finding shelter in 
mountains, ceremonies for death militants.   224
!
 The leadership of PKK used time in Syria to complete the organizational 
structure. As PKK stands for Kurdistan Workers’ Party, during time in Syria, party 
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structure, recruitment ways, responsibilities of party organs, and unquestionable 
leadership of Abdullah Öcalan were established.   PKK specified its main goal to 225
create an independent Kurdish State by attacking military targets, security forces, 
if necessary civilians, tourism facilities, in order to stop state from giving public 
services.  
!
 PKK had its second congress in Damascus, Syria in 20-25 August 1982, 
and in that congress, the leadership decided that it was time to start attacks inside 
Turkey again and they chose Northern Iraq as a way to pass Turkish 
border.   According to Marcus, between 1980 and 1982, around 300 PKK 226
militants were trained   and got ready to start armed attacks. The Government of 227
Syria provided support to PKK and demanded more attacks inside 
Turkey.   There were problems between Syria and Turkey about certain subjects; 228
Turkey was building dams over the rivers Tigris and Euphrates for domestic and 
electrical purposes; however, these two rivers also provides water to Syria. 
Turkey’s dams construction made them fear about the possibility of total control 
of Turkey over said rivers. Syria also believed that Turkey gave shelter the 
Muslim Brothers who attacked against Syrian Government.   PKK used the 229
high-tension situation between Turkey and Syria in its favor and gained Syria’s 
support on its attacks through Turkey. 
!
 While PKK was taking its time to train militants and complete the 
organizational structure, Turkey was under the military governance. Inside 
Turkey, many military officials considered PKK as a small-scale ‘banditry’ 
organization, and did not take seriously.    230
!
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 Under the military governance, the existence of Kurds has become a 
question one more time, and General Kenan Evren, the head of National Security 
Council, said the following about the existence of Kurds; 
!
 “There are no Kurds in Turkey, these people who describe themselves as Kurds are 
just Turks living in mountain, and make cracking sounds, Kart Kurt, when they walk 
over snow”.    231!
 With this, Kenan Evran tried to explain the name Kurd was coming from 
the cracking sound of snow. This meaningless definition of Kenan Evren, was 
considered as official denial of Kurds in Turkey. 
!
 A new constitution was written under the military governance and 
accepted by referendum in 1982. Likewise previous constitutions, the 
Constitution of 1982 did not mention the Kurds or their existence and explained 
who is Turk with following description in Article 66; 
!
“(1) Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. 
(2) The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. 
(3) Citizenship can be acquired under the conditions stipulated by law, and shall be 
forfeited only in cases determined by law. 
(4) No Turk shall be deprived of citizenship, unless he commits an act incompatible 
with loyalty to the motherland. 
(5) Recourse to the courts in appeal against the decisions and proceedings related to 
the deprivation of citizenship, shall not be denied.”   232
  
 With the new constitution, the main idea was to put the Turkishness back 
on track. As the Kurds and Turks had religion in common, this taken as base of 
the Turkishness. The ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ idea claimed that, all population 
living in Turkey as Turks and Muslims. Officials promoted this idea on that time, 
especially on eastern part of Turkey, where there were terror activities of 
 65
!  “Tansu Çiller: Ya Bitecek, Ya Bitecek”, Sabah, 11 August 2009, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/231
Siyaset/2009/08/11/tansu_ciller_ya_bitecek_ya_bitecek>, site visited on 4 April 2012.
!  “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası”, Grand National Assembly of Turkey, <http://232
www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf>, site visited on 6 April 2011.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
PKK.   New idea claimed that Kurds did not exist at that time. Additionally, it 233
was claimed that Kurdish language did not exist, as well.   That year’s articles 234
and books were commonly claiming that the efforts to separate Kurdish identity 
from Turkish one were all games of Western intelligence agencies and separatist 
groups, which wanted to divide up Turkey.    235
  
 With the acceptance of 1982 Constitution, General Kenan Evren became 
the President of the Republic. In 1983, Turkey returned to democracy with 
elections, as the military intervention closed all political parties in 1980, new 
founded parties participated to the elections of 1983. Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi, ANAP) won the elections   and Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister, 236
who later would become the President of the Republic. 
!
 The PKK returned to armed attacks in 1984 with raids against military 
stations in Şemdinli and Eruh.   Security forces of the Republic of Turkey started 237
operations against PKK; however, militants quickly left the country via Turkey-
Iraq border. With Şemdinli and Eruh attacks, PKK announced its army wing 
under the name Hezen Rızgarıya Kurdistan (HRK, Kurdistan Freedom 
Brigades).   238
!
 In 1985, Öcalan gained support of Greece, and PKK opened a branch in 
Athens under the name of Eniya Rızgariya Netewa Kurdistan (ERNK, National 
Liberation Front of Kurdistan).   This branch of PKK organized and controlled 239
the organizations’ activities in Europe.  
!
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 In the same year, the Government introduced the village-guard system. 
With village-guard system, government recruited local people and provided 
weapons. The idea behind this system was to make villages enable to defend 
themselves against PKK attacks.   One can see the similarity with village-guard 240
system and creation of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army in the Ottoman Empire. 
With both, central power tried to control the local people and empower their 
loyalty to the central government. The creation of village-guard system is 
evidence that history repeats itself from time to time. 
!
 In 1986, PKK continued its attacks inside Turkey; meanwhile, it did 
necessary preparations for its third congress. As the PKK used Northern Iraq as a 
safe-heaven to penetrate and attack Turkey, Turkish Military Forces did an air 
assault in Northern Iraq and killed 165 PKK militants, and this assault became a 
problem between PKK and Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP).   The third congress took place in Lebanon, Helve Camp, between 241
26-30 October 1986, the camp later was used as PKK’s base of training and 
control until 1992.   During this congress, PKK decided a so-called ‘tax law’ in 242
order to provide more financial assets to the organization.   With the ‘tax law’, 243
PKK forced Kurdish business owners and workers to pay ‘taxes’. 
  
 During the Iran-Iraq war, the dictator Saddam Hussein used chemical 
bombs in Kurdish town in Iraq, Halebja, on 16 March 1988; consequently, 
massive number of Iraqi Kurds started to migrate through Iran and Turkey as 
refugees.   PKK used this situation in its favor and settled in vacant areas in Iraq 244
and propagated its ideas about why Kurds needed to be independent.    
!
 While PKK continued its attacks against the State of Turkey and 
established connections in Europe, it also started to publish magazines to promote 
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its ideas. On 15 June 1988, PKK started to publish “Social Resurrection” 
(Toplumsal Diriliş), in which Öcalan wrote under the alias of Ali Fırat.   Later 245
that year, this magazine was closed; however, PKK continued to publish other 
magazines and newspapers. The organization saw the media as a functional tool 
to promote ideas and to gain more supporters and sympathizers. Also in 1988, 
PKK gained the support of France, as the wife of French President at that time, 
Danielle Mitterand showed interest in PKK’s situation and PKK organized a 
conference in Paris.   246
!
 In June 1989, President Turgut Özal openly declared that he had a Kurdish 
blood by giving reference to his mother’s origin.   With Özal's declaration, 247
Kurdish existence came into the political discourse after the military intervention 
of 1980. 
!
 During 1990, PKK continued its attacks inside Turkey with the intention 
to create ‘liberated zones’. With the help of liberated zones, PKK had the idea to 
gain control of some cities and to remain there. The idea behind its actions to 
assure the Kurdish population’s support and create ‘Serdilhan’ (insurrection) 
among Kurdish population. PKK’s wing in Europe organized conferences in other 
countries to draw attention to the Kurdish issue in Turkey.    248
!
 In 1991, government adopted a new law on fight against terrorism. The 
Anti-terror Law of 1991 was introduced with the intention of more effective way 
to deal with terrorism. According to the law, terrorism was defined as;  
!
“[Terrorism] is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an 
organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as 
specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, 
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damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and Nation, endangering 
the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing 
the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging 
the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by 
means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.”   249!
  At the end of 1991, the fourth congress of PKK took place in Iraq, during 
which PKK decided to increase of attacks and of legal activities.   Meanwhile, 250
PKK had some opposition inside itself and tried to suppress them. From its 
creation to 1991, PKK’s attacks increased over the years. According to Tayyar, 
PKK attacked 47 times in 1984, 127 in 1985, 129 in 1986, 245 in 1987, 297 in 
1988, 602 in 1989, 1.111 in 1990, and 1.192 in 1991.   While PKK was 251
continuing its actions and activities, another official declaration about Kurdish 
existence was made. In December 1991, deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü made 
a public call for the recognition of cultural identity of Kurdish originated Turkish 
citizens.   The Gulf War affected the policies of Turkey as thousands of Iraqi 252
Kurds migrated to Turkey as refugees. The ban of usage of Kurdish language, 
which was put in force after the military intervention of 1980, was removed.   253
  
 In 1992, PKK increased its movements again inside Turkey and made 
preparations for another attempt to create an insurrection in 21 of March 
celebrations. 21 of March is known as Nowruz, which is Persian New Year and 
also the starting date of spring. In Turkey and other countries, during 21 March 
daytime, people do celebrations. Since State of Turkey applied heavy security 
measures, PKK could not reach its goal to create an insurrection.   However, 254
there were clashes between PKK militants and military forces, for instance in 
Cizre, because of the clashes 90 people died and many were wounded.   In the 255
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meantime, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel openly declared that he personally 
recognize the Kurdish existence in Turkey.   In April 1992, President Özal 256
suggested that broadcasting in Kurdish in TV and radio, and teaching Kurdish in 
schools could help the government to deal with the question.   These 257
declarations from high officials, like President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel, 
made public opinion to believe that the state would act politically to solve the 
Kurdish and terrorism problems. However, the National Security Council saw the 
situation in southeastern of Turkey as a product of separatist terrorism, which 
required a military solution rather than a political one. 
!
 PKK attacks and military operations against militants continued until the 
march of 1993. On 17 March 1993, Öcalan held a press conference in Lebanon, 
and declared a unilateral cease-fire until 15 April 1993.   With the cease-fire 258
decision, Öcalan also abandoned his idea for independence and started to talk 
about ‘autonomy’.   President Özal was in contact with Iraqi Kurdish leader, 259
Jalal Talabani, who was acting as the messenger between PKK and the State of 
Turkey.   The first response from the State of Turkey was, as expected, 260
demanding the total surrender of all PKK militants.   During the unilateral cease-261
fire time, possible amnesty rumors for PKK militants started to be circulated in 
official circles in Ankara. On 16 April 1993, Öcalan announced that he extended 
the cease-fire for two months.   President Özal was the main driven force about 262
the possibility of amnesty and believed that this might start a solving process of 
terrorism problem.   While PKK was waiting a gesture about a possible amnesty 263
for its militants, President Turgut Özal suddenly died because of a heart attack on 
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17 April 1993.   After Turgut Özal’s death, officials did not know how to deal 264
with the situation. 
!
 On 23 May 1993, National Security Council made suggestion to the 
Government for a partial amnesty for PKK militants; however, on 24 May 1993 
PKK broke cease-fire by killing 33 unarmed soldiers and 5   civilians.   This 265 266
PKK attack against unarmed soldiers raised the tension among society; 
consequently, military officials started to call for heavy measures against PKK. 
!
 After Özal’s death, Süleyman Demirel was elected as the President of the 
Republic, and Tansu Çiller became the Prime Minister. In late 1993, Prime 
Minister Çiller considered a possibility of allowance of education and 
broadcasting in Kurdish and referred to the relevance of the Basque model and its 
provisions for wide-ranging autonomy.   However, the new President Demirel 267
opposed the idea by saying, “Unless terrorism is solved, cultural issues cannot be 
debated”.   This was an exact moment that, terrorism problem and Kurdish 268
problem had started to be considered as one single problem. 
!
 Even-tough Prime Minister Tansu Çiller talked on possibility of allowance 
education and broadcasting in Kurdish, in late 1993 for a possible solution for 
Kurdish Problem, she introduced a new slogan in 1994 on the fight against PKK, 
‘either end or end’ (‘ya bitecek ya bitecek’).   Heavy military operations started 269
against PKK and as Kirişçi and Winrow stated the numbers of PKK attacks 
decreased.   270
!
 The education system was another target for PKK attacks. At the 
beginning of 1994 educational year; PKK declared that the teachers who would 
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work on the region needed to have permission from PKK. PKK did this 
announcement after the killing of six teachers in Tunceli, then another four in 
Erzurum.   Apart from schools and teachers, PKK also targeted tourism areas, 271
big cities during the year of 1994.    272
!
 In January 1995, PKK made its fifth congress in Northern Iraq, during 
which the organization decided to do more sensational attacks in big cities and 
especially in North of Turkey.   PKK also increased its propaganda activities in 273
media by founding a TV channel in England, Med TV;   in the meantime, it 274
continued to organize meetings in European cities. On 19 March 1995, Turkey 
started operation against PKK militants in Northern Iraq, which lasted until July 
1995 and respectively 35.000 troops involved.   On 12 April 1995, PKK 275
announced that they founded the ‘parliament in exile’ in Netherlands.   With its 276
actions in Europe, PKK tried to promote itself as legal organization, which seeks 
a ‘peaceful’ solution for the problems of Kurds inside Turkey. At the end of 1995, 
Turkish Armed Forces was in preparation for another operation on Northern Iraq; 
however, as Öcalan knew that, he suddenly declared another unilateral cease-fire 
on 15 December 1995.   The cease-fire was accepted as a proof of weakness by 277
the Government and planned military operation was put in action. 
  
 Between 1996 and 1998, PKK’s attacks and military operations against 
them continued. On this period, PKK started to use suicide bombers; however, 
Abdullah Öcalan claimed that, although suicide bombers were ‘heroes’, PKK did 
not accept this tactic as main tool to attack.   PKK declared that the year of 1997 278
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would be the ‘final’ and they would reach their goal. It started to organize 
meetings inside and outside Turkey in order to promote its ideas.   In the 279
meantime, Turkish Government was forcing Syria for the capture of Öcalan, but 
Syria denied that Öcalan was in the country. Even though, Turkish intelligence 
agency had concrete evidence of Öcalan’s presence in Syria and many journalists 
made interviews with Abdullah Öcalan in Damascus from time to time, 
Government of Syria had always given the same answer: there was no one under 
the name Abdullah Öcalan in Syria.  
!
 On the fight against PKK, Turkish security forces used every measure. 
Apart from Turkish military forces and police forces, another unit was formed in 
1987 under the name of Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight Against Terrorism 
(Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele, JITEM). For many years, the existence 
of JITEM was a rumor among the society. State officials often tried to avoid any 
questions about JITEM. As in 1990s, many people were killed and their cases 
stayed unsolved, public opinion believed that all these cases were carried out by 
members of JITEM and the organization used tactics, which were considered as 
violation of human rights and interrogations. In July 2013, legal prosecutor in 
Diyarbakır re-opened the case of Musa Anter, a Kurdish writer who was murdered 
in 1992 and his killer has never been found. According to the indictment, JITEM 
was formed in 1987 by the approval of the Ministry of Interior of Turkey under 
the Turkish Gendarmerie Institution and the organization was active inside Turkey 
until 1997.   At the writing time of this thesis, the organizational structure of 280
JITEM, its operations and unsolved cases of 1990s are still in the agenda of 
Turkey. JITEM is an important part of the puzzle to understand what really 
happened in Turkey, and who was murdered by whom in 1990s. Unfortunately, 
public opinion believes that, as JITEM was a secret organization of the State, the 
state might not solve the case completely in order the protect members of JITEM 
organization.  
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3.1.4. Abdullah Öcalan in Prison !
 While the Turkish pressure over Syria was rising, Öcalan declared another 
unilateral cease-fire on 1 September 1998.   Turkish Government continued to 281
force Syria about him, and on 16 September 1998, a General from Turkish Armed 
Forces travelled to Hatay, a Turkish City at the Turkish-Syrian border, he talked in 
public and declared that Turkey had an intention of good relationship with 
neighbors, but neighbors like Syria supported Öcalan, and Turkey ran out of 
patience, and would take all necessary measures for its security.   General’s 282
declaration was forced Syria to expel Öcalan. This was the starting time of last 
journey for Öcalan before his capture. 
!
 After leaving Syria, Öcalan first went to Athens/Greece, then to Russia. As 
Turkish Government applied for his return from Russia, Öcalan went to Rome/
Italy and made an application for political asylum to Italy. In the meantime, 
Turkey started a boycott against Italian products, and also applied to Italian 
Government for his return. As Öcalan did not receive any political asylum, he 
went back to Russia then Greece, and his last destination was from Greece to 
Kenya. He was captured in Kenya and brought to Turkey on 16 February 1999 for 
his trial.    283
  
 Abdullah Öcalan stood trail and was sentenced a death penalty on 29 June 
1999. While Öcalan’s case and death penalty decision was at waiting list for final 
approval from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, death penalty was 
removed in 2002 from the Turkish Penal Code. As a consequence, Abdullah 
Öcalan was sentenced lifetime imprisonment in İmrali, an island of Turkey. 
!
 The capture of Öcalan caused different feelings in people’s mind in 
Turkey, on one side a disappointment for extremist Kurds and sympathizers of 
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PKK, who believed that they could reach their desire only by armed struggle, and 
on the other side a glory for Turkish nationalists.    284
  
 During his trial, Öcalan continued to control PKK via his lawyers. In 
August 1999, he made a call for PKK militants to stop attacks and leave 
Turkey.   In September 1999, PKK declared another unilateral cease-fire and 285
announced that PKK would not attack, lay down arms and leave Turkey. 
However, while PKK militants were leaving country, Turkish military forces 
started operations against them and consequently many PKK militants were killed 
or captured.    286
!
 During cease-fire period, PKK organized its eighth congress on 4 April 
2002 and changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy 
Congress, Kongreya Azadi ù Demokrasiya Kurdistan). The ‘new’ organization 
also selected Öcalan as president.   However, PKK changed its mind on the 287
name KADEK and dissolved it. Instead of KADEK, they formed KONRA-GEL 
(Kurdistan Peoples Congress, Kongra Gelê Kurdistan) on 15 November 
2003.   With changing its name, PKK started to promote that KONGRA-GEL 288
and PKK’s armed wing were separate organizations. All these name changes were 
PKK’s effort to transform itself to a more-like political organization; however, 
even they changed the name of organization, they did not give up arms 
completely, and PKK was started to be called as PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 
!
 Meanwhile in 2002, Turkish political scenes changed and a new party, the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) won the 
elections of 2002 with the majority of valid votes. AKP had 34.28% of valid 
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votes.   This was the starting point of another single party period, AKP’s rule in 289
Turkey. The high percentage of the Turkish society saw AKP as a solution for all 
problems, including Kurdish Problem. AKP put a dedicated section for Kurdish 
problem in its party program under the label of ‘The East and Southeast’, and they 
explained AKP’s aim to guard cultural diversity on the region. A part of the 
mentioned section explained AKP’s language and territorial unity and integrity of 
Turkey as;  
!
“The cultural diversity in this region is considered richness by our Party. On 
condition that the Turkish remains the official and instruction language, our Party 
regards the cultural activities in languages other than Turkish, including 
broadcasting, as an asset, which reinforces and supports the unity and integrity of 
our country, rather than weaken it. The elimination of certain troubles originating 
from the under -development of the region, are intended to be solved within the 
scope of the general democratization project, rather than special arrangements aimed 
at the region.”    290
  
 AKP also highlighted the importance of citizenship rather then ethnicity.   291
!
 This cease-fire period lasted until 2004, and in May 2004, PKK organized 
another congress to declare that so-called unilateral cease-fire was over and PKK 
militants would continue its attacks inside Turkey. That year, PKK started its 
attacks with claiming that government did not take necessary actions to solve the 
Kurdish Problem and demanding improvements on Öcalan’s prison conditions. 
!
 In 2005, the leader of the AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
made a public speech in Diyarbakir. He indicated that ethnical identities were 
needed to be considered as sub-identities, and the Turkish citizenship needs to be 
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considered as an upper identity.   This was a significant moment for the 292
acceptance of Kurdish reality. During the same year, PKK formed another 
organization under the name Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK, People’s 
Confederation of Kurdistan). The new organization was a model of a ‘state’ that 
contained legislative, executive and juridical organs in itself. However, in 2007, 
PKK gave up on KKK and formed another organization under the name of Koma 
Civakên Kurdistan (KCK, Union of Communities in Kurdistan), which acts as 
‘state’ with its organs, as well, in order to protect every Kurd in four countries, 
that was to mention the Kurds who were living in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. 
!
 As the KCK was formed by PKK and started to act like a state, State of 
Turkey launched an investigation about KCK organizations. In 2009 multiple 
operations were carried out in Turkey, and many people were detained with the 
accusation of being members of illegal organization, in this case KCK. According 
the Kurdish politicians, with the operations of KCK, the State of Turkey tried to 
undermine the political activities of Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve 
Demokrasi Partisi, BDP). According to Selahattin Demirtaş, co-chairman of the 
party, more than 6000 people were detained by 2009, among them many were 
members of BDP.   At the writing time of this thesis, KCK trails were still 293
continuing in many cities in Turkey. Kurdish politicians often demand the release 
of KCK detainees as the State of Turkey is in talks between the active members of 
PKK and the imprisoned leader, Öcalan. 
!
 PKK’s attacks continued until 2009. In 2009, AKP Government started a 
democratic opening process with a report on its third congress on 3 October 2009. 
According to this report, the cure for terrorism was more democracy. This process 
was also known as ‘democratic opening’ as it had reform ideas to bring more 
democratic rights to Kurdish originated people of Turkey. AKP’s efforts on 
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Kurdish issue brought another unilateral cease-fire of PKK in April 2009.   With 294
‘democratic opening’ process, government officials made contacts with PKK 
leadership and Abdullah Öcalan.  
  
 Cease-fire lasted until June 2010, then PKK started its attacks inside 
Turkey. During 2009-2010, government’s contacts with PKK members continued 
in Oslo, Norway.   295
!
 In 2011, PKK continued its attacks. One of the most brutal attacks of PKK 
was carried out 14 July 2011, in which PKK killed 13 soldiers. In late 2012, AKP 
government announced that state officials were in contact with Öcalan for a 
possible solution to the terrorism problem.   The contacts have brought the last 296
unilateral cease-fire of PKK on 21 March 2013. A message from Abdullah Öcalan 
was read during Nowruz celebration in Diyarbakir. Öcalan called for a cease-fire 
and ordered PKK militants to leave Turkey.   A response came from PKK’s 297
leader in charge, Murat Karayılan on 23 March 2013, and he declared the 
unilateral cease-fire.   298
!
 AKP’s efforts, reforms and contacts with PKK leadership will be 
explained in detail in the ‘solving the problem’ part of this thesis.  
!
 The information about Kurdish nationalism from the Ottoman Era up to 
today was given briefly in order to provide an idea to the reader. One can see that 
Kurdish nationalist movements started during the Ottoman Era with tribal 
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rebellions against central power. The main driven tool was religion and Kurdish 
tribes revolt against authority to protect their privileges. With the creation of the 
Republic of Turkey, a new nation-building process took place and Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and his companions tried to implement the ‘Turkish Nation’ as a common 
point for the population. As the Republic of Turkey rose over the Ottoman 
Empire’s heritage, it contains many ethnic identities in itself. Placing the Turkish 
Nation with reforms like abolishment of Sultanate and Caliphate revoke religious 
and ethnic sensitivity among population, especially among Kurds. During lifetime 
of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, The Republic of Turkey faced another major Kurdish 
rebellion in 1925, and another one in 1937. After the establishment of multi-party 
political system in 1946, Kurds entered the political area and rebellions had 
reduced. However, military interventions in 1960 and 1980 put democracy away 
and banned all political parties. The denial of Kurdish existence paved the way 
for the creation of PKK. 
!
 With creation of PKK, the Republic of Turkey faced again another 
‘rebellion’. However, this time, the motivation was not tribal rights nor religion. 
PKK differs itself from previous rebellions as the organization formed around 
Marxists-Leninist ideas and with the intention of building a large-scale Kurdish 
identity awareness.  
!
 Rebellions before PKK’s creation were given in order to highlight the 
difference between PKK and previous movements. Annual information about 
PKK’s attacks was only a little part of them to exhibit that organization’s terrorist 
activities were continuous. PKK was attacking so often that during 90s, 
population of Turkey was ‘accustomed’. As one can see that PKK has declared 
cease-fires many times; nevertheless, it has never finalized its activities. Political 
initiatives were started in 1993 to solve the terrorism problem; however, Turkey 
has never managed to achieve a solution for Kurdish problem or terrorism 
problem. All efforts and obstacles on solving the problems will be examined in a 
dedicated part of this thesis. 
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 From its creation up until 21 March 2013, PKK was actively attacking 
Turkey while having all bases in Northern Iraq. The total cost of fight against 
PKK is very high, millions of dollars have been spent on military measures. 
According to number of Ministry of Defense of Republic of Turkey more than 
40.000 people died and more than 20.000 people wounded during the period of 
1984-2009. Milliyet Daily Newspaper published the following tables about the 
fight against PKK; 
!
!
  
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
    
Table I:   Victims of PKK by Year 299
!
!
!
!
!
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Victims of PKK
1984 43
1985 141
1986 133
1987 237
1988 109
1989 178
1990 204
1991 233
1992 832
1993 1479
1994 992
1995 313
1996 170
1997 158
1998 85
1999 83
2000 17
2001 8
2002 7
2003 63
2004 28
2005 30
2006 38
2007 37
2008 51
2009 18
TOTAL 5687
!  Source: Milliyet, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/26-yilin-kanli-bilancosu/guncel/haberdetay/299
24.06.2010/1254711/default.htm>, site visited 20 September 2012.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
!
          
!
!
!
!
Table II:   Death and Wounded State Forces by Type 300
!
Within this fight, Turkey lost a lot of lives, money and opportunities. 
!
!
3.2. History of Basque Nationalism, Roots of ETA 
!
 Basque people is one of the historical populations in Spain. The history of 
Basque people and Basque Nationalism are effective both in Spanish politics and 
the problem of terrorism. The geographical description of the Basque Country 
(Euskal Herria in Basque) contains territories from Spain and France. Briefly 
seven regions in total describe the Basque Country. Alava, Navarra, Vizcaya, 
Guipúcoa are in Spain, and Soule, Lower Navarra, Labourd are in France. In the 
state structure of Spain Alava, Vizcaya, Guipúcoa are under the control of Basque 
Country (País Vasco in Spanish and Euskadi in Basque), and Navarra also is an 
autonomous community like Basque Country. Basque territories in France are 
also known as Northern Basque Country or Iparralde in Basque. Even though 
Basque Country and Navarra are autonomous communities of Spain, the desire 
for a united Basque Country existed among Basque people and in the roots of 
ETA.  
!
 To understand the terrorism problem in Spain, it is necessary to look 
throughout history of Basque nationalism and the Foral System. 
!
 81
Dead Wounded
Military Forces 4968 9855
Police Forces 217 617
Village Guards 1335 1932
TOTAL 6520 12404
!  Ibid.300
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3.2.1. Fueros and Carlist Wars !
Local governments and local rights are maybe two of the newest terms in 
our world order, nowadays. For countries which have different type of 
populations - that is mostly ethnically different groups - local government is a 
suitable solution to protect the union of nation state. Local rights are the tools 
which hold different groups of people together.  
!
Spanish’s political system of today was established after Dictator Franco’s 
period  . After 40 years of dictatorship, transition to democracy after Franco’s 301
death was a success. The 1979 constitution offered a new political framework 
within which Spaniards could organize their lives. One of the major issues that 
the new regime was facing, was the national question, particularly in Catalonia 
and the Basque Country. The new constitution radically transformed the centralist 
non-democratic regime inherited from Francoism by creating the Autonomous 
Communities System.    302
!
This local governments or autonomous system can be difficult to 
understand and apply for some countries; however for Spaniards, it is like an 
updated version of an old experience. 
!
In their long history from time to time some nations of Spain had some 
privileges or some rights, which were given by the Central State. The roots of 
these rights were going back to medieval time. In medieval Spain they were 
called as Fueros. 
!
For the term fuero there is not an exact translation to English. Some 
dictionaries define fueros as; 
!
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“Fueros were the charters granted to villages, towns and regions by 
Spanish monarchs in the Middle Ages and which established their rights and 
obligations. The fueros under which the Basques and Navarrese received certain 
privileges (some fiscal autonomy, their own local administration system and 
exemption from military service outside their province) became a political 
football in the 19th Century, being alternately abolished and restored depending 
on the interests of the monarch or administration in power. Today, Navarre is 
recognized in the Estado de las Autonomías as the  Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra.”    303!
“in the medieval states of the Iberian Peninsula: 
(1) A corpus of general law relating to all the subjects of a kingdom. 
The first code of this type was the Lex Visigothorum, which came to be known 
in the 13th century as the Fuero Juzgo. 
(2) A charter of feudal liberties granted to a particular province, class, 
or family. 
(3) A municipal charter. This type of charter, the most common fuero, 
was usually granted in the name of the king and set forth the rights, privileges, 
and obligations of the inhabitants of an urban or rural community. !
The development and proliferation of municipal fueros, which were 
particularly numerous from the 11th to 13th centuries, was associated with the 
Reconquest. As lands were won back from the Arabs, it became necessary to 
provide for their military defense and to develop their economies. The crown 
was compelled to provide incentives in order to attract settlers. In the early 
period of the Reconquest, municipal fueros merely fixed the location and 
boundaries of settlements; later, they defined the status of the settlers, made 
official the settlers’ exemption from corvée, and established rates of taxation. 
They also granted a measure of autonomy that included the right to elect a 
magistrate, freedom from seignorial jurisdiction, and the right to maintain a 
militia. !
The fuero also defined the rights of the seignior over a particular 
community. The seignior could alter the fuero only with the approval of all the 
settlement’s inhabitants. Almost every city and the adjacent rural communities, 
hamlets, and villages had their own fueros. The cities jealously defended from 
encroachment by the crown the privileges granted under the fueros; alliances of 
cities, known as hermandades, were formed for this purpose. !
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Until the 14th century fueros of all types were the basic form of 
legislation in the states of the Iberian Peninsula. In the 14th and 15th centuries 
local fueros were of equal standing with royal codes of law; they were affirmed 
by the king, and new fueros were introduced. As the state government became 
centralized and royal power increased, the fueros lost much of their force. With 
the unification of Spain, they became nugatory. !
The fueros are extremely important sources for the socioeconomic, 
political, and military history of medieval Spain.”   304!
Basically fueros - rights of the people - is a term which is related to 
Spanish history of medieval time. For the Basque people, these fueros were bases 
of their autonomy. In the history of the Basque people, fueros were fundamental 
to their relation with the Spanish State. Within this relation, fueros were not just 
codes of daily life, they were the power, rights and their position against the 
Spanish King. With the fueros, administrative, economic, political and daily lifes 
were created. 
!
Traditional Basque social organization had their own civic life as a part of 
the kingdom of Castile since the medieval times. The four Basque provinces had 
their own financial, legal and administrative structures.   These special structures 305
were depending on fueros. On that sense, these fueros were also agreements 
between the King and Basque provinces. The Basque provinces accepted the King 
as their sovereign and the King recognized their privileges. With this agreements 
local organizations of Basque provinces were sovereign on their provinces. For 
instance, each province retained the power of tax collecting and used to have their 
own soldiers which could not be subject to the royal army automatically. While 
Basque people defend that historical fueros are the base of their today’s 
autonomy, even the self determination, nationalist Spaniards often claim that 
fueros were just privileges given by the Spanish King.   306
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Besides these privileges, there was a possibility to veto any laws 
introduced by the King. Moreover, as a symbol of royal allegiance, any ascending 
Spanish monarch had to travel to the Basque provinces in order to swear an oath 
of loyalty to their fueros. In the case of Bizkaia, this act took place under the oak 
Tree of Gernika (Guernika), traditional meeting place of the Bizkaian 
representatives. From the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, Basque 
society maintained social and economic autonomy within the emergent Spanish 
State.   307
!
Until the Cadiz Constitution (1812), Basque people defended their rights. 
Cadiz Constitution  established revolution over political system, which abolished 
ancient foral regime depending on fueros, and for the first time, it identified all 
Spaniards as a nation. As a consequence, Cadiz Constitution had also abolished 
the fueros. While abolishing it, the new system was providing a uniform system 
of government, administration, and law; although these provisions also allowed 
for clear local and regional decision-making powers through ayuntamientos (city 
halls) and diputaciones (provincial councils).   308
!
Between 1814 and 1833, Ferdinand VII ruled Spain as a king. On his 
death in 1833, Ferdinand named his daughter, Princess Isabel II, as a successor in 
opposition to his brother, Don Carlos María Isidro. Even though Princess Isabel 
took the seat of the Kingdom, Don Carlos proclaimed himself as the legitimate 
King of Spain. This situation risen tension in the Kingdom of Spain. A part form 
the debate over the throne, debates over the position of the church, Spain’s 
economic future and the question of foral privileges were occurred in 
Kingdom.   Both Isabell II and Don Carlos had their supporters. As the 309
supporters of Don Carlos known as ‘carlists’, the wars between 1833 and 1874 
were named as ‘Carlist Wars’. Carlism emerged as a political ideology in base of 
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religious and rural movement, there were three Carlist Wars in this period which 
were partly effective on Basque nationalism. 
!
In the Basque Country, Carlism was often linked with the question of 
fueros. At the beginning of Carlism period, Basque people saw the Carlism as a 
way to defend the ancient fueros; however, it turned to a way to defend Basque 
culture itself within time. Carlism put religion as a point of motivation for the 
wars. Basque people accepted the Carlism not only a way to defend fueros, but 
also to defend the religion.   310
!
The First Carlist War (1833-1839) occurred after the death of Spanish 
King Ferdinand VII. It lasted six years as a brutal, guerrilla war in which Basque 
people were well-trained in this type of warfare. For the Basque people, it was not 
a war of national liberation, but it was more like a struggle of two different ideas: 
liberal and traditionalist ideas. The war caused a split among Basque people, as 
some part of the Basque territories were with Isabel II and other parts were with 
Don Carlos. In these conditions, Navarra started to become more and more 
different from other Basque regions, which effected today’s Basque Country map 
in Spain.   While the Spanish Basque Country composed by three Basque 311
regions, Navarra stood alone as a different autonomous community. At the end of 
the War, in October 1839, a law passed in Madrid. This law confirmed that 
Basque people had rights to have fueros, and also it stipulated that they should not 
brake the constitutional unity of Spain. However, during this time, a liberal 
government was ruling the country. Since the end of the First Carlist War, Basque 
politics became dominated by a growing upper-middle-class liberal elite who 
used to take full advantage of the erosion of foral system. 
!
The Second Carlist War (1846-1849) was a relatively short civil war 
which broke in Catalonia to overthrown Isabel II by Carlists. Carlists moved 
under the control of General Ramón Cabrera against the forces of Isabel II. The 
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rise against the Kingdom began in Catalonia; however, within time, it spread to 
other regions. Theoretically, the war was carried out to facilitate the marriage of 
Isabella with Carlos VI, son of Carlos V. Eventually, the marriage never took 
place, as Isabel was wed to Francis, Duke of Cádiz. For three years, sides fought 
each other. In 1849, Carlos VI forced to go to the United Kingdom and the troops 
of Spanish Kingdom entered Catalonia, General Ramón Cabrera fled from Spain. 
As a result, Isabel II won the second Carlist war as the previous one.   312
!
Third Carlist War (1872-1876) was effective nearly in every part of Spain. 
Carlists managed to occupy several cities and forced Isabel to exile. The King 
Amadeus I was not popular. In that context of the country, the Carlist pretender, 
Carlos VII, proclaimed the restoration of Catalonian, Valencian and Aragonese 
fueros.   In 1874, the son of Isabel II, Alfonso returned to country, and he was 313
proclaimed as the King Alfonso XII with the alliance of liberals. This was the 
defeat of Carlists. Right after that, a new constitution was proclaimed in 1876. For 
the Basque People, the effect of this constitution was the end of the foral system, 
a victory for Spanish liberalism and the ultimate defeat of Carlist ideology as a 
political force.   314
!
With the help of aforementioned historical information, it is possible to 
say that Basques always know how to rule themselves. The fueros, mostly 
codified during the 17th and 18th centuries, though some of them date back to the 
7th century, exempted the local population from both military service and taxation, 
and gave provincial assemblies the right to veto royal edicts. These institutions 
embodied the ‘rights’ of the people, rather than concessions granted to them. 
Throughout their history, the Basques defended the fueros, ensuring their 
autonomous status within the Spanish State.   315
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3.2.2. Emergence of Basque Nationalism !
In history of the Basque Country, Basque nationalism was created around 
these fueros by Sabino Arana. 
!
Sabino Policarpo de Arana y Goiri, the father of the Basque nationalism 
and also the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, 
PNV   ), was born in 1865 and died in 1903. During his short life, he basically 316
created the feeling of being a Basque. He defined himself as a Carlist like his 
father until a conversation that he made with his older brother Luis in 1882. Luis 
convinced Sabino Arana that the Basque people were different than the Spanish 
people in senses of blood, race, and traditions.    317
!
  Sabino Arana was a law student in Barcelona (1883-1888) and decided 
not to complete his study to go back to Basque region in order to learn Basque 
language. During his time in Catalonia, he had chance to observe Catalan 
nationalism. In this sense, it is possible to say that he was affected by Catalan 
nationalism and learnt the importance of having a different mother tongue. During 
these years, he began to create a new ideology which contained the foralism (in 
base of fueros), traditional values and regionalism.   According to Arana, the 318
history of foral system should be accepted as the history of Basque people also. 
During his years in the Basque Country, Sabino Arana used history and historical 
terms on his speeches and papers with the hope of awakening nationalist ideas 
among Basque people. In 1892, he published his book under the title Bizkaya por 
su independencia (Bizkaia throughout its independence) as the first explicitly 
political public statement, which sold out with two thousand copies.   319
!
Sabino Arana was not only the founder of Basque nationalism, the founder 
of political organization, PNV and a political doctrine, Aranism, above all he was 
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the father of the Basque nation by the sense of providing their main symbols: the 
name Euzkadi, the Basque Flag (ikurriña), the hymn.   The description of great 320
Basque Country - Euskal Herria - was also made by Sabino Arana.   The flag 321
was composed of two crosses, one white and the other green, superimposed on a 
red background. The white cross represented the importance of religion, while the 
green one represented the Basque race, its ancient laws-fueros-, and Euskara -
Basque language-. The red background, according to Arana, symbolized the fact 
that Basque people were ‘ready to shed their blood in defense of the two 
crosses.’   In terms of nationalism, flags are the main symbols to create a 322
national consciousness. For the case of Basque nationalism, the flag is more than 
a symbol of nationalism, it is also an icon to demonstrate collective memory and 
Arana’s ideas of nationalism. 
!
For the Basque nationalism, the Spanish influence was severe. Sabino 
Arana claimed that Basque people were independents until the fueros were 
abolished and Spanish people colonized the Basque region.   According to 323
Arana, Basque people should not accept the autonomy, as in case of an autonomy, 
Basque region would become one of the regions of Spain.   For the total 324
independence, Arana suggested that Basque people should protect their own 
identity against the Spanish effect. 
!
The Basque regions were common targets for immigration, as these 
regions were popular with industrial sector. Arana saw the immigrated Spanish 
speaking population as a threat to the existence of Basque language, culture and 
tradition.   The early nationalists, Arana and friends, considered Spanish 325
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language as a language that forced to be learnt. Because of this, importance of the 
Basque language (Euskara) became vital in their minds. Additionally, the race and 
blood were essential to create a common consciousness. According to Arana, the 
Basque people had to be ready to shed their blood for their independence and for 
their right to live as Basques.  
!
In the creation of the PNV, the blood was at the center as well. Through 
the blood, Arana explained how different Basque people were as a race. Sabino 
Arana often tried to differentiate the Basque people from Spanish people. During 
the summer of 1895, he published an article under the title of “Who Are We?”, and 
he said that, Basque people were not Spanish by nature; however, they were 
forced to believe that they were Spanish. As they were not Spanish, they were not 
supposed to engage with any Spanish either. In other articles, he indicated the idea 
by saying “it is necessary that we isolate ourselves from Maketos (Spanish 
People). Otherwise, here on earth that we walk on, it is not possible to work for 
the glory of God”.   According to him, the language was an important element to 326
preserve the traditions and nationalism of certain people. For the importance of 
Basque language, he said that Basque Language should be spoken only by Basque 
people, because if any Spaniard speaks the Basque language, this could ruin the 
Basque traditions. He even suggested that Basque people should not marry with 
the Spanish people in order to protect the Basque language.   327
!
In the second part of the article, “Who Are We?”, he indicated “the 
Bizkanian that lives in the mountains...the true Bizkanian, is through [his] natural 
character, religious” while “the Spaniard that lives far from the town...the true 
Spaniard either knows no word of religion...is a fanatic, or is ungodly”.   With 328
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this part, he showed the importance of religion and how Basque people differed 
from Spanish people. 
!
Sabino Arana often tried to differentiate Basque cultures and traditions 
from Spain. For instance, he opened the discussion about fueros. Even he 
defended and wanted to construct the Basque independence over fueros, he 
criticised that even the word of fueros was Spanish. Arana explained fueros as 
basic laws of sovereign peoples, not as privileges by the Spanish Empire. And he 
described Basque provinces as independent sovereign states (estado), the Basque 
population as people (pueblo) and defined Spanish as a nation (nación).    329
!
The legacy of Arana was and still is effective on Basque nationalist 
politics. His differentiation of the Basque nation from Spain was at the center of 
the Basque nationalism. He recalled their history, he created the symbols, 
basically he defined the meaning of being Basque in order to create a general 
consciousness among Basque People. We can consider his ideology as an original 
one, as he combined historical myths and recalled fueros, created flag, gave a 
name to their language, wrote the national hymn etc. In the real meaning, he 
became the father of the Basque nationalism. 
!
Sabino Arana’s efforts to mobilize people on politics gave outcome on 31 
July 1895, with the formation of the Bizkanian Council (Bizkai Buru Batzar), 
which later evolved into the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV. With the creation of 
PNV, Sabino Arana marked Basque nationalist movement that he founded with an 
indelible mark. Because, the Aranism was merely an ideology, but also an actual 
political-religious doctrine, which was based on so much in terms of ideas and 
reasons in particular beliefs and feelings.    330
!
A part from his contribution to Basque identity and nationalism, Sabino 
Arana’s legacy was the formation of the Basque Nationalist Party. Party’s name in 
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Basque language is Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, which means literally ‘Basque Party 
of Supporters of God and Old Laws’. Basque name of PNV shows Arana’s idea of 
nationalism based fueros. The PNV was formed in 1895; however, it gained more 
importance after the death of Sabino Arana. As the Basque people lived in the 
foral system with their own traditions and culture, PNV made its organization 
among Basques with giving references to the fueros and Basque history. As PNV 
had a ‘closed’ organization system, which only targeted traditionalist Basque 
people, José Luis de la Granja Sainz described its organization as ‘partido-
comunidad’, community party.   331
!
At the beginning of the 20th century, Spain was in political disorder. The 
Kingdom lost its colonies like Cuba, Porto Rico, and discussions on Spanish 
political system and life started among the politicians. As the Spanish Kingdom’s 
political power was decreasing, nationalist and regional ideas of historic peoples, 
like Basques, Catalans and Galicians were increasing. The situation paved the 
way for demands on regional reforms by parties like PNV. As a result of the 
political sphere in Spain, PNV transformed itself to Basque Nationalist 
Communion (Comunión Nationalista Vasca, CNV) in 1916. The ideological 
challenges among the party continued these years, as a wing was supporting 
independence, others were supporting to wide-range autonomy. The 
understanding of autonomy at that time was being part of Spain but having all 
administrative organs under their control.  
!
The political instability in Spain finished with the military intervention of 
General Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923. As he took the control of the State, all 
parties and political organizations were closed. So, the CNV was also closed; 
however, it continued to operate secretly.   The Dictatorship of General Miguel 332
Primo de Rivera ended in 1930. On 12 April 1931, elections took place and the 
Second Republic proclaimed. With the proclamation of the Second Republic, 
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King Alfonso XIII went to exile. With the Second Republic, political parties were 
opened again and Basque people returned to politics with the name of PNV. After 
years, Sabino Arana’s political movements retook its name, and continued its 
political actions under the leadership of Sabino Arana’s brother, Luis Arana 
Goriri. In the new political atmosphere, PNV centered its policies around 
autonomy and made alliances with other parties. The Second Republic 
government made promises about giving autonomies to the regions; however, it 
never happened.  
!
In 1936, Spanish nationalist under General Franco started rebellion against 
the Republic by saying that the Second Republic lost its legitimacy among 
population. As the Second Republic provided autonomy to the Basque region, 
PNV supported Republic’s forces against Franco’s supporters.   However, 333
Franco’s forces occupied Bilbao in 1937, and the war practically ended for PNV 
and for Basque people. 
!
After three years of bloody war between Republicans and Nationalists, 
General Franco established its dictatorship. Under Franco’s rule, all regional 
languages were banned, and regional powers and autonomies were removed. 
Franco’s administration promoted the unity of Spain with single identity. Being a 
member of historical societies, such as Catalan, Basque and Galician, became 
impossible. All names were changed with Spanish names and regional or ethnic 
identities suppressed by the dictatorship. Under the heavy unitary policies of 
Franco’s dictatorship, some Basques fled away from Spain to France, to the 
United States of America and to other countries.  
!
 Spain was isolated from international scene under Franco’s rule, first 
postwar, until 1953-1955. For instance, Spain’s application to become a member 
of the United Nation was rejected and the United Nation cut entire diplomatic 
relationship with Spain. As Franco’s regime took away every chance to be in 
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regional politics, Basques could not find any place on Spanish system for 
themselves. Basque Autonomous Government in exile often tried to revive to 
issue in international scene; however, it did not managed to do so. Franco’s heavy 
suppression on regional communities paved the way for the creation of Basque 
Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) organization.   
!
As General Franco stayed in power for 36 years and suppressed all 
political activities, PNV continued its activities secretly. Franco’s policies over 
regional peoples pushed minds to act against this dictatorship. Young members of 
PNV split from the party and started a new political action under the name of 
EKIN (means ‘to learn’ in Basque language) in 1953. The movement was started 
by a small group of students, but grew in short time.   The group started to 334
publish a secret journal under the name of ‘Cuadernos EKIN’ in which the idea of 
independent Basque Country was promoted. Similar to Sabino Arana, EKIN 
considered the Basque language as a base of Basque existence and according to 
them the Basque Country, had not only parts in Spain but also in France, should 
become independent in order to set Basque language free. EKIN even accused 
PNV by saying that the party was not defending the Basque language efficiently. 
The EKIN movement declined the idea of autonomy and defended the total 
independence for Basque regions. In this sense, the group later transformed itself 
to ETA in order to fight against Franco’s dictatorship with the aim of gaining 
independence for Basque Country. 
!
ETA was founded on 31 July 1959;   however, the organization’s first 335
armed attack against Franco’s forces was carried out in 1968.   From its creation, 336
ETA built the idea of total independence over Sabino Arana’s ideas. The main 
strategy of ETA was to create a revolutionary war, which would contain public 
participation with armed struggle. According to Robert P. Clark, ETA’s intention 
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was to apply action-repression spiral theory.   With armed attacks, ETA wanted 337
to create an atmosphere among the Basque population that would support ETA 
from bottom to top in spiral way. On the creation of ETA, it is possible to say that 
nationalist movements around the world became the inspiration point for the 
founders of ETA. For instance, Cuban Revolution (between 1953 - 1959) was a 
revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro against the Dictator Fulgencio 
Batista. ETA, similarly, was created around the revolutionary ideas against the 
Dictator Franco. On this sense, it is possible to say that ETA wanted to create a 
revolution like Cuban one and expected to have similar outcomes; however, 
ETA’s intention did not bring any revolution to Basque people, just brought death 
in Spain. 
!
ETA promoted that Basque people should struggle against the system and 
should engage the war for the total independence. As ETA adopted the Marxist 
ideas on the war against capitalism, the struggle was often called as ‘people’s war’ 
against the status-quo. ETA saw that it needed to have the proletarian support, for 
which Marxist ideas were an efficient tools, in order to achieve its goals. ETA 
accused PNV by saying that the party was defending the status-quo in Spain, and 
called all Basque people to join the “revolution”. Even the ETA promoted Marxist 
ideas for the proletarian support, its main goal of revolution for the total 
independence of Basque country took Sabino Arana’s nationalist ideas as base. In 
this sense, one can say that ETA took Marxist ideas as a tool for support; however, 
thought about an independent Basque Country just for Basque people for the 
preservation of Basque language and culture.  
!
Until 1968, ETA continued its propaganda actions and small-scale 
activities like burning the Spanish flag or painting Basque flag to walls; however, 
none of these activities carried out with weapons or resulted with any death. In 
1968, two ETA militants were stopped by the Spanish forces and the militants 
opened fire. The event resulted with the death of one Spanish force and that event 
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was noted as the first terrorist attack of ETA. During aforementioned event, one 
of ETA militant was killed by the Spanish forces, and became the symbol of ETA 
movements against the Franco’s dictatorship. The Basque people showed reaction 
to the death of ETA militants and ETA managed to turn this reaction into support 
for the movement. For the second attack of ETA, the target was one of Franco’s 
high rank representatives in the Basque region, Melitón Manzanas, who was 
killed by attack in 1968.   As a response to ETA’s attack, Franco administration 338
increased the security measures and pressure over people in Basque region and 
many Basques, even ones who did not have any connection with ETA, was 
detained for interrogation. In this condition, ETA’s actions against Franco’s unfair 
measures were supported more and more by the Basque people. 
!
With each attack, ETA militants and Basques were detained and set on 
trail; however, every trail increased the tension in Basque region and people 
protested Franco’s regime. Detained ETA militants were seen as ‘heroes’ among 
the Basque people and protest increased in 1970. Consequently, Franco’s 
administration declared martial law, not only in Basque region but in whole of 
Spain.   339
!
During 1970s, ETA continued its attacks against Spanish forces, and 
especially selected its targets from General Franco’s inner circle. In 1973, ETA 
assassinated Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco.   After the assassination, none 340
of the ETA members were captured and that was accepted as weakness of 
Franco’s regime. As Franco was old and in no condition to rule anymore, people 
started to believe that with Franco’s death, the dictatorship could not stand for 
long and should be collapsed. Meanwhile, an internal discussion inside ETA 
organization occurred and members gathered around two different ideas. 
Eventually, ETA split into two fractions; ETA Politico-Militar (pm), which 
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defended that a part from military attacks, ETA should engage into politics also; 
and ETA Militar (m), which claimed that ETA should pursue its armed attacks for 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic freedom of the Basque people and for the 
independence of the Basque Country.  
!
During 1974, ETA (m) and ETA (pm) were effective in Basque’s struggle 
against Franco’s administration. During Franco’s last years, ETA increased its 
attacks against Franco’s forces. In 1975, General Franco died; however his 
dictatorship lasted until 15 June 1977, when first democratic elections took place. 
With the elections a new era in Spanish political history started; nevertheless, this 
change did not effect ETA’s position. Following week after Franco’s death, ETA 
declared that they would continue to fight against any central authority, at that 
time the King Juan Carlos I by publishing the following announcement; 
!
“ETA against JuanCarlismo” 
"We cannot postpone the struggle because liberal democracy is nothing 
more for us than a tactical objective. . . . Pacifist organizations are worthless for us; 
instead we have to create struggle organizations capable of winning over the power 
of the oligarchy, just as much if this power is exercised under dictatorial forms as if 
it is done under liberal forms . . “   341!
3.2.3. Aftermath of General Franco, Transition to Democracy       !
After the death of Franco, general elections were held and writing process 
of a new constitution started. General amnesty for political captives were declared 
and political parties and regional parties, like PNV, allowed to act in political 
sphere. On the negotiations for the new constitution, PNV became a side of the 
talks and tried to defend Basque regional rights within the frame of politics and 
avoided to obstruct the talks with other parties. On the other hand, ETA continued 
its attack against the Spanish State and the new government.  
!
A part from ETA’s attacks, another political movement emerged among 
Basque people. An umbrella organization for the Basque political movements, 
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except PNV, was formed under the name of Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista 
(KAS, in English; Socialist Patriot Coordinator). The formation of KAS had 
started back in 1974; however, it became a political movement after the death of 
Franco. 
!
While the negotiations were continuing, ETA (pm) wanted to be in the 
process of democratic transformation of the Spanish State. In September and 
October 1976, in its 7th assembly, ETA (pm) accepted the new policy under the 
name of ‘el desdoblamiento’ (opening-up) and declared its intention to end the 
armed struggle against the central Spanish Authority. ETA (pm) formed a new 
political party under the name of Basque Revolutionary Party (Euskal Imultzale 
Alderdia, EIA). The party later merged itself with Basque Left (Euzkadiko 
Ezkerra, EE).   342
!
In 1976, KAS published the following objectives as the common Basque 
demand on new political scene;  
!
"-the complete independence of Euskadi, that is, the full capacity of the 
Basque people to decide their own destiny, which means the achievement of an 
independent and reunified Basque state;  
-the achievement of the socialist revolution, which must mean the 
installation of that Basque state as a popular and democratic socialist republic, 
headed by the workers, in which the constitutional forms will guarantee the full and 
direct participation of the people in the total management of Basque society;  
-the euskerizacion [restoring Euskera as a working language of the Basque 
Country) and full normalization of Euskera based on a situation of bilingualism;  
-the destruction of the capitalist and imperialist structures that exploit and 
oppress our people."   343!
On one side, KAS basically rejected any negotiation over Basque rights 
during the writing process of the new constitution; on the other side, PNV 
defended that Basques should be recognized as pueblos (peoples), while the 
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whole population of Spain accepted as nación (nation). According to PNV’s 
proposition, Basque region should have a wide-range autonomy.   
!
On 1 February 1978, ETA (m) declared via a public newspaper that they 
would talk about for a cease-fire, if their five demands were accepted by the 
authorities.  These five demands, known as the KAS alternative, were; 
!
“1-Total amnesty  
2. Legalization of all political parties/ including those whose program 
includes the creation of an independent Basque state without having to reduce their 
statutes.  
3. Expulsion from Euskadi of the Guardia Civil and other security forces. 
4. Improvement of the living and working conditions for the popular 
classes and especially for the working class, satisfaction of their immediate social 
and economic aspirations as expressed by their representative associations. 
5. An autonomy statute that, as a minimum, recognizes the national 
sovereignty of Euskadi, authorizes Euskera as the principal official language of the 
country, provides for Basque government control over all law enforcement 
authorities and all military units garrisoned in the Basque country, and endows the 
Basque people with adequate power to adopt whatever political, economic or social 
structures they deem appropriate for their own progress and welfare.”   344!
Even there were some contacts with ETA (m) and the Spanish central 
authorities - all attempts to solve the ETA problem will be discussed in dedicated 
part- the KAS alternative was not accepted by Spanish authorities and writing 
process of the constitution continued. As the written constitution recognized the 
Basques as one of nationalities in Spain and gave autonomy to the region, but not 
as wanted by PNV, PNV decided not to participate the constitutional referendum. 
However, the new constitution was accepted by 88% of voters’ support in 
December 1978. 
!
In April 1978, a new nationalist Basque political party, Herri Batasuna, 
HB (Popular Unity) was founded. The HB was formed as a coalition of several 
groups. At the beginning Herri Batasuna did not have any relation with ETA; 
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however, within time, HB started to have a role in terrorism problem and 
connections with ETA. HB’s relation with ETA will be examined in upcoming 
part of this thesis. 
!
With the new constitution, a new state structure was introduced and 17 
autonomous-communities and two autonomous cities were created, and Basques, 
Catalans and Galicians were recognized as nationalities, which form the Spanish 
Nation. The constitution contains 169 sections, with which State structure, 
citizenship, rights and duties of Spaniards, language of State, Spanish flag etc. 
were explained and also the regional rights and languages were mentioned.   
!
The State structure of Spain is described by Section I as;  
!
“The political form of the Spanish State is the Parliamentary Monarchy.”   345!
Section II describes the Spanish state as unitary State and explains the 
legal status of regions as;  
!
“The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the 
right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and 
the solidarity among them all.”  !346
One can see that, with the new constitution, regions and historical 
nationalities gained the right of self-government. Section III stated that Castilian 
is the official language of the State; however, other languages were recognized as 
well by saying;  
!
“The other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective Self-governing 
Communities in accordance with their Statutes.”   347
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It is possible to say that, with the aforementioned article, regional 
languages, including Basque language, obtained semi-official status in Spain. 
Section IV gave chance to autonomous communities to determine and to use their 
own flags in accordance with official Spanish flag. 
!
After the constitution, the faith of Basque region was determined with the 
referendum for autonomy in 1979. PNV defended the new status of Basque 
region; however, ETA (m) carried out many attacks to scare people and to force 
them not to vote in referendum. Nevertheless, total participation to referendum 
was 58,86% and the autonomous status of Basque region was accepted by 94,6% 
of total votes.   According to the new structure, Basque Country and Navarre 348
became autonomous communities.  
!
Aforementioned sections show that Basque language and rights were 
accepted by the central Spanish authority. According to new autonomous-
communities system, the Basque Country and Navarre became two different 
autonomous communities among all 17. After the approval of the constitution, 
communities of historical nationalities started to enjoy their regional rights while 
others needed to wait for five year of adaptation time.  
!
After the approval of the new constitution, ETA (m) attacks continued and 
even increased during the year of 1980. As the ETA’s, both ETA(m) and 
ETA(pm), attacks increased, heavy security measures were applied on Basque 
region and even a new antiterrorist force was formed. Meantime, as the ETA (pm) 
had intention to end its armed struggle, after their attack in Madrid in February 
1980, they published following five-point-list for cease-fire;  !
“1-that the Basque autonomy statute be expressly exempt from any 
contradictory or conflicting legislation  
passed by the Spanish parliament; 
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2-there be a referendum  
held in Navarra to ascertain the preferences of the Navarrese people 
regarding integration into the Basque Autonomous Community;  
3-that all ETA prisoners be returned immediately to Euskadi, and that there 
be a general amnesty when the Basque autonomy statute went into effect;  
4-that all special police measures in the Basque Country be halted, and the 
law enforcement power be transferred to an autonomous Basque Police Force. The 
Spanish government rejected any negotiations about these demands.”   349
   
As expected, Spanish government rejected the demands and continued to 
fight against terrorism.  
!
In late 1980, ETA violence and killings increased, ETA targeted high rank 
state officials. The political party EIA made a call to both wings of ETA to stop 
the attacks and to declare cease-fire. ETA’s response was more attacks and 
kidnapping of three diplomats in Madrid. The high tension resulted with an 
attempt of coup by security forces in February 1981.   Guardia Civil (Civil 350
Guard) and some military personal tried to take over the power of Spanish 
parliament, the Cortes, by saying that the government became incapable to stop 
ETA’s attacks. The King called military to obey the constitution and restore the 
order.   The attempt failed; however, many protests took place all over Spain.   351
!
After the unsuccessful coup attempt, ETA (pm) declared the cease-fire. 
However, the decision caused split among ETA (pm) and the group split into two; 
ETA (pm) VII -known as septimos- which were in favor of an end of armed 
struggle, and ETA (pm) VIII - known as octavos - which were against the idea of 
having a truce with central authorities. In 1982, ETA (pm) VII ended its actions 
after the contacts with Spanish authorities. And in 1983, ETA (pm) VIII merged 
with ETA (m).    352
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While political participation increased and Basques became more and 
more engaged with politics, ETA’s attacks continued. During 1980s, unsuccessful 
attempts took place to communicate with ETA and to solve the terrorism problem. 
As mentioned earlier, all these attempts will be explained in dedicated part of this 
thesis.   
!
The rights of Basque people caused the terrorism problem not only in 
Spain but also in France. Since the early 1960s, ETA maintained its headquarters 
and some support facilities on the French side of the border, mostly in the small 
towns and villages of the French Basque region. During 1960s and most of 1970s, 
French authorities tolerated ETA’s existence in France, as long as the organization 
did not organize attacks in the country.   As ETA members often attacked targets 353
in Spain then passed to France to get away from security forces, ETA problem 
became an issue between France and Spain. Spain wanted from France the return 
of known ETA militants to Spanish security forces, but most of the time France 
did not accept this proposition and proposed to deport ETA militants to the third 
countries. Within this context, during 1980, a new organization hit the surface 
under the name of Grupos Antiterroristas De Liberación, GAL (Antirerrorist 
Liberation Groups), which targeted ETA members both in Spain and France. The 
GAL was effective between 1983 and 1987. Later on 1990s, trails opened against 
the actions of GALs, and Spanish High Court stated that GAL was formed under 
governments approval and financial aid accumulated for the organization from 
State’s budget.    354
!
The main idea behind to creation of GAL was to force government of 
France to hand-over ETA militants back to Spain and to increase the cooperation 
between two countries. For many years, ETA had relations with French 
government and often use France territories as safe heaven to plan attacks and 
hide-out.  
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3.2.4. 1990s and 2000s !
In late 1980s, a new initiative occurred for the solution of Basque problem 
and ETA. On 12 January 1988, a pact was signed by multiple parties including 
nationalist PNV, and EA (Eusko Alkartasuna, Basque Solidarity). This pact also 
was known as Ajuria Enea Pact, as it signed in Ajuria Enea Palace, which is the 
presidential compound of Basque regional president. According to the Pact, ETA’s 
actions were considered as an obstacle on legal struggle for Basque rights. Parties 
stated that armed actions were not a way to achieve political goals. The pact 
affected 1990s on fight against terrorism. As HB often supported the ETA’s 
actions, it did not sign the pact.  
!
As the problem of Basque region was a concern for both Spain and 
France, two countries cooperation against ETA members increased during 1990s. 
Many high rank ETA directors were captured in France. More and more, ETA 
gave up to see France as a safe heaven. One of the major operations against ETA 
leaders in France was against the ETA leader Peio El Viejo. With the operation 
French police forces captured the ETA leader and many other ETA militants with 
him.   355
!
As the French-Spanish cooperation increased and state of Spain adopted 
heavy security measures, ETA took its armed attacks out of Basque Region. 
Starting from early 1990s, ETA carried out attacks in big cities like Madrid and 
Barcelona. ETA militants even tried to assassinate King Juan Carlos I and party 
leader and future Prime Minister José María Aznar. In 1996, Aznar took the office 
of Prime Minister and Spanish policies against ETA’s actions were hardened. 
After Aznar came into power, ETA shifted its attacks to Party Popular (PP, 
Partido Popular). A mayor of PP, Miguel Angel Blanco, was kidnapped by ETA. 
With the kidnap, ETA published a list of demands and gave 48 hours to Aznar’s 
Government to fulfill them. As ETA’s demand on transfer of convicted ETA 
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militants to prisons in Basque country rejected by the government, ETA killed 
Blanco.   The death of Blanco, raised the tension against ETA and protests took 356
place all over of Spain. During the funeral of Blanco, nearly two million people 
gathered in Madrid and protested ETA.   People shouted the famous slogan 357
‘Basta ya!’ (Enough!). The slogan later was carried as banner in other 
manifestations and in 1999 became the name of the civil initiative against the 
terrorist attacks and became the platform of victims of terrorist attacks. The HB 
was also protested, people threw rocks on HB offices and shouted as ‘HB you 
have to pay!’.   As a result of protests, ETA did not attack for two months; 358
however, afterwards it returned to terrorist attacks. In September 1998, ETA 
declared an indefinite and unconditional cease-fire; however, it broke out its 
cease-fire decision in late 1999.   359
!
Since the beginning of 2000s, a new solution seeking process started 
among Basque political sphere for the rights of Basque people. In 2003, Juan Jose 
Ibarretxe, the president of the Basque Country Autonomous Community between 
1999 - 2009 came up with a plan for the rights of Basque people. As the plan was 
majorly formed by Ibarretxe and announced by him, the plan was also known as 
“Ibarretxe Plan”. According to the plan, the new “Euskadi Community” described 
its relation with Spanish state as “Free Association”. This the plan tried to 
overthrown legal rights of Spanish State over the Basque Country. The plan also 
described that the Basque people of Basque Region would have Basque 
‘nationality’ in addition to Spanish citizenship, and the Spanish people who would 
live in Basque Country would have ‘the Basque citizenship’. According to the 
new Basque nationality explanation, Spaniards other than Basques would become 
‘legal aliens’ in Basque Country, which is a part of state of Spain. One can see 
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that, adaptation of citizenship-nationality duality would cause big problems in the 
minds of Spaniards. Nevertheless, introducing the Basque nationality even could 
be considered as a step away from the proclamation of independent Basque State.  
!
As the plan described the Basque regions of France as Basque country, the 
idea of unification of Spanish and France Basque regions was also introduced 
basically. The plan had explanations for every thing concerning an independent 
Basque State, including international relations of Euskadi Community, 
economical rules and internal affaires and so on. According to the plan, the 
Basque people of Euskadi Community would determine their future by 
referendum, and Spanish State would not veto the possible separation and 
declaration of an independent state decision of Basque people. 
!
The Ibarretxe Plan was considered as “treason” by Spanish politicians, 
who commonly stated that more autonomy to Basque country could end the unity 
of Spanish State. Mariona Rajoy, then Deputy Prime Minister, declared that the 
Ibarretxe Plan had the same objectives as ETA.   Common belief regarding the 360
plan was that, Basque people already had autonomy and they tried to gain 
independence by that plan.  
!
The Ibarretxe Plan needed to be accepted by the Basque Parliament and 
also by the Spanish Parliament to be put into force. As expected, Basque 
Parliament approved the plan; however, Spanish Parliament rejected it. Hence, the 
plan did not put into force; however, the discussion on political future of Basques 
and other people in Spain continued during following years.   
!
During the first decade of 2000, the cooperation between France and 
Spain continued. ETA operations stopped, ETA leaders were captured. More and 
more, ETA started to lose its support from the Basque people, and in international 
area, ETA started to be known as a terrorist organization rather than a liberation 
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movement. Within time, the government in Spain changed, and José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero became Prime Minister of Spain in 2004. As the government 
changed in Spain, ETA wanted to try to engage in talks with Spanish Government 
and declared a permanent cease-fire in March 2006.   Even though the 361
Government contacted with ETA, the talks did not give any outcome and ETA 
attacked to the Airport in Madrid, in December 2006.   With this attack, ETA 362
declared that so-called permanent cease-fire was over.  
!
During following years, ETA’s attacks continued in small scale; however, 
after the Madrid bombing, both Spanish and French security forces made 
operations against ETA and many ETA leaders were captured. As a result of heavy 
operations against ETA, the terrorist organization declared another cease-fire in 
September 2010. However, political parties and the government of Spain declared 
that the cease-fire decision was insufficient and demanded that ETA should give 
up weapons permanently.    As a result of public and political pressure, firstly 363
ETA declared that cease-fire as permanent in January 2011, then on 20 October 
2011, ETA broadcasted a video message and declared that the cease-fire was 
definitive and organization finished its armed struggle against Spanish security 
forces. Also they stated that ETA was ready to engage dialogue with both state of 
Spain and France.   ETA’s declaration was as following;  364
!
“With this declaration, Euskadi ta Askatasuna, the Basque socialist revolutionary 
organisation for national liberation, wishes to give news of its decision: 
Eta considers that the international conference that has recently taken place in the 
Basque country is an initiative of enormous significance. The agreed resolution 
includes all the elements for an integral solution of the conflict, and it has attained 
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the support of a wide spectrum of the Basque society and the international 
community. 
A new political time is emerging in the Basque country. We have an historical 
opportunity to find a just and democratic solution for the centuries old political 
conflict. Dialogue and agreement should outline the new cycle, over violence and 
repression. The recognition of the Basque country and the respect for the will of the 
people should prevail over imposition. 
This has not been an easy road. The cruelty of the fight has taken away the lives of 
many comrades. Many others are still suffering in prison and in exile. Our 
recognition and deepest tribute goes out to them. 
From here on the road will not be easy either. Facing the imposition that still exists, 
every step, every achievement, will be the result of the effort and fight of Basque 
citizens. During these years the Basque country has accumulated the necessary 
experience and strength to address this path and it also has the determination for 
doing it. It is time to look at the future with hope. It is also time to act with 
responsibility and courage. 
Therefore, Eta has decided the definitive cessation of its armed activity. Eta calls 
upon the Spanish and French governments to open a process of direct dialogue with 
the aim of addressing the resolution of the consequences of the conflict and, thus, to 
overcome the armed confrontation. Thorough this historical declaration, Eta shows 
its clear, solid and definitive commitment. 
Lastly, Eta calls upon the Basque society to commit to this process until freedom and 
peace are achieved. 
Long live the free Euskal Herria! Long live Basque socialism! No rest until 
independence and socialism! 
Basque country, 20 October 2011 
Euskadi ta Askatasuna 
Eta”   365
!
ETA’s declaration found place in international media, as well. All over the 
Europe and United States of America, ETA’s decision on finishing armed struggle 
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was welcomed by Governments and authorities. With the declaration of ETA, fear 
of terror finished in Spain, but not fade away completely. As ETA declared 
permanent cease-fire but later broke it and returned the terrorist attacks before, 
public opinion has doubts about ETA’s decision on finishing armed struggle. Until 
ETA declares that the organization diffuses itself and its name, ETA, points out 
just an organization in history not in actuality, the fear will be among the 
population. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!
!
!
4. POLITICAL WINGS OF TERRORISM 
!
!
4.1. Sinn Féin and IRA as a Reference Point 
!
This thesis takes the British case as a reference point for the cases of Spain 
and Turkey. To understand the relationship between Sinn Féin and IRA, and its 
relevance to this thesis, brief information about ‘North Ireland problem’ will be 
given below, and the Sinn Féin and IRA relationship will be examined to 
highlight the relation of politics and weapons.  
!
4.1.1. General Frame of Northern Ireland Problem !
As the British Empire conquered the island of Ireland in 12th century, the 
history of the problem goes back to that date. The British control of the island 
lasted until the aftermath of World War I, in 1922, when the Irish Republic was 
proclaimed. Historically, the British rule and its existence are widely accepted as 
the base of long lasted dispute in the island. With the British rule, many 
Protestants immigrated to the island where the population was Catholic, once. As 
English men and Irish men differentiate themselves on the terms of sects of 
religion, the Northern Ireland problem has also a religious basis. Irish historians 
often claims that, a part from religious basis, British rule always treated 
Protestants with favor, such as giving land on the island. With this unequal 
treatment of British rule, Catholics struggle to have an equal treatment. 
!
Sinn Féin - means ‘Ourselves’ in English - was founded in 1905 by Arthur 
Griffith with the goal of creating an independent Irish State by politics. As a result 
of British rule’s suppression policies, the idea of having an independent state 
backed by the Irish people and Sinn Féin gained the support of the population 
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from its creation. While the Sinn Féin wanted to pursue its way within politics, 
high tension continued between Catholics and Protestants regarding great 
differences in life conditions. As a result of the high tension, the clashes occurred 
in 1916.   The rebellion of 1916 was named as Eastern Rising and by the 366
rebellion, Irish militants wanted to gain independence from the British Empire. 
The 1916 Eastern Rising was also the scene where the roots of Irish Republican 
Army; Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizens Army showed themselves. In 1919, Irish 
Volunteers regrouped and formed Irish Republican Army (IRA, Óglaigh na 
hÉireann).  
!
The clashes between British and Irish forces finished with Anglo-Irish 
Treaty, in 1921. The Sinn Féin delegates signed the treaty and by the treaty, 
Northern Ireland, consisted six counties of Ulster, stayed under the rule of the 
United Kingdom. In 1922, the Irish Republic became self-governing state under 
the name of Irish Free State. As the new state did not include the Northern 
Ireland, the conflict occurred among the population and also caused the first split 
of Sinn Féin. After the conflict, Catholics started to be called as ‘Nationalist’ as 
they seek to form a ‘United Ireland’ and Protestants started be called as ‘Unionist’ 
as they were in favor of British rule.  
!
The 1916 Eastern Rising was the starting point of the cooperation between 
military forces and politicians. The Irish Volunteers, which later became IRA, 
came under the control of Irish Assembly, and Sinn Féin political organization, 
which was backed by the Irish people had the legitimacy on the signing of Anglo-
Irish Treaty. Two wings of Irish movements worked together for the same goal.  
!
Sinn Féin is in politics of Ireland more than a century; however, the 
organization faced with many splits but succeeded to preserve itself. For the 
purpose of this thesis, only the last two splits will be examined to understand 
today’s Sinn Féin and its relation with Provisional IRA. 
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4.1.2. Sinn Féin and IRA, After 1970 !
Sinn Féin maintained its goals and policies since the beginning. The 
organization preserved its desire of ‘United Ireland’ by seeking to set Northern 
Ireland free from British rule. The goal of the creation of ‘United Ireland’ was 
common between IRA and Sinn Féin, and IRA faced with the split within itself as 
well as Sinn Féin.  
!
By 1970, Sinn Féin party members, who demanded the equality between 
Catholics and Protestants, adopted leftist policies and pursued their goal by non-
violent politics. This group started to be called as ‘Official Sinn Féin’. Official 
Sinn Féin later changed its name to ‘Sinn Féin the Workers Party’ in 1977 and 
then to ‘The Workers’ Party’ in 1982.   By becoming the Workers Party, Official 367
Sinn Féin transformed it self to another organization and the name Sinn Féin 
stayed with the other wing. 
!
The other wing of Sinn Féin, who preserved the idea of separatism for 
Northern Ireland, started to be called as ‘Provisional Sinn Féin’. By its policies, 
Provisional Sinn Féin became the representative of Catholics.   Sinn Féin 368
defined its goal as to lead all Irish people and form a United Ireland.  
!
As it happened with Sinn Féin, IRA split itself into two groups around the 
question of usage of violence. Official IRA chose the way to form a new political 
structure both among North and South Ireland to create a United Ireland by non-
violent acts. They recognized the South and North administrations, which was 
against the original idea of IRA as the IRA did not accept the two-administration 
structure in island of Ireland. Since the Official IRA gave up the armed struggle 
ideas of original IRA, this thesis focuses on the other wing of IRA, Provisional 
IRA. 
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The Provisional IRA was formed as a response to the Catholics demands 
on protection against Protestants. The Provisional IRA conducted the armed 
struggle in Northern Ireland against British forces and continued to refuse the 
administrations both in North and South. They also claimed that IRA Army 
Council was the main organ, which acted as governments in the island of Ireland. 
The cooperation between Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Féin continued 
during 1970s, and the British rule was aware of it; nevertheless, Sinn Féin was 
never closed down by the British rule.   Instead, British Government took other 369
measures to control the acts of Sinn Féin. These measures will be examined in 
coming lines. 
!
In 1986, another split occurred in Sinn Féin over the policies of the party 
against the Assembly of the Republic of Ireland. In its congress, majority of Sinn 
Féin delegates voted in favor to end up abstentionism policy in the Assembly. 
Until that time, as Sinn Féin did not recognized the Assembly of the Republic of 
Ireland, elected members did not take their seats in the assembly. The discussion 
paved the way for another party. The Republican Sinn Féin was formed by the 
members who were in favor to pursue the abstentionism. They declare that their 
candidates for elections would not enter the assembly in case of being elected. 
Republican Sinn Féin did not have major support from the Irish people.  
!
On the other hand, Provisional Sinn Féin under the Garry Adams 
leadership - he is still the leader of Sinn Féin - continued to be in politics and took 
its places in the administrative organs of Northern Ireland; however, even though 
they entered the general elections in the United Kingdom, but never took their 
seats in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Even they do not take the oath of 
allegiance. 
!
The connection between provisional wings of IRA and Sinn Féin became 
clear with Garry Adams’ leadership in Sinn Féin. Garry Adams was in the 
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leadership of IRA between 1977 and 1978.   Within time, Garry Adams became 370
the leader of Sinn Féin from the leadership of IRA. One of the evidences of 
relation between Sinn Féin and IRA took place in 1981 Hunger Strike. Mostly the 
IRA members participated the Hunger Strike, which lasted 217 days, and Bobby 
Sands, who was elected for the Parliament of the United Kingdom from the Sinn 
Féin list, died. Sinn Féin as political organization supported the Hunger Strike.  371
During 1980s, Sinn Féin gained support among the Irish population by supporting 
to IRA’s actions.  
!
With the splits of 1970 and 1986, the core of Sinn Féin was preserved 
under the leadership of Garry Adams; however, the organization adopted more 
flexible attitude towards the participation in administration system of Northern 
Ireland. Additionally, historical connection and cooperation between IRA and 
Sinn Féin was preserved itself throughout years. 
!
From the split of 1970, the policies of provisional wings of Sinn Féin and 
IRA formed around the United Ireland desire. IRA was seeking to set Northern 
Ireland free, and if necessary with an armed struggle. For IRA, the usage of 
violence was taken into account as a way to the freedom of the Ireland, and as 
already mentioned, with the splits within Sinn Féin, group had occurred with the 
similar ideas. Briefly, while IRA was conducting an armed struggle, Sinn Féin 
was being active in politics; nonetheless, Sinn Féin supported the IRA’s way of 
struggle for the United Ireland. Started in 1969-1970, IRA engaged the armed 
campaign against the British forces, which lasted thirty years.  
!
4.1.3. British Measures Against Political Party-Terrorism Connection !
The connection between Sinn Féin and IRA existed for a long time in the 
history of Ireland. Both of them faced with internal splits within their 
organizational structure and ideas; however, these internal problems did not 
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become obstacles on their way to preserve themselves. For IRA, it was easy to 
carry on its actions as it was accepted as illegal organization by the British rule. 
Sinn Féin existed and is still active as political party, which is recognized by the 
British rule, it’s continuous existence depended on British legal system for 
political parties. Party ban method is not a used measure in the United Kingdom, 
which paved the way for the long existence of Sinn Féin.  
!
As the closing political parties was not a way of dealing with them in 
British politics, measures of British rule generally concentrated on individual 
levels. At the individual level, British system closed down the way for the 
politicians who were imprisoned more than one year to become a member of 
parliaments. With this, the main idea was to keep away convicted politicians who 
supported the terrorist acts, from becoming the voice of people in the 
administrative organs of the United Kingdom. As the British system forced 
politicians not to defend any illegal organization and its attacks, ‘Elected 
Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act of 1989’ forced every elected local authority to 
take the oath not to support the terrorism activities and organizations.    372
!
A part from the legal necessities to become the voice of people, active 
members of political parties were forced not to speak to public by broadcasts 
about any terrorist actions. The Broadcasting Ban in 1988 was clearly put in force 
to stop Sinn Féin members to give declarations on TVs. As the IRA and Sinn Féin 
were accepted as connected, British rule prohibited any declarations of the 
members of Sinn Féin. However, Sinn Féin members found a way to make public 
declarations, which noted as an historical act.   
!
When the Broadcasting Ban was introduced, the clashes between IRA and 
British forces was at high level. IRA was using violence in daily basis, and Sinn 
Féin often made declarations to defend and support IRA’s actions. Within these 
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conditions, the British Government believed that they should find a way to stop 
Sinn Féin. Even, the ban did not clearly target Sinn Féin by giving its name, 
instead every political organizations that supported the acts of IRA and spoke 
about violence; Sinn Féin was the real target to stop. The law said that direct 
declarations were prohibited; however did not mention its way of practice. Hence, 
the broadcaster did not know exactly what to do and not to do. Sinn Féin was 
totally sure about that the law was put into force to stop their campaign, and they 
started to ask to television and radio stations to find out what could be done. Main 
claim of the British Parliament for the ban was that: when people saw Garry 
Adams and others from the leadership of Sinn Féin were defending IRA and 
violence, the tension was raising among the population.  
!
Sinn Féin found the solution to broadcasting ban by using actor’s voices. 
Garry Adams and other leaders of Sinn Féin wrote down their declarations by 
their own words; however, instead of them, actors read these declarations. By the 
usage of actor’s voices, Sinn Féin might not use its own voice; however, as they 
wrote the words, declarations were broadcasted indirectly. With this work-around, 
the broadcasting ban was never violated. The broadcast ban was lifted in 1994, 
after the cease-fire declarations of IRA.   373
!
Political terrorism has the connection of political parties and terrorist 
organizations in its nature. Two different approaches fight for the same goal in the 
structure of a certain country. If one takes into account the various definitions of 
terrorism which were explained in the first part of this thesis, and the common 
discourses on terrorism that is also popular among social scientists, ‘one man’s 
terrorists is another man’s freedom fighters or heroes’, Sinn Féin’s defensive 
declarations on IRA attacks and Irish people’s support to Sinn Féin can be 
understood in a wider perspective. 
!
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Among Irish people, IRA was accepted as freedom fighters and Sinn Féin 
was accepted as a legitimate representative in politics. As the British rule also 
accepted the Sinn Féin as a legitimate political organization and voice people, the 
political party was never closed down, even though their leaders’ declarations 
were restricted or politicians was kept away by laws. One can say that British 
authorities took into account that closing a political party never could be a 
solution to any problem and did not prevent the people to form an another one. 
Therefore, in the British experience, British authorities never tried to silence 
people by closing down political parties; however, as a legitimate actions, British 
rule tried to eliminate politicians who supported the violence. The British 
experience shows that punishment for the individuals who supported the violent 
actions that effected the general population and public safety, is more convenient 
than closing the political parties.  
!
!
4.2. Kurds in Politics, Effects of PKK 
!
4.2.1. During Ottoman Empire !
 Kurdish existence in politics in the history of Turkey goes back to  the 
Tanzimat Period of the Ottoman Empire. As Tanzimat period gave chance to the 
creation of political organizations, Kurds created the first political organization in 
1908  ; Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid (Kürt Terakki ve Teavun 374
Cemiyeti).   This society had members from famous Kurdish families, in other 375
words, tribes. As the activities of Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid 
increased, Young Turks, which formed a government under Ottoman Sultan’s 
rule, considered the organization as a potential threat to their authority and shut it 
down in 1909. Then, Kurds tried to be an active political player in the Ottoman 
politics with the creation of a second Kurdish political organization, Hevi-i Kürt 
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Cemiyeti (Kurdish Hope Society) at the beginning of 1912; however, this 
organization did not last very long and was closed in very short time.   376
!
 During the aftermath of the World War I, Kurds founded another political 
organization with the name of Society for the Progress of Kurdistan (Kürdistan 
Teali Cemiyeti) based in Istanbul on 17 December 1918.   The Society opened 377
branches in other cities and started to promote Kurdish nationalism among 
people.   The Society for the Progress of Kurdistan was effective during already 378
explained Koçgiri rebellion, and the organization closed down in 1921, after the 
suppression of the Koçgiri Rebellion. 
!
 Kurds were also a part of the resistance movement in Anatolia. During the 
resistance movements, Mustafa Kemal organized congress to gather people and 
talked about the resistance and its aftermath. As Kurds were important actors on 
politics, Mustafa Kemal invited them to Erzurum Congress in 23 July-7 August 
1919.   Maybe they did not formed another political organization during the time 379
of resistance movements; however, by being present in the congress, they 
participated actively to the political sphere at that time. The first National 
Assembly of Turkey was officially opened on 23 April 1920, in which Kurdish 
MPs existed. 
!
4.2.2. Kurds in Politics in New Republic 
  
 The Republic of Turkey was declared on 23 October 1923. A month before 
the declaration, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his companions founded a political 
party under the name of ‘People’s Party’ on 9 September 1923. The name of the 
party changed into ‘Republican People’s Party’ (CHP) in 1935 as it is today.  380
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The Republican People’s Party was the only political party until 1945, which 
ruled Turkey until the elections of 1950.  
!
 Democrat Party was founded on 7 January 1946, and entered the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey in 1946 as opposition party. Four years later after 
the first multi party election, Democrat party won the general elections of 1950 
and took over the power from Republican People’s Party for the first time. The 
elections of 1950 hold significant importance on the political history of Turkey as 
it ended the single-party rule period (1923-1950).  
  
 DP rule lasted until the military intervention of 1960. After the military 
intervention,  constitution of 1961 was introduced, which was more liberal than 
the previous constitution on the subject of the creation of political parties. As 
Kurds were in politics as members of CHP and DP, other political parties was 
started to be founded. 
!
 DP was closed by the military intervention of 1960. Instead of DP, new 
political parties were founded. On 11 February 1961, Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, 
AP) and on 13 February 1961, New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, YTP) 
were established. YTP had the support of local elites in the Kurdish populated 
areas and received more than 30% of votes in the east during the elections of 
1961, and became the partner of the government with six ministries in the CHP-
led coalition government.    381
!
 One of the political parties, which was effective on the creation of Kurdish 
awareness of ethnic identity, was Turkish Workers’ Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 
TİP), which was founded in 1961. As stated on previous parts of the thesis, TIP 
was the first party, which accepted the Kurdish reality in the politics of Turkey. 
Their proposition for the solution of Kurdish problem was recognition of Kurds as 
separate nation, and changing the state regime needed to federation.   As 382
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expected, the Constitutional Court closed the Turkish Workers’ Party on 20 July 
1971.   383
!
 Reliance Party (Güven Partisi, GP), which was founded on 12 May 1967 
by a group of broke away CHP MPs.   GP managed to receive votes from 384
Kurdish populated areas.   According to Kirişçi and Winrow, in the elections of 385
1965 and 1969, Kurds also supported independent candidates.   One can see that 386
Kurds have been active in elections with supporting political party’s candidates, if 
not independent candidates.  
!
 During 1970s, Kurds continued to be active in politics in elections; 
moreover, young Kurds had been in student organizations in major cities. Student 
organizations were mainly founded over Marxist-Leninist revolutionist ideas, 
which was also the idea that PKK was founded over. During late 1970s, leftist and 
rightist student groups and youth groups of political parties fought with each 
other, political and social chaos and violence spread fear among population. All of 
these paved the way for another military intervention on 12 September 1980.    387
!
 The military intervention of 1980 suspended all political activities of any 
kind. Political parties and all student organizations were closed. The Turkish 
Armed Forces ruled the country through the National Security Council for three 
years. A new constitution was introduced in 1982 and the country returned to the 
democracy in 1983. 
!
 The new constitution re-set the rules of political life in Turkey. The 
constitution of 1982 was accepted by a referendum on 7 November 1982, which 
is still in use in Turkey. The constitution has 177 articles; some of them describe 
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the main duty of the state and the roles of political parties. Article 5 explains the 
duties of state as; 
  
 “Article 5: The fundamental aims and duties of the state are; to safeguard the 
independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, 
the Republic and democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the 
individual and society; to strive for the removal of political, social and economic 
obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a 
manner incompatible with the principles of justice and of the social state governed 
by the rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for the development of the 
individual’s material and spiritual existence.”   388!
 One can see that the constitution made state responsible from itself. State 
centric article focused, primarily on the independence and integrity of the nation, 
indivisibility of the country, then secondly, put population’s welfare and 
happiness as duties. This shows that the fear about the territorial integrity started 
to show itself from the beginning of the constitution.  
!
 As the constitution has articles nearly for every scenario, Article 26 
described the freedom of express as;  
  
 “Article 26. (As amended on October 17, 2001): Everyone has the right to express 
and disseminate his thoughts and opinion by speech, in writing or in pictures or 
through other media, individually or collectively. This right includes the freedom to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference from official 
authorities. This provision shall not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, 
television, cinema, and similar means to a system of licensing. !
The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of protecting 
national security, public order and public safety, the basic characteristics of the 
Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and 
nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly 
classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation and rights and private and 
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family life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or 
ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary. 
The regulating provisions regarding the use of dissemination means of news and 
thoughts shall not be regarded as restriction of freedom of expression and 
dissemination of thoughts, provided that such provisions do not hinder publications 
thereof.  
The formalities, conditions and procedures to be applied in exercising the right to 
expression and dissemination of thought shall be prescribed by law.” 
  
 The article guaranteed the freedom of expression; however, made it 
possible to interpret any idea as ‘against the indivisible integrity of the State with 
its territory and nation’. Basically, any expression about the Kurdish existence can 
be considered as a threat to the integrity and may be restricted. This article gives 
fear to the individuals and political parties to talk about Kurdish existence and the 
Kurdish problem. 
!
 Section tree of the constitution described how to form a political party and 
principles to be observed by the political parties by two articles; !
!
“III. Provisions Relating to Political Parties 
A. Forming Parties, Membership and Withdrawal From Membership in 
a Party 
ARTICLE 68. (As amended on July 23, 1995: 4121/6 Article) 
Citizens have the right to form political parties and in accordance with the 
established procedure to join and withdraw from them. One must be over 18 years of 
age to become a member of a party. 
Political parties are indispensable elements of democratic political life. 
Political parties can be formed without prior permission and shall pursue their 
activities in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Constitution and law. 
The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall 
not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its 
territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, 
sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they 
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shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any 
kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime. 
 Judges and prosecutors, members of higher judicial organs including those of 
the Court of Accounts, civil servants in public institutions and organizations, other 
public servants who are not considered to be labourers by virtue of the services they 
perform, members of the armed forces and students who are not yet in higher 
education institutions, shall not become members of political parties. 
The membership of the teaching staff at higher education institutions in 
political parties is regulated by law. This law cannot allow those members to assume 
responsibilities outside the central organs of the political parties. It also sets forth the 
regulations which the teaching staff at higher education institutions shall observe as 
members of political parties. 
The principles concerning the membership of students at higher education 
institutions to political parties are regulated by law. 
The state shall provide the political parties with adequate financial means in 
an equitable manner. The financial assistance to be extended to political parties, as 
well as procedures related to collection of membership dues and donations are 
regulated by law. 
B. Principles to be Observed by Political Parties 
ARTICLE 69. (As amended on July 23, 1995 and October 17, 2001) 
The decision to dissolve a political party permanently owing to activities 
violating the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 68 may be rendered only 
when the Constitutional Court determines that the party in question has become a 
centre for the execution of such activities. 
The activities, internal regulations and operation of political parties shall be in 
line with democratic principles. The application of these principles is regulated by 
law. 
Political parties shall not engage in commercial activities. 
 The income and expenditure of political parties shall be consistent with their 
objectives. The application of this rule is regulated by law. The auditing of the 
income, expenditure and acquisitions of political parties by the Constitutional Court 
as well as the establishment of the conformity to law of their revenue and expenses, 
methods of auditing and sanctions to be applied in the event of unconformity shall 
also be regulated by law. The Constitutional Court shall be assisted in performing its 
task of auditing by the Court of Accounts. The judgments rendered by the 
Constitutional Court as a result of the auditing shall be final. 
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The dissolution of political parties shall be decided finally by the 
Constitutional Court after the filing of a suit by the office of the Chief Public 
Prosecutor of the Republic. 
The permanent dissolution of a political party shall be decided when it is 
established that the statute and programme of the political party violate the 
provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 68. 
The decision to dissolve a political party permanently owing to activities 
violating the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 68 may be rendered only 
when the Constitutional Court determines that the party in question has become a 
centre for the execution of such activities. A political party shall be deemed to 
become the centre of such actions only when such actions are carried out intensively 
by the members of that party or the situation is shared implicitly or explicitly by the 
grand congress, general chairmanship or the central decision-making or 
administrative organs of that party or by the group’s general meeting or group 
executive board at the Turkish Grand National Assembly or when these activities are 
carried out in determination by the above-mentioned party organs directly. 
Instead of dissolving them permanently in accordance with the above-
mentioned paragraphs, the Constitutional Court may rule the concerned party to be 
deprived of State aid wholly or in part with respect to intensity of the actions 
brought before the court. 
A party which  has been dissolved permanently cannot be founded under 
another name. 
The members, including the founders of a political party whose acts or 
statements have caused the party to be dissolved permanently cannot be founders, 
members, directors or supervisors in any other party for a period of five years from 
the date of publication in the official gazette of the Constitutional Court’s final 
decision and its justification for permanently dissolving the party. 
Political parties which accept financial assistance from foreign states, 
international institutions and persons and corporate bodies shall be dissolved 
permanently. 
The foundation and activities of political parties, their supervision and 
dissolution, or their deprival of State aid wholly or in part as well as the election 
expenditures and procedures of the political parties and candidates, are regulated by 
law in accordance with the above-mentioned principles.” 
!
 These articles and others regarding political life in Turkey restrict the 
political parties on their ideas and policies. The 1982 Constitution authorizes the 
Constitutional Court to close any anti-system political party. This arrangement 
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aims to prevent any kind of act carried out by any political party, which spoils the 
foundational principles of the regime and the state. These principles inevitably 
cover the indivisible integrity of the state, with its nation and territory. Within 
perspective of democracy, it is possible to see that by the constitution, state 
created a limited space, which is restricted and always kept under the heavy 
control of central authorities. Consequently, not just Kurdish parties but various 
parties have been closed over the years with accusation of being an ‘anti-system’ 
parties. 
!
 The National Security Council put a new rule to the election system of 
Turkey. 10% election threshold has been introduced and it was undermined the 
chance of representation of the small political parties.   Mostly, Kurdish political 389
parties suffered from this high threshold percentage. 
!
 After the military intervention and the introduction of the constitution of 
1982, Turkey returned to the democracy with the elections of 1983. As National 
Security Council observed the creation of political parties, and had the right to 
veto of any party, only three political parties entered the elections. Motherland 
Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), People’s Party (Halkçı Parti, HP), Nationalist 
Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, MDP) participated in the election 
of 1983 and ANAP won the majority of votes under the leadership of Turgut Özal 
who later became the President of the Republic of Turkey.   390
!
 With the return to democracy, other political parties were also formed. 
Political parties and politicians tried to avoid the Kurdish problem in political 
discourses. As PKK started its armed attacks against Turkish forces in 1984, 
Kurdish question lost its importance and terrorism problem took the first place in 
state’s agenda. After the creation of PKK, Kurds also started to form their political 
parties; however, every Kurdish parties stayed under the shadow of PKK. 
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4.2.3. Kurdish Parties, PKK’s Domination !
 As the military intervention closed CHP, the founder party of the republic, 
a new party was formed under the name of Social Democracy Party (Sosyal 
Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP) to take on CHP’s role. The party later merged with 
the People’s Party and gained the name Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP) in 1985. During the elections of 1987, Kurdish 
candidates entered the elections under SHP flag and then took seat in the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey.   In 1989, a group of Kurdish MPs from SHP 391
attended to Kurdish national identity conference in Paris. Attendance to the 
conference in Paris resulted with their expulsion from SHP.    392
!
 In 1990, expelled Kurdish MPs formed the first Kurdish political party, 
People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP).   Abdullah Öcalan, founder of 393
PKK, was mainly against the creation of HEP, as he considered an organization 
outside his control could divide the Kurds. Nevertheless, PKK engaged with HEP 
and tried to control it. For the elections of 1991, HEP and SHP formed a political 
pact to act together. As a result of this pact, twenty-two HEP representatives were 
elected and entered to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey from the list of 
SHP. Abdullah Öcalan declared that he supported the idea of the electoral pact 
between SHP and HEP.   394
!
 On 6 November 1991, during the ceremony of the oath of allegiance in the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Leyla Zana, Kurdish MP, came into the hall 
wearing a headband, which had colors of PKK flag and tried to take to oath in 
Kurdish and changed the text.   This caused high-tensioned debates not only in 395
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the Assembly, but also among the Turkish society. Mass media put these efforts 
on headlines on the next day.    396
!
 In March 1992, fourteen HEP MPs that entered the parliament under SHP 
flag, resigned from SHP and rejoined HEP.   During its congress, HEP hung 397
PKK flags, which used as an evidence of their relations with PKK.   HEP was 398
banned by the Constitutional Court’s decision on 14 July 1993. HEP’s activities 
were against the ‘indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation’.   399
!
 In October 1992, before the closure of HEP, some members of HEP 
formed another political party under the name of Freedom and Democracy Party 
(Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi, ÖZDEP).   However, with similar reasons of 400
the closure of HEP, ÖZDEP was banned by Constitutional Court’s decision on 23 
November 1993.   401
!
 As Kurds were already aware of a possibility of closure for ÖZDEP, they 
had formed another political party with the name of Democracy Party (Demokrasi 
Partisi, DEP) on 7 May 1993.   According to Dündar, PKK was effective on 402
formation of DEP, and even Abdullah Öcalan stated that DEP should be under the 
PKK’s control; otherwise, they could not get any support from Kurds.   In 403
January 1994, during DEP congress, PKK flag was hung and participants gave 
discourses in which the State of Turkey was described as an occupying power in 
Kurdish populated areas.   In February 1994, PKK attacked and killed young 404
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military school students in a railway station, and a DEP MP denied the terrorist 
characteristic of the attack and said “During war, these things happen, everyone in 
uniforms is a target”.    In March 1994, the immunities of thirteen DEP MPs’ 405
were lifted as a consequence of their discourses and actions, and prosecution 
process started which resulted with the imprisonment of seven DEP MPs and one 
independent.   The Constitutional Court banned DEP on 16 June 1994 for similar 406
reasons to HEP and ÖZDEP.   407
!
 During the trail of closure for DEP, another Kurdish political party was 
formed. People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP) was 
founded in 1993, and always described itself as not a Kurdish party but a party for 
everyone. HADEP tried to maintain its distance with PKK in order not to be 
banned. In 1999, during his interrogation, Abdullah Öcalan said that PKK 
provided economic aid on the creation of HADEP.    408
!
 Until its congress in 1996, the idea, which used to assume that HADEP 
was different from its predecessors was common among the political sphere. 
During its congress, participants took down the flag of Turkey and hung PKK 
banner. As a result, all party members were arrested.   Later, in 1999, the 409
Supreme Court chief prosecutor applied to Constitutional Court with the demand 
of ban for HADEP. The prosecutors argued that HADEP had become legal wing 
for illegal PKK activities. The party offices and other capabilities were 
consequently serving as tools of terrorist propaganda. Moreover, as mentioned 
before, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan said that PKK provided economic aid on 
the creation of HADEP.   The trail process took four years and on 13 March 410
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2003, the party met the same fate as its predecessors, and was banned by the 
Constitutional Court for having separatist goals and connections with PKK.   411
!
 As it happened before, Kurds formed another political party before the 
closure of HADEP. However, as the lifetime of HADEP lasted longer than 
expected, time frame between HADEP and the new party was different than the 
previous examples. Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi, 
DEHAP) was founded in 1997; however, it was not highly active before the 
closure of HADEP. After the closure of HADEP in 2003, DEHAP took its place in 
the political area. As DEHAP was the continuation of HADEP, HADEP delegates 
joined DEHAP immediately. For instance, 35 mayors of municipalities joined to 
DEHAP.   412
!
 DEHAP was not different from previous political parties regarding its ties 
with PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan. In September 2005, DEHAP organized 
a meeting near the İmralı Island where the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan is in 
prison. The main goal of the meeting was to carry out a demonstration for the 
release of the prisoned leader of the PKK.   In every meeting of DEHAP, it was 413
possible to see photos of Abdullah Öcalan and PKK flags. Among the Turkish 
population, protests started to rise against DEHAP, and party merged with another 
Kurdish organization, the Democratic Society Movement (Democratik Toplum 
Hareketi, DTH) initiated in 2005 by Leyla Zana, who tried to take the oath in 
Kurdish in 1991. DTH members discourses on certain incidents supported their 
claim on being a mass movement in Turkey. For instance, in 2005 during the 
Nowruz celebration, flag of Turkey was set on fire. Right after this event, DTH 
members made declarations to condemn the flag burning incident. Leyla Zana 
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said, “Flag is our common value”.   On 9 November 2005, this movement 414
formed another political party; Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum 
Partisi, DTP). 
!
 As DTH transformed itself to DTP, the party described itself as a mass 
party for everyone in Turkey.   However, party members were charged with 415
supporting PKK.  For instance, on 2 September 2006, 12 DTP members were 
arrested after police search of the offices of the Party, as the authorities discovered 
PKK documents and posters.   As happened in previous cases of Kurdish 416
political parties, discourses and declarations of DTP members were watched 
closely by the Supreme Court Chief Prosecutor. Even though DTP was an existing 
political party, due to the ten percent election threshold, Kurds entered the 
elections of 2007 with independent candidates. 19 MPs entered the parliament, 
then another independent candidate joined DTP and party reached 20 MPs in the 
assembly, which is necessary to form Party group in the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey.   And in 2007, prosecutor applied to Constitutional Court with the 417
demand of ban for DTP by claiming that it became the wing of PKK; and the 
members were making propaganda of the its actions, the discourses and actions of 
the DTP were against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and 
nation.   The trail process took two years and on 11 December 2009, DTP was 418
banned by the Constitutional Court.   419
!
 As the closure trail started in 2007, an alternate Kurdish political party 
was formed on 2 May 2008 in case of the ban of DTP. Peace and Democracy 
 131
!  Ahmet Hakan, “Zana: Bayrak Ortak Değerimizdir”, Hürriyet, 22 March 2005, <http://414
hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=305702>, site visited on 28 November 2012.
!  “Demokratik Toplum Partisi Kuruldu”, Bianet, 10 November 2005, <http://bianet.org/bianet/415
siyaset/70037-demokratik-toplum-partisi-kuruldu>, site visited on 28 November 2012.
!  “12 DTP’li Tutuklandı”, Milliyet, 2 September 2006, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/09/02/416
siyaset/siy08.html>, site visited on 28 November 2012.
!  Dündar, op. cit., p. 241.417
!  “Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı DTP Hakkında Kapatma Davası Açtı”, Milliyet, 16 418
November 2007, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/11/16/son/sonsiy14.asp>, site visited on 28 
November 2012.
!  Whole text of decision can be found in (Turkish): “Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı”, Constitutional 419
Court of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?
l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2756&content=>, site visited on 28 November 
2012.  
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) took over the political space of DTP 
after its closure. Like the elections of 2007, BDP did not enter the elections of 
2011 as a party, but supported independent candidates. 36 independent candidates 
entered the parliament, 29 of them later formed party group in the Assembly.   At 420
time of writing this thesis, allocation of seats according to following parties is;  
!
!
!
!
!
!
Table III:   Seats per Political Parties 421
 BDP is not the only party who has Kurdish originated MPs. Other parties 
also have MPs who are elected from Kurdish populated areas. Consequently, BDP 
is not the only representative of Kurds in the Assembly; however, Kurds are 
mostly pointing out BDP as their political representative; even they voted for 
other parties also. 
!
 At the time of writing this thesis, BDP stands as a Kurdish political party 
in Turkey. A part from BDP, Kurds have also Democratic Society Congress 
(Demokratik Toplum Kongresi, DTK) as a political organization. The co-leaders 
of DTP are Aysel Tuğluk and Ahmet Türk who were the leaders of banned DTP. 
As Constitutional Court also banned Aysel Tuğluk and Ahmet Türk from forming 
any political parties, being member of political parties for five years in 
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Republican People’s Party (CHP) 134
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 52
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) 29
Independent 6
Total 548
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2009,   DTK become a tool for their political activities. In 2011, DTK declared 422
so-called ‘democratic autonomy’ in Kurdish populated areas, which caused a 
negative reaction among the population.    423
!
 With respect to all aforementioned information about political activities of 
Kurds, it is possible to say that until creation of first the Kurdish political party, 
HEP in 1990, Kurds had not been completely engaged with politics with Kurdish 
identity. With formation of HEP, Kurdish political parties trend started; however, 
every Kurdish party was accused of being the wing of PKK, and was banned by 
Constitutional Court.  
!
 HEP, ÖZDEP, DEP, HADEP, and DTP were Kurdish political parties, 
which were banned by the Constitutional Court. On each cases, the Constitutional 
Court pointed out certain articles of the Constitution of Turkey and the Law of 
Political Parties. 
!
 In each closure case, the Supreme Court Prosecutor described the 
activities of parties and members as against to independence of the state, its 
indivisible integrity with its territory and nation by pointing out of the 
Preamble   of the Constitution and Articles 68 and 69, which were quoted in 424
previous pages. A part from articles from the Constitution, articles from the Law 
of Political Parties were given as reasons for the ban as well. Articles 78, 80, 81, 
82, 90 explain the limit of political parties in terms of party programs, materials, 
etc. These articles underline that political parties cannot claim existence of 
minorities in terms of race, religion, and language difference, and cannot form 
party policies against the national security, territorial integrity, national 
independence, and so on. 
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 If aforementioned articles examined in details, one can see that political 
sphere in Turkey is very limited and restricted. Political parties’ actions, and 
politicians’ discourses are under state’s full-time observation. The Constitution of 
1982 and laws regarding this constitution set very strict rules for politics, and 
demand total obedience to this rules.  As these articles and laws regarding 
political parties and political life can be interpreted in very large scale, any party 
slogan or poster, any public discourse from a politician can be considered as 
against the law. This situation is a problem not just for Kurds, but for all political 
parties and party members. Even as a citizen, no one can express his/her ideas if 
they are against State’s policy on certain subjects like, territorial integrity or unity 
of the nation and so on. However, in case of Kurdish political parties and PKK 
connection, PKK’s actions bring only problems to the Kurdish political 
movement. As PKK has interfered the candidate selection process, party congress, 
party leaders etc., party members felt obliged not to condemn any PKK actions 
and support them by their discourses and propaganda meetings in eastern Turkey. 
Closure decisions for Kurdish political parties came from party members talks in 
public, parties’ slogans and posters. Their ‘unclear’ statements about PKK actions 
were interpreted as against the law by the State and as a consequence, parties 
were closed and party members were banned from political activities.  
!
 During 1990s, the situation of Turkish political sphere was heavily 
disorganized. As the coalition governments were in power, there were no political 
stability in the country. Therefore, there were no economic stability either. Within 
context, Kurdish problem could not be solved, and terrorism problem grew. There 
were previous attempts to solve the Kurdish problem; however, none of them 
reached the solution. With the election of 2002, the political life has changed in 
Turkey. Under the AKP Governments, certain regulations have been changed on 
Kurdish issue, and at the end of 2012 a new solution process has started. All 
attempts to solve Kurdish problem and terrorism problem will be examined in the 
next part of this thesis. 
!
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4.3. The Basque Political Life, Effect of ETA 
!
4.3.1. Arana’s Legacy  !
 As stated in previous part, Basque political life was formed around 
nationalist ideas of Sabino Arana. Arana described Basque people as historical 
people and often made references to history of fueros for the rights of Basque 
people. Sabino Arana transformed his nationalist ideas to political movement with 
the creation of Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). From its creation, PNV formed 
its policies around Arana’s ideas. The main goal was to gain all historical rights 
for Basque people and, if possible, the independence for Basque regions.  
!
 The PNV, which was formed in 1895, stands as the second old political 
party of Spain. With respect to party’s name in Basque language (Euzko Alderdi 
Jeltzalea, which means literally ‘Basque Party of Supporters of God and Old 
Laws’), it is possible to say that references to the history of Basque people are 
evident. Basque name of PNV shows Arana’s idea of nationalism was based on 
fueros. As the idea of nationalism requires certain elements to find place in 
people’s mind, giving references throughout history is a common tool.   
!
 Arana described the Basque people as following: they lived in the foral 
system with their own traditions and culture; and PNV made its organization 
among Basques people with giving adequate references to the history. As stated 
earlier, PNV had a ‘closed’ organization system, consequently, José Luis de la 
Granja Sainz described its organization as “partido-comunidad”, community 
party.  
!
 PNV always adopted itself to the political structure of Spain, and as a 
result, it managed to be active all the time. For instance; it transformed itself to 
Basque Nationalist Communion (CNV) in 1916. With this transformation it tried 
to avoid to political discussions inside the party.  
!
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 The party, as PNV and for a while as CNV, was closed in 1920s as a result 
of military intervention of General Miguel Primo de Rivera; however, it continued 
its actions and propagandas in secret. With declaration of the Second Republic, 
the CNV regained its original name PNV and continued as the major political 
party for Basques.  
!
 Under General Franco’s rule, once again political activities and parties 
were banned, and PNV operated secretly among the Basque people. During 
General Franco’s rule, as the PNV and other political parties were closed, young 
Basque students formed EKIN, which later became the ETA. 
!
 With the creation of ETA, a part from PNV, a new political actor entered 
the Basque political scene. ETA’s terrorist actions with political goals, such as the 
total independence of Basque Country, make them political terrorist organization.  
!
 After the death of General Franco, political life in Spain started to be 
restored and many political movements hit the surface. As a result, a new political 
movement was formed as an umbrella organization under the name Koordinadora 
Abertzale Sozialista (KAS). However, PNV did not become the part of this 
organization. With the formation of KAS, ETA started to make demands not for 
themselves but for KAS, as well. 
!
 The ETA had split into two fractions in 1976 and ETA (pm) formed a new 
political party under the name of Basque Revolutionary Party (EIA). The party 
later became the partner of Basque coalition organization, Basque Left (EE). 
!
4.3.2. Herri Batasuna and Aftermath !
 In April 1978, a new nationalist Basque political party, Herri Batasuna, 
HB (Popular Unity). The HB was formed as a coalition of several leftist groups 
and parties. At the beginning, HB did not have any direct relations with ETA; 
however, both of them were promoting the same ideas to gain support of the 
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people. Within time, ETA had more influence over HB, and HB became the public 
appearance of ETA. 
!
The new constitution after General Franco’s death formed the new social 
and political order in Spain. For the political parties, the Article 6 of the 
Constitution said the following;  
!
“Political parties are the expression of political pluralism; they contribute to the 
formation and expression of the will of the people and are a fundamental instrument for 
political participation.Their creation and the exercise of their activities are free in so far 
as they respect the Constitution and the law.Their internal structure and operation must 
be democratic.”   425!
 The Article 22 also explained the right of association as following;  
“1. The right of association is recognized. 
2. Associations which pursue ends or use means classified as criminal offenses are 
illegal. 
3. Associations set up on the basis of this article must be recorded in a register for the 
sole purpose of public knowledge. 
4. Associations may only be dissolved or have their activities suspended by virtue of a 
justified court order. 
5. Secret and paramilitary associations are prohibited.”   426
6. !
 One can see that participation to the political life and forming political 
parties were under the protection of the Spanish Constitution: The secret and 
paramilitary associations were prohibited; so, ETA was labeled as an illegal 
organization - as a natural result of the democracy, armed groups could not be 
integrated directly to the system - during the transformation to democracy in 
Spain.  
!
 A part from the constitution article about political parties, law for political 
parties, which was in force until 2002, was introduced on 4 December 1978. The 
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law of political parties explained the formation process of political 
parties in detail and stated that all Spaniards were free to form political 
parties.   427
!
 The aforementioned constitution and law of political parties were given to 
explain the  political sphere of Spain after General Franco’s dictatorship period. 
  
 After  approval of the new constitution, the first election of Basque 
Parliament took place in 1980. According to the results, PNV had the highest 
support with 38.1%, HB became the second party after PNV with 16.55%, and 
PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) 
became the third one with 14.21% total votes.   A part from these three parties, 428
four more parties took seats in Basque Parliament. One can see that the majority 
of Basque people gave their support to nationalist Basque political parties, PNV 
and HB. The support for both PNV and HB showed diverse thinking among 
Basque population. While nationalist PNV, which defended the idea of autonomy 
as a part of Spanish State, has the highest percentage of valid votes; HB, the party 
supported the idea of revolution even with the method of ETA and defended the 
total independent of Basque Country, also has significant support from the Basque 
population.  
!
 Even PNV and HB had different ideas and policies to follow for the 
Basque problem in Spanish political sphere, two parties managed to stand next to 
each other on one occasion. PNV, HB and PSE (Partido Socialista de Euskadi, 
Socialist Party of the Basque Country) formed the mesa para la paz (peace table) 
for possible negotiations between ETA and Spanish authorities in 1983.   The 429
mesa para la paz was started as an initiative to reach the peace in Basque region; 
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!  “Partidos Políticos (Ley 54/1978, de 4 de diciembre, Articulo 1)”, Ministerio de la 427
Presidencia / Gobierno de Espana, <http://www.mpr.gob.es/servicios/publicaciones/vol35/
pag_12.html>, site visited on 13 March 2013.
!  “1980 Basque Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/428
eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 
2013.
!  Clark, op. cit., p. 126.429
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however, as parties had different points of view for the solution of the problem, 
the initiative did not give any outcome.  
!
 HB’s engagement with ETA was often seen after ETA attacks. For 
instance, in beginning of 1980s, after ETA’s attack in Madrid, HB leaders held a 
press conference and stated that Spanish Government should negotiate with ETA 
(m) directly and gave three demands from Spanish State: Navarra should be 
included into the Basque Autonomous Community, the constitution should give 
the right of self-determination to the Basque people, total amnesty for all ETA 
members including prisoners and exiles should be applied.   One can see that, 430
the demands listed by HB were the demands of ETA. As a political party, HB 
could call for a direct negotiation; however, same demands as ETA’s, made party 
the public voice of the terrorist organization. HB saw itself on the same basis of 
ETA and in political structure, both of them had the same ideas to defend, and 
same goals to reach. 
!
 PNV continued its success in elections of 1984. PNV had 42,01% and 
became the first party, PSOE had 23,07% and HB had 14,65% of valid 
votes.   One can see that while PNV increased its votes, HB lost a small 431
percentage its support from the Basque population. The result of 1984 Elections 
shows that Basque people increased their support to the idea of wide-range 
autonomy, PNV policies.  
!
 PNV faced with a split in 1986 right before the elections. A group of PNV 
members left the party and formed a new political party under the name of Eusko 
Alkartasuna, (EA). This split reflected the results of 1986 Elections, eventually 
PNV had 23.71% of votes and gained 17 seats, while PSOE gained 19 seats with 
22.05% of votes. HB had 17,47% and gained 13 seats and new party EA had 
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!  Clark, op. cit., p. 120. 430
!  “1984 Basque Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/431
eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 
2013.
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15,84% and gained 13 seats.   One can see that political split among PNV paved 432
the way for the domination of Spanish party, PSOE. Even though political splits 
caused a decrease of PNV’s votes and made more room for PSOE, Basque people 
continued to support regional nationalist parties, PNV, HB and EA.  
!
 First three Basque parliamentary elections were given in order to show the 
political diversity in Basque political life. Even the parties had the same or similar 
ideas and policies for the Basque people; they did not choose to be together and 
acted by themselves.  
  
 In 1986, Spain’s admission to the European Union (EU) as full member 
was not supported by HB. HB claimed that the European economic policies 
would effect negatively the economy of Basque Region. While HB was against 
the EU, PNV supported the admission to the EU. 
!
 In the Basque Parliament, PNV had 28,49%, PSOE had 19,94%, HB had 
18,33% and EA had 11,38% of valid votes in the elections of 1990.   The 433
political structure and the distribution of votes was similar to previous years.  
!
 In the elections of 1994 for Basque Parliament, PNV had 29,84%, PSOE 
had 17,13%, HB had 16,29% and EA had 10,31.   While PNV increased its 434
percentage of valid votes, PSOE’s and HB’s percentages decreased. Even though 
the difference between 1990 and 1994 was not significant, one can say that HB 
lost around 20.000 votes.  
!
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!  “1986 Basque Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/432
eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 
2013. 
!  “1990 Basque Parliament Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://www.euskadi.net/433
q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site 
visited on 13 May 2013.
!  “1994 Basque Parliament Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://www.euskadi.net/434
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visited on 13 May 2013.
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 One of the obvious evidences for the relation between HB and ETA had 
took place in 1996. Before general elections of 1996, HB used one of ETA’s 
videos during its propaganda period. As a result of usage of ETA’s video, the 
National Court (Audiencia Nacional) started a trail against HB leaders with the 
accusation of “collaboration with ETA” in 1997. The trail process ended with the 
approval of sentence decision for HB leaders by Spanish Supreme Court, 23 HB 
leaders were imprisoned   and stayed in prison for 20 months. The trail for HB 435
leaders was considered as a sign of possible closure trail for the party, and HB 
decided to enter the elections of 1998 under another organization; Euskal 
Herritarrok (EH, Basque Citizens). All HB party members continued to do 
politics under EH. 1996 was also the year that José María Aznar became Prime 
Minister of Spain, and heavy security measures started to be applied against ETA.  
!
 The Basque parliament elections of 1998 was the first elections that 
former HB entered as EH. PNV had 28,01%, PP had 20,13%, EH had 17,91%, 
PSOE had 17,6% and EA had 8,86%.   One can see that the main difference on 436
the results of 1998 local elections was the position of PP as it became the second 
party after PNV. At that year, PP was in power in central government of Spain. PP 
success in general election for Spanish governments, accumulated in the local 
elections of Basque Country. 
!
 In the Basque parliament elections of 2001, EA made coalition with PNV. 
As a result of this coalition, PNV-EA had 42,72%, PP had 23,12%, PSOE had 
17,9% and EH had 10,12% of valid votes.   While the PNV-EA coalition 437
managed to have high percentage of votes, EH lost around 7% votes from the 
previous election. 
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December 1997, <http://elpais.com/diario/1997/12/02/portada/881017202_850215.html>, site 
visited on 13 May 2013.
!  “1998 Basque Parliament Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://www.euskadi.net/436
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visited on 13 May 2013.
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4.3.3. Banning Political Parties !
 First HB, then EH both wanted to be a player in Basque politics just in 
Spain. However, in 2001, HB formed a new political platform to be active both in 
Spain and France, in their saying; in Euskal Herria. The new organization took 
the name Batasuna (Unity). Batasuna took the place of HB in Spain and opened 
branches in France, as well. Even the name changed from Herri Batasuna to 
Batasuna, party members and leaders did not leave the political scene of Basque 
politics. Batasuna continued to defend ETA’s actions. Hence, the ban process of 
Batasuna started in 2002.  
!
 As aforementioned earlier, Law on Political Parties was changed in 2002, 
which paved the way for the suspension of Batasuna. With the new law for 
political parties, Spanish government had chance to put pressure over Batasuna. 
The Article 9.2 of Law for Political Parties explained the reasons to ban a political 
party as; 
 “Article 9.2 A political party will be declared as illegal if; violates democratic 
principles in a repeated and grave form, or aimes to undermine or destroy liberties, or 
injure or eliminate the democratic system by;  
  *promoting, justifying or excusing of attacks on people’s life or integrity, or 
exclusion or persecution of people because of their ideology, religion or beliefs, 
nationality, race, sex or sexual orientation  
 *Encouraging, promoting or legitimizing violence as a means to achieve political 
goals, or destroying conditions necessary for democracy, pluralism and political liberties 
 *Complementing or supporting politically, the activities of terrorist organizations 
which aim to subvert the constitutional order, gravely alter public peace, create a 
climate of fear, or enhance the effects of fear and intimidation generated by terrorist 
violence.“   438
!
 In August 2002, the National Court suspended Batasuna’s political 
activities for three years for further investigation to look into ETA-Batasuna 
relation. Then, on 17 March 2003, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that 
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Batasuna was illegal by saying that Party’s actions were against the Law on 
Political Parties Article 9 and Batasuna had financial relationship with ETA. With 
Batasuna, the Court also banned two previous party, Herri Batasuna and Euskal 
Herritarrok.   In May 2003, the United States of America added Batasuna, HB 439
and EH to its list of terrorist groups just before Spanish Prime Minister José 
María Aznar’s meeting with the U.S President George W.Bush.    440
!
 HB and following parties were active in Basque politics and participated 
the elections for Basque parliament; however, as they did not believe the 
legitimacy of this regional institutions, elected candidates did not occupy their 
seats in the Basque parliament. Hence, with not occupying the seats, they tried to 
block the legitimate system in Basque region and force people to think that the 
regional Basque Government could not be effective.  
  
 The ban of Batasuna, HB and EH created a space in the Basque leftist 
political movement. As none of the aforementioned organizations could not 
participated the Basque parliament elections of 2005, a new organization, Partido 
Comunista de las Tierras Vascas (PCTV, The Communist Party of the Basque 
Homelands or in Basque language, Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista, 
EHAK) tried to fulfill the empty place. PCTV was formed in 2002; however, 
became active after the ban of Batasuna, HB and EH. As a result of the election s 
of 2005, PNV-EA had 38,67%, PSOE had 22,68%, PP had 17,4%, PCTV had 
12,44%.   If one takes a glance at previous Basque Parliament Elections’ results, 441
it is possible to say that PCTV had more or less the same percentage of votes. 
This shows that the PCTV fulfilled the place of Batasuna and its fractions. 
However, PCTV was also banned in 2008 by the Spanish Supreme Court with the 
accusation of having relation with ETA. The Court stated that Batasuna used 
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PCTV to have financial aid, and former ETA members and Batasuna members 
became members of PCTV.    442
!
 The ban of PCTV reflected the Basque parliament elections of 2009. 
There was no political party to fulfill the space of PCTV/Batasuna movement this 
time. As a result of elections; PNV had 38,56%, PSOE had 30,7%, PP had 14,1% 
of votes.   According to the results, one can say that there were no 443
representatives of Batasuna fraction.  
  
 Another coalition was formed under the name of Sortu (in English; 
Create) in 2011, in order to fill the empty place in Basque leftist movement. The 
creation of Sortu was considered as another Basque leftist party in the line of 
Batasuna; however, since its creation, Sortu has claimed that the party is not the 
continuation of anything. Also the leaders of Sortu stated that Sortu rejects the 
violence of ETA.   However, the Spanish Government believed that Sortu was 444
the continuation of Batasuna; hence, Government made appeal to the Spanish 
Supreme Court with the demand of closure for Sortu. In March 2011, the Spanish 
Supreme Court decided that Sortu could not be registered as political party by 
saying that Sortu did not present enough evidence about not having relations with 
ETA.   Sortu had a change to give evidence and become a legal party; however 445
in any case, with this decision, Sortu did not participate the elections of 2011. The 
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visited on 15 May 2013; 
   “Procesados Cinco Cargos del PCTV por Pertenecer a ETA”, El País, 18 July 2009, <http://
elpais.com/diario/2009/07/18/espana/1247868012_850215.html>, site visited on 15 May 2013.
!  “2009 Basque Parliament Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://www.euskadi.net/443
q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site 
visited on 13 May 2013.
!  Al Goodman, “New Basque Party Tries to Run in Spain”, CNN, 10 February 2011, <http://444
edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/02/09/spain.basque.politics/index.html?>, site visited on 
16 May 2013.
!  Maria Peral, “El Supremo Impide que Sortu se Presente el 22-M al Ver Vínculos con ETA”, El 445
Mundo, 24 March 2011, <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/03/23/espana/1300908345.html>, 
site visited on 16 May 2013.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
decision about Sortu raised the tension in Basque Country and many Basques hit 
the streets to protest the decision.   446
!
 Right after the decision about Sortu, another coalition was formed under 
the name of Bildu (in English; Gather). Nevertheless, like in the case of Sortu, 
Spanish Government made appeal to the Spanish Supreme Court with the demand 
of closure for Bildu. The court banned entrance of Bildu to the elections of 
2011.   The decision was protested by Basques in Basque Country, and PNV 447
declared that they would no longer support the central Government of 
Spain.   Consequently, the Spanish Supreme Court lifted the ban decision and 448
Bildu entered the municipality elections of 2011. As a result of the election PNV 
had 30,74%, Bildu had 26,03%, PSOE had 16,71%, PP had 13,83% of valid 
votes.    449
!
 For the general elections of 2011, leftist Basque political parties formed 
another coalition under the name of Amaiur and entered the elections as a single 
party. As a result of this coalition, Amaniur became the second party after 
PNV.   The new coalition rejected the violence of ETA and as a result of Spanish 450
general elections of 2011 gained six seats on the Spanish Congress of Deputies. 
After many years, Basque pro-independence leftist movement represented itself in 
the Spanish Congress of Deputies.   
!
 145
!  “Thousands March for Basque Party in Spain”, Fox News, 2 April 2011, <http://446
www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/02/thousands-march-basque-party-spain/>, site visited on 16 
May 2013.
!  Maria Peral, “Bildu Fue ‘Auspiciada por la Misma ETA,’ dice el Supremo”, El Mundo, 2 May 447
2011, <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/05/02/espana/1304313695.html>, site visited on 16 
May 2013.
!  “Spanish Government Loses Basque Nationalists’ Support”, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2 448
May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/item/?map=spanish-govt-loses-basque-nationalists-support>, site 
visited on 16 May 2013.
!  “2011 Basque Municipality Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://www.euskadi.net/449
q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site 
visited on 13 May 2013.
!  “Basque Results of 2011 Spanish General Elections”, Departamento de Seguridad, <http://450
www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?
menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
 Sortu, the left wing party that was banned to enter the elections of 2011, 
was legalized by the Constitutional Court’s decision in June 2012. 
!
 In the Basque parliament elections of 2012, another coalition was formed 
under the name of Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu), which contained the left wing 
parties such as Sortu, Eusko Alkartasuna, Alternatiba and Aralar. The new 
coalition became the second party after PNV. According to the results, PNV had 
34,61%, EH Bildu had 25%, PSOE had 19,14%, PP had %11,75 of valid 
votes.    As seen before, PNV had the majority support of Basque electorates. 451
  
 Basque political parties were effective both in regional politics and 
Spanish politics from the formation of PNV. After PNV, Basque political parties 
were majorly formed as left wing parties. The leftist Basque parties are named as 
Ezker Abertzalea (‘Patriotic left’ in English) in Basque language. Basque 
nationalism and Basque political life was formed by Sabino Arana himself with 
PNV that took Arana’s ideas as party acts. Even the Basque political life started 
with PNV, following parties made contributions for its evolution. Starting with 
Herri Batasuna, leftist parties relation with ETA paved the way to talk about 
‘political terrorism’. ETA, which is labeled as a separatist terrorist organization, 
pursued political goals with armed struggle. While ETA was attacking the Spanish 
security forces in order to create an independent Basque Country, HB and 
following parties tried to accumulate ETA’s actions into political acts. With the 
closure decision of Batasuna, following leftist parties declared total denial of 
armed struggle for any political cause, which paved the way to act legally in 
political life both in regional and general atmosphere. Maybe ETA and Batasuna 
relation gave a limited pace to Basque politics in short term; however, in long 
term, it is possible to say that Basque politics were damaged because of it. 
!
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 While ETA’s actions and Batasuna’s position and support in political 
sphere call attention to terrorism problem of Spain both in national and 
international level, it also caused the closure of Batasuna. Ban of political parties 
in a functioning democracy harms the system and decreases the support of public 
to the elections process. With every closure or ban of a political party, electorates 
started to question the system whether they have chance to be represented or not. 
It is possible to say that, creating more space to political parties in a functioning 
democracy and searching for an appropriate solution to certain problem in 
democratic frame will captivate more and more percentage of population in every 
election. Consequently, the system will reflect people’s will more accurately. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 147
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 148
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
!
!
!
5. SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
!
!
5.1. The United Kingdom Example 
!
 As the splits happened within IRA and Sinn Féin in 1970s, British political 
scene changed. A solution to the Northern Ireland Problem was in search among 
official circles. The British rule was in favor of solving the problem with creating 
a mechanism, which represents both parties in Ireland: Nationalists and Unionists.   
!
5.1.1. Attempts Without Sinn Féin !
 In 1973, a new assembly was elected and a new government was formed 
which contained six Unionists and four Nationalists and one neutral from the 
Alliance Party.   The new system did not include Sinn Féin by saying that the 452
organization was related with terrorism. After the elections and formation of 
government, British rule signed an agreement with Irish Government over the 
decision making process in Northern Ireland. The idea of having a co-control over 
Ireland with relation between Irish and British governments was failed because of 
the Nationalists worker strike in 1974. As a result of the strike, Irish government 
removed and Northern Ireland returned to the direct British rule.   453
  
 During 1980s, Northern Ireland Assembly became active again, but with 
little power. British Government’s intention was to increase the power of 
Northern Ireland Assembly over years. Sinn Féin was not in the Assembly and 
they boycotted the newly formed Assembly. In 1985, another treaty was signed 
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between governments, which made the Northern Ireland problem as joint problem 
for two governments. The negotiation about the responsibilities of joint 
governments was started; however, all efforts to form a joint system failed in 
1986.   454
  
 In 1989, Irish Government started to meet with all political parties for a 
possible solution.  As it happened before, Sinn Féin was not among the political 
parties that Irish Government had meet. The efforts of Irish authorities did not 
reach to any solution. The situation continued with the talks between parties 
except Sinn Féin until 1993.  
!
5.1.2. Road to Solution !
 In 1993, Sinn Féin leader, Garry Adams and leader of the Social Democrat 
and Labour Party, John Hume, started to talk with every party for a political 
solution for the conflict.   The ultimate goal was to find a proper solution and 455
finish the violence. The talks continued for a while then the Downing Street 
Declaration was announced. According to the Declaration, British Government 
described itself as ‘neutral’ between Nationalist and Loyalists and gave guarantee 
that every political party, even parties linked with terrorism, would be a part of 
the talks as long as they renounced the violence.    456
  
 Sinn Féin actively participated the talks and became the mediatory 
between IRA and the British authorities. As a result of talks, IRA declared a 
cease-fire in 1994. At this point, President of the United States of America, Bill 
Clinton, appointed Senator George Mitchell as a neutral representative for the 
talks between parties.   In 1995, British and Irish governments declared a joint 457
document for their cooperation on Island. The document suggested a creation of a 
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new authority, which contained representatives from Irish Parliament and 
Northern Ireland Assembly. By the involvement of George Mitchell, an 
International Body on Arms Decommissioning was formed. In January 1996, the 
International Body on Arms Decommissioning published its report on Northern 
Ireland problem and indicated six principles for a healthy solution. According to 
the commission, parties should show commitments to following principles; !
“a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;  
b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;  
c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an 
independent commission;  
d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or 
threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;  
e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations 
and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any 
aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,  
f. To urge that 'punishment' killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to 
prevent such actions.”    458
  
 As the International Body on Arms Decommissioning was formed by the 
U.S Senator George Mitchell, aforementioned principles were also knows as 
‘Mitchell Principles’. However, while the talks were continuing, British 
Government declared that terrorist organizations should give up their weapons for 
further political talks. IRA was against this idea as they thought cease-fire should 
be enough to talk for political solution. At this point, Sinn Féin leader Garry 
Adams put his effort to explain the talks to IRA in details with many 
meetings.   However, Garry Adams’ efforts were not enough to convince IRA 459
and in February 1996, IRA declared that the cease-fire was over with accusing the 
British Government by saying they were just wasting their time. 
!
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 British Government under Tony Blair’s leadership kept talking with Sinn 
Féin and gave every guarantee on political reforms for the solution of problems in 
Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin's efforts to force IRA to announce another cease-fire 
continued and on 19 July 1997, IRA declared another cease-fire. With cease-fire 
of IRA, all parties of the problem, including IRA, joined to talks and negotiations 
On 9 September 1997, Sinn Féin declared that they accepted the Mitchell 
Principles. In April 1998, Belfast Agreement was accepted by parties after 48 
hours of non-stop talks.  
!
 As Belfast Agreement was signed on Friday, agreement also known as 
‘The Good Friday Agreement’ in international scene. The Good Friday Agreement 
covers political issues not on the Northern Island but on all-island. According to 
the Agreement, parties should renounce the use of violence together. The 
Agreement demanded that historical goal for United Ireland should be abandoned 
and parties should work together for the island of Ireland. With the Agreement, a 
new political structure was created for the island; a North/South Ministerial 
council was formed for the cooperation and the development of island of Ireland. 
British-Irish Council was formed for the mutual beneficial relationship between 
British and Irish authorities. A part from administrative issue, other issues were 
covered by the agreement, such as development of social and economic policies, 
and so on.    460
!
 The Good Friday Agreement was voted with the referendum in the island 
of Ireland and passed with 71% of votes in Northern Ireland and %94 in the 
Republic of Ireland.   The agreement started a new era in island of Ireland and in 461
the British history. 15 years after the Agreement, Tony Blair who was Prime 
Minister at the time of the Agreement, said that it was an historic day and 
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achievement for the Ireland and United Kingdom, and Garry Adams said that with 
the Agreement the necessary checks and balances were ensured to prevent the 
political abuses and discrimination of the past.     462
!
 In the solution of Northern Ireland Problem, one can see that parties, both 
Irish and British, did not pursue their daily politics but the common good. A part 
from dedication of every party,, the involvement of International Body on Arms 
Decommissioning and George Mitchell’s mediatory role, especially Tony Blair 
and Garry Adams, established the trust between parties. Both parties’ devotion on 
political goals made the agreement possible.  
!
5.1.3. IRA After the Good Friday Agreement !
 At the sign of the Agreement, IRA was in cease-fire period and as the 
Agreement required the total decommissioning of every paramilitary 
organizations, IRA started its decommissioning process. With the Agreement, 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning was set up to review 
to process. However, in August 1998, a bomb exploded in Northern Ireland and 
killed 29 people.   Both IRA and Sinn Féin condemned the attacks and a new 463
group which was formed by extremist IRA sympathizers, Real IRA, took the 
responsibility. The Irish community condemned the attacks, which was accepted 
as the total desire of the community for an end of violence.  
!
 In October 2001, Sinn Féin made a public call to IRA to start 
decommissioning its weapons. IRA’s decommissioning process lasted until 2005 
under the surveillance of Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning. On 28 July 2005, IRA announced that its armed campaign 
ended and they ordered their militants to drop weapons.   The final 464
decommissioning was confirmed by Independent International Commission on 
 153
!  “Good Friday Agreement: Cameron Hails 15th Anniversary”.462
!  “Omagh Bomb: Colm Murphy and Seamus Daly founda Liable at Retrial”, BBC, 20 March 463
2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-21858904>, site visited on 1 March 2013.
!  “IRA Says Armed Campaign is Over”, BBC, 28 July 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/464
uk_news/northern_ireland/4720863.stm>, site visited on 1 May 2013.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
Decommissioning on 26 September 2005.   The era of violence ended for 465
Northern Ireland and the political progress continued on following years.  
!
 The Real IRA hit the surface after the split in 1997 within IRA. However, 
their only major attack was in 1998 and after then Real IRA split to small groups. 
Their existence was always accepted as a threat to peace on Ireland. Recently, 
BBC published a piece about the threat of armed groups. According to BBC, 
former members of Real IRA, and  Provisional IRA were formed the ‘New IRA’ 
in 2012.   According to authorities in Northern Ireland armed threat still existed 466
in Northern Ireland against the British presence in Ireland.  
!
 It is possible to expect that terrorist organizations split after the major 
decisions of its leadership. Many of the members and sympathizers of the certain 
organization often do not accept any other decision than the original goal. For the 
case of IRA, with the Good Friday Agreement, IRA abandoned its original goal of 
‘United Ireland’ and accepted the new political structure. This major decision was 
a policy change for IRA and unsatisfied members formed the Real IRA, and even 
after 15 years of the Agreement, the New IRA take place in Ireland for the 
original goal of IRA.  
!
!
5.2. Turkey: Previous Attempts, The Future of Process 
!
 Kurdish problem of Turkey is an history related and complicated problem. 
Kurds have had problems on cultural and identity bases since the Ottoman 
Empire. As the Kurds have been living in the Mesopotamia, after the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds started to live under four different state flags; 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria where they have had different problems. However, 
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the case of Turkey is more important than others as majority of the Kurds live in 
Turkey.  
!
 Central authorities have always wanted to control the Kurds in the region 
of today’s Turkey. During the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish political parties were 
closed, and rebellions were suppressed with heavy military operations. With the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey, a new ‘nation’ was born, and all citizens 
accepted as equals, first the founders described the new nation as ‘Nation of were 
Turkey’, but then the term changed with ‘Turkish Nation’. Adopting ‘Turk’ as the 
name of nation was accepted as the reference to the Turkish race. After the death 
of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, state policies centralized around the Turkish language 
as well, and that was considered as denial of other languages. With every 
constitution, the identity problem of Kurds has become more complicated.  
!
 During 1980s and 1990s, PKK’s actions increased and terrorism problem 
took place in the agenda of Turkey, next to Kurdish problem. Eventually, these 
two different but related problems were started to be accepted as one. Since 
1990s, Turkey has had chance to solve the Kurdish problem and terrorism 
problem; however, each time, obstacles occurred and problems continued.  
!
5.2.1. Previous Attempts to Solve the Kurdish Problem/Terrorism Problem !
 PKK was founded in 1978 and started its terrorist attacks against Turkish 
security forces in 1984. Within this time frame, Turkey faced with a military 
intervention which put democracy away and brought violation of human rights to 
the country, in 1980. Under the National Security Council rule, martial law was 
applied, political parties were closed, freedom was restricted, and many people 
were arrested with accusation of being a leftist or rightist party supporters. For 
Kurds, military intervention brought pain and suffer, and official denial of their 
existence. 
!
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 As Hasan Cemal cited in his book with details,   in Kurdish populated 467
areas, many people were taken into the custody with accusations of supporting 
‘the secessionists’. At the time of the military intervention, the name PKK was 
not well known among the official circles and the state officials referred PKK as 
‘secessionists, rebels, bandits’. Especially the prison of Diyarbakir was the place 
where many Kurds faced torture and humiliating treatment. Prison of Diyarbakir 
was not only place where torture had happened, but the prison of Diyarbakir was 
the main place where the hatred of Kurds against the State of Turkey had born. 
!
 On 12 September 1980, Military took over the rule of the country, and put 
martial law in action. Following days of the military intervention, the National 
Security Council denied the existence of Kurds in Turkey. As already mentioned, 
Head of the National Security Council, General Kenan Evren, publicly said; 
!
 “There are no Kurds in Turkey, these people who describe themselves as Kurds are 
just Turks living in mountain, and make cracking sounds, Kart Kurt, when they walk over 
snow”.   468!
 With this statement from Kenan Evren, Kurds were shocked. They were 
citizens of Turkey; however, the State did not recognize their ethnic origin, or 
their language. The denial from the State push Kurds away from the state to the 
arms of PKK. 
!
 As PKK leadership fled away from Turkey before the military intervention 
and focused its actions on recruitment, state’s position against Kurds during 
military intervention made them a favor. Many Kurds run away in order to join 
PKK, especially who was released from prisons. Young Kurdish population 
started to see PKK as ‘heroes’, ‘army of salvation’. Either the State’s denial or 
torture did not give legitimacy to any terrorist action; however, the reality stands 
still that Kurds felt disappointment and run through the PKK. 
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 PKK’s armed terrorist attacks started in 1984, and since then Kurdish 
problem of Turkey was forgotten and terrorism problem took over it. For many 
years, Kurds in the region of eastern Turkey stuck between the state’s military 
measures and PKK’s pressure over them. PKK sought support, such as food, 
water, money, from Kurds who lived in villages, and military officials demanded 
from villagers to abandon their villages and migrate to big cities. As PKK 
threatened villagers to gain support, military burned down houses in villages of 
who did not abandon their places. For many years, Kurds in the region suffered 
because of PKK’s attacks and heavy security measures.   469
!
 After the military intervention, Kurdish existence started to be talked 
again in late 1980s. First in 1988, a MP from SHP stated that there were Kurds in 
Turkey. He said that Kurdish population was a national minority, who could not 
speak their language. After the statement, discussions started in Turkey and many 
journalists and politicians and even citizens started to criticize the denial of 
Kurdish existence.   Under Erdal İnönü’s leadership, SHP formed a group of 470
party members to investigate the problems in eastern Turkey, then published a 
report under the name of ‘SHP’s overview and solution proposal on East and 
Southeast Problem’.   In June 1989, Turgut Özal, president at that time, declared 471
that he had Kurdish blood.   As the declaration came from President of Turkey, 472
this was considered as a policy change of the State and a hope appeared among 
Kurds for the solution to their problem. Kurds believed that Turgut Özal wanted 
to solve the problem by providing their cultural rights.  
  
 Turgut Özal put significant attention to the Kurdish problem of Turkey in 
order to solve it, he believed that Kurds needed to feel as ‘equal citizens’ and to 
achieve that point, the State policies should be changed.   With his efforts, ban of 473
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using Kurdish language in daily life, which was put into force with the military 
intervention of 1982, was lifted in 1991.   This accepted as the premier step for 474
the process of solving the Kurdish problem. 
!
 In 1991, numerous calls to recognize the Kurdish identity started to come 
from politicians and other public actors. In December 1991, Deputy Prime 
Minister Erdal İnönü declared that the cultural identity of Turkey’s Kurdish 
citizens should be recognized.    In 1992, this time Prime Minister Süleyman 475
Demirel announced that he recognized ‘the Kurdish reality’.   The calls from 476
high rank state officials were significantly important on the Kurdish issue in 
Turkey. After a long time, the State accepted the Kurdish existence and declared 
that there were regulations that needed to be changed.  
!
 In 1992, one MP from ANAP made a visit to Diyarbakir, then wrote a 
special rapport about the Kurdish Problem in Turkey for President Turgut Özal. 
Then, Özal made his own additions to the report and as a consequence, this report 
started be known as ‘Özal report’. The said report made description of the 
problem in the region and gave  proposals for a solution. Briefly, the report stated 
that while the operations continued against PKK, other measures were needed to 
be implemented. President Özal proposed that villages, where PKK sought 
support, should be evacuated. More military vehicles and weapons should be 
provided to the military, and lastly Özal cited that every idea should be discussed 
freely and openly.   According to Hasan Cemal, President Özal even proposed 477
the idea of TV channel, which would broadcast in Kurdish, to the National 
Security Council, and indicated that even federation should be discussed as a 
possible solution.   However, while President Özal was proposing ideas on 478
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Kurdish TV channel, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was opposed to this idea, 
and he stated to Hasan Cemal that as the official language of the Turkish Republic 
was Turkish, there were no way to broadcast in another language.   For these 479
years, state’s official policy was known as following; first the terrorism problem 
has to be solved prior to any cultural rights for Kurds. The attitude difference 
between Özal and Demirel made Özal popular among the Kurds.  
!
 While these declarations, statements and proposals were coming from 
official circle of the state, PKK’s actions against Turkish security forces did not 
stop in year of 1992. As a consequence, state’s counter-actions continued as well. 
Between PKK’s attacks and state’s counter-attacks, talking about Kurdish 
problem was not easy. As soldiers died in the field, the public opinion gathered 
around the ‘nationalist’ ideas as a normal reaction.  
!
 PKK attacks and military operations against PKK militants continued until 
the March of 1993. On 17 March 1993, Abdullah Öcalan held a press conference 
in Lebanon and declared an unilateral cease-fire until 15 April 1993.   At the 480
same day Abdullah Öcalan gave an interview to El-Hayat, London based 
newspaper, and listed his demands from the state as; PKK should be accepted as a 
legal party, he should return to Turkey unharmed and be able to do politics in the 
country.   481
  
 With the cease-fire decision, Abdullah Öcalan also abandoned his idea for 
independence and started to talk about ‘autonomy’.   President Özal was in 482
contact with Iraqi Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, who was acting as the messenger 
between PKK and the State of Turkey.   During the unilateral cease-fire time, 483
possible amnesty rumors for PKK militants started to be circulated in official 
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circles in Ankara. President Özal was the main driven force about the possibility 
of amnesty and believed that this might be a start for the solving process of 
terrorism problem.    484
!
 On 16 April 1993, Abdullah Öcalan announced that he extended the cease-
fire for two months.   While PKK was waiting a gesture about a possible 485
amnesty for its militants, President Turgut Özal suddenly died because of a heart 
attack on 17 April 1993.   After Turgut Özal’s death, officials did not know how 486
to deal with the situation. As another unsuccessful assassination attempt had 
happened in 1988, when Prime Minister Turgut Özal was giving a speech in his 
Party congress,   the rumors about Turgut Özal’s death never stopped circulating 487
that President Özal did not die by a natural cause but was poisoned. Long after his 
dead, in 2012, an investigation started with the assumption of Özal was murdered 
with poison. His corpse was taken out from his grave on 3 November 2012 for 
forensic technical analysis.   On 16 April 2013, a lawsuit was opened against 488
former Brigadier General, Levent Ersöz, with the accusation of assassination of 
Turgut Özal.   489
!
 As stated in previous parts, after Özal’s death, the National Security 
Council made suggestion to the government for a partial amnesty for PKK 
militants; however, in following days PKK broke cease-fire by killing 33 unarmed 
soldiers.   Consequently, PKK’s attack raised the tension among society, and 490
military officials started to call for heavy measures against PKK. On 8 June 1993, 
Abdullah Öcalan held another press conference in Bekaa Valley and announced 
that the cease-fire was over. He also cited that the cease-fire was a response to 
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Özal’s attitude on Kurdish problem, and PKK accepted Özal as interlocutor, and 
after his death state did not continue its efforts to solve the problem.   491
!
 After Turgut Özal, with new president and new Government, State’s 
policies changed. In late 1993, while Prime Minister Tansu Çiller considered the 
possibility of allowance of education and broadcasting in Kurdish and referred to 
the relevance of the Basque model and its provisions for wide-ranging 
autonomy,   the new President Süleymand Demirel opposed the idea by saying, 492
“Unless terrorism is solved, cultural issues cannot be debated”.   This showed 493
the new understanding of the problem in official circles: terrorism problem and 
Kurdish problem had started to be considered as one single problem. 
!
 In 1994, Prime Minister Çiller indirectly declared her changed position 
about Kurdish problem by introducing a new slogan on fight against PKK, ‘either 
end or end’ (‘ya bitecek ya bitecek’).    494
!
 Even after the death of Turgut Özal, call for solution kept coming from 
public actors. For instance, in 1995, a renowned businessman, Sakıp Sabancı, 
made a visit to Diyarbakir, then he declared “Kurdish Problem is more-over than 
an economic problem, the solution needs to come from politicians. Spanish and 
English examples should be examined”.   However, Sakıp Sabancı’s statement 495
made its scene on mass media as he was suggesting the ‘Basque Model’, or even 
more ‘separatism’.   Response to Sakıp Sabancı’s statement came from chairman 496
of Nationalist Movement Party, Alparslan Türkeş; “Sakıp Agha, you are crossing 
the line! You think politics is a piece of cake!”   A couple of month later, 497
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Sabancı’s brother, Özdemir Sabancı was murdered on 9 January 1996.   Even 498
though there were no concrete evidence, public opinion always believed that this 
murder was connected with Sakıp Sabancı’s statement on Kurdish problem and 
even more, Sakıp Sabancı was the real target. 
  
 With the murder of Özdemir Sabancı, the fear spread among the 
population and no more call for solution for Kurdish problem was heard. The 
hope, which started with Özal’s statement, faded away totally with the 
assassination of Özdemir Sabancı. 
  
 In 1999, Turkish political life started to spin around Kurdish problem and 
terrorism problem one more time. Abdullah Öcalan’s capture raised the 
expectation on finishing the terrorism problem. When Abdullah Öcalan captured 
on 16 February 1999, Kurdish problem was forgotten suddenly, and public 
opinion started to think that as the leader of PKK was captured, PKK would not 
continue its terrorist attacks. During his trail, Abdullah Öcalan said “I wanted to 
serve for the Republic of Turkey”.   During his trial and aftermath, Abdullah 499
Öcalan continued to control the PKK via his lawyers. With his capture, Abdullah 
Öcalan’s attitude changed and he started to talk about withdrawal of PKK 
militants from Turkey. He believed that PKK did not need to wait actions from the 
State on the Kurdish problem, they could withdraw from Turkey and the State 
would see their ‘positive’ attitude and act afterwards.    500
!
 In August 1999, Abdullah Öcalan made a call for PKK militants to stop 
attacks and to leave Turkey.   In September 1999, PKK declared another 501
unilateral cease-fire and announced that PKK would not attack, and leave Turkey. 
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However, while PKK militants were leaving country, they were panicked and 
withdrawal process gone out of PKK’s control. As Turkish military forces saw the 
situation as an opportunity for debilitation of the PKK, they started operations 
against them and consequently, many PKK militants were killed or captured.   502
!
 In late 1999, Turkish agenda was occupied with Turkey’s relation with the 
European Union. At the Helsinki Summit of 10-11 December 1999, the European 
Union declared that Turkey, as candidate country destined to join the European 
Union, should have at certain level of democracy on its political life. According to 
European Union’s criteria, a candidate country should have stable institutions 
guaranteeing the democracy, the rule of law, the human rights and the protection 
of minorities. On the Kurdish problem, the EU asked from Turkish Government 
to reform its legal system and to solve the Kurdish problem on legal basis, with 
peaceful measures. The demand of EU reflected the speeches of politicians and 
Mesut Yılmaz, chairman of ANAP, Prime Minister at that time, said: “The road to 
the EU passes through Diyarbakir.   Nevertheless, the government at that time 503
was a coalition government and did not carry out all necessary changes, and the 
fulfillment of EU’s demand waited until the AKP Government. 
!
 The capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the premature withdrawal of PKK 
militants, the EU perspective and EU’s demand on Kurdish problem brought out 
another chance to solve problems for Turkey. However, the coalition government 
failed to do necessary political reforms on cultural right basis, and focused on 
fighting against terrorism problem, which did not paved the way for the 
dissolution of PKK. 
!
!
!
!
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5.2.2. Attempts Under AKP Governments !
 Justice and Development Party was founded in 2001, entered the general 
elections of 2002, and won the elections with the majority of the valid votes. AKP 
had 34.28% of valid votes.   With AKP’s winning, Turkey rescued itself from 504
coalition governments and after a long time, a rule of a single party government 
started.  As in 2001 economic recession and political instability were effective in 
Turkey, population needed a change, and a new party seemed as the best option. 
Even though AKP founders were coming from conservatism, Islamist party 
tradition, known as Milli Görüş (National View), starting with the leader Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, founders always claimed that they changed and abandoned the 
National View.  
!
 Under the success of AKP, party name is also important. As the country 
had a long history with tortures and violation of human rights ‘Justice’ was a 
message for everyone, and as the country was in recession at that time, 
‘Development’ made sense for the population and especially for capital holders. 
Putting Justice and Development together, gave a hope to the people of Turkey. A 
new party with new faces and voices paved AKP’s way for the rule of the country. 
As a consequence, the high percentage of the Turkish society saw AKP as a 
solution for all problems, including Kurdish Problem.  
!
 AKP’ s dedicated section for Kurdish problem in its party program under 
the label of ‘The East and Southeast’ was already mentioned; however, it is 
necessary to point out once again for this part of the thesis. In this section, AKP 
founders explained Party’s aim to guard cultural diversity in the region. A part of 
the mentioned section explained AKP’s policy regarding to language and 
territorial unity and integrity of Turkey as;  
!
“The event, which some of us call the Southeastern, others call the Kurdish or the 
Terror problem, is unfortunately a reality in Turkey. In cognizance of the negative 
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issues caused by this problem in our social life, our Party shall follow a policy 
guarding the happiness, welfare, rights and freedoms of the regional population, in a 
manner not to create a weakness in a sustainable policy which goes beyond the 
identification of the reality the prevention of the terror threatening the region, the 
integrity of Turkey, as well as the unitary State structure; a sustainable policy which 
goes beyond the identification of the reality respectful to the sensitivities of the 
entire society, efficient and aimed at solving problems at the root. The cultural 
diversity in this region is considered richness by our Party. On condition that the 
Turkish remains the official and instruction language, our Party regards the cultural 
activities in languages other than Turkish, including broadcasting, as an asset, which 
reinforces and supports the unity and integrity of our country, rather than weaken it. 
The elimination of certain troubles originating from the under -development of the 
region, are intended to be solved within the scope of the general democratization 
project, rather than special arrangements aimed at the region....”    505!
 AKP also highlighted the importance of citizenship rather than ethnicity 
by these sentences;  
!
 “...Cultural diversities do not require that what we have in common with the 
region's population should be pushed to the background. On the contrary, being a 
citizen of the Republic of Turkey is the cement of our society...” !
 On the relation between Kurdish problem and terror problem, AKP’s view 
is;  
!
“[...Despite the terror which has lasted for long years and was maintained with an 
intense outside support, the fact that the region's population is attached to the unitary 
State structure, and the fact that the problem did not turn into an ethnic conflict with 
the common sense of our people, is proof that the issue can be solved as an internal 
affair...] !
[...In the period after the intense terror, no significant steps have been taken in our 
Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian Regions to eliminate the differences in 
development between the regions, even to minimize them. Our Party shall provide 
the needed rehabilitation by starting serious economic projects to increase 
employment aimed at the region, and implementations to reduce the suffering of our 
citizens who have been hurt from the terror environment. !
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Lack of public services, unemployment, poverty and oppression are situations where 
terror can flourish most conveniently. Terror and oppression respectively feed one 
another. Any approach, which ignores that terror is a consequence, turns to 
producing solutions with only oppression. Consequently, this only promotes terror. 
Therefore, the way to end terror requires an approach by the State, respectful of 
basic rights and freedoms, and a way of thinking, which sees economic development 
and security as pieces of the same whole…”] !
 These AKP views could give an idea of their manner of thinking. Briefly, 
AKP sees that an approach on political level, which contains elimination of 
certain problems in the Kurdish populated areas, eventually would end the terror 
itself. As PKK’s main arguments as a reason for its terrorist actions were the 
incorrect state policies and applications in the region, lack of cultural rights for 
Kurds, and so on, AKP’s point of view could make sense. Even though PKK’s 
aim was not and never has been to force state for cultural rights for Kurdish origin 
people. PKK’s aforementioned arguments were its excuses for terrorist actions 
and PKK’s goal was the creation of an independent Kurdish State at the 
beginning, which later changed into regional autonomy, and at the time of writing 
this thesis, to ‘democratic Republic for everyone’. However, their understanding 
of democratic republic also contains sort of regional autonomy in itself which is 
commonly understood by the society as ‘division’ of the country. 
!
 As AKP Government came into power in 2002, PKK’s unilateral cease-
fire of 1999, which lasted until 2004, was continuing. AKP started its reforms 
with the European Union perceptive. As a result, eight legislative reform packages 
were adopted by the Turkish Parliament in 2002-2004 period. With these reforms, 
Turkey declared its commitment to human rights in international convention. The 
packages also helped to solve numerous problems regarding the social and 
political life. Nearly every single of them, one way or another, were welcomed by 
the Kurds. As a result of reforms packages, following improvements happened; on 
government-military relations, European standards were adopted; State Security 
Courts were abolished, more freedom of expression was provided; law which led 
easy punishment for criticizing military and state system was changed; more 
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freedom was provided on gathering and demonstration; necessary changes were 
made for television broadcasting other than Turkish; usage of languages other 
than Turkish become possible for private language courses, and so on.   Many 506
other regulations have been adopted regarding to EU laws. With these packages 
dead penalty was also abolished, which paved the way for  Abdullah Öcalan to 
lifetime imprisonment instead of death penalty. The European Union welcomed 
reform efforts of Turkish Government.   As a consequence of reform packages, 507
in 2004, the EU confirmed that Turkey had made all necessary changes in its legal 
system and was ready for the negotiations for full admission to the European 
Union. The negotiations started on 3 October 2005.   508
!
 In accordance with reform packages, the first private Kurdish language 
course was opened in Şanlıurfa in 2003.   Later on, other private courses were 509
opened in other Kurdish populated cities, and in 2004, a Kurdish language course 
opened in Istanbul.   However, in May 2004, PKK declared that they did not see 510
these reforms enough and finished its unilateral cease-fire; hence, PKK militants 
would continue its attacks inside Turkey. That year, PKK started its attacks with 
saying that the Government did not take necessary actions to solve the Kurdish 
problem and demanding improvements on Abdullah Öcalan’s prison conditions. 
With PKK’s return to terrorist actions, positive atmosphere on Kurdish problem 
faded away and another chance to solve the problem missed. 
!
 Even though PKK’s attacks continued, AKP followed its ideas on Kurdish 
problem. In 2005, the chairman of AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan gave a public speech in Diyarbakir. He indicated that the Kurdish 
Problem exists and ethnical identities such as Turk, Kurd, Arab, were needed to 
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be considered as sub-identities, and the Turkish citizenship need to be considered 
as upper identity.   However, the Article 66 of the 1982 Constitution defines 511
Turkish Citizenship as following;  
!
“Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. 
The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizenship of a 
child of a foreign father and a Turkish mother shall be defined by law.”   512
 The common understanding of the aforementioned article is that every 
single citizen of Turkey is Turk, which refers to an ethnic origin in a way. Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement on citizenship and identity was significantly 
important for Kurds, as he listed Turk and Kurd together as sub-identities and 
called the citizenship as upper-identity. This brought another discussion to 
Turkish political life; the possibility to modify the Article 66 for a more general 
description of citizenship.  
!
 In 2009, Turkey faced with a lot of changes on Kurdish issue. On 1 
January 2009, TRT 6, a dedicated TV channel started to broadcast in Kurdish, was 
opened by Turkey Radio and Television Corporation (TRT, Türkiye Radyo ve 
Televizyon Kurumu), which is an official institution of the state.   With the TV 513
broadcasting, Kurdish language was accepted at state level. Even though Kurds 
generally live in eastern Turkey, TRT 6 broadcasts as a national channel, which 
gives opportunity to Kurds to watch TV in their mother tongue. AKP’s efforts on 
Kurdish issue brought another unilateral cease-fire of PKK in April 2009.   In 514
July 2009, AKP Government declared a new initiative on Kurdish problem. AKP 
Government believed that reforms on Kurdish issue eventually paved the way for 
the end of terrorism problem. If the Kurdish problem start to fade away, terrorism 
problem could finish within a process.  
!
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 The name of the initiative, which was ‘Kurdish opening’, was changed to 
‘democratic opening, national unity and solidarity project’.   With this 515
democratic opening, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that whatever the 
name of the project was, Government was seeking a way to solve the problems of 
Turkey. In 2009, in a time between August and September, Abdullah Öcalan sent 
a message to PKK militants via his lawyers that a group could come to Turkey 
from Northern Iraq as a signal of PKK’s goodwill.   The opposition parties did 516
not support Government’s project by saying that Government was in negotiation 
with PKK.   On 19 October 2009, 34 PKK militants entered Turkey from Iraq-517
Turkey border. They stood trail at the border then released at the scene.   PKK 518
militants’ enter to Turkey was promoted as a ‘victory’ by Kurds, militants were 
welcomed with celebrations and made a tour in the region over DTP’s party 
bus.   DTP’s show with PKK militants raised tension on the political atmosphere 519
in Turkey, public opinion did not accept these images, opposition parties accused 
the Government by saying that they lost control of the ‘democratic opening’ 
process.  
!
 With Abdullah Öcalan’s call, another group of PKK militants were 
supposed to return Turkey from Europe; however, as 34 PKK militants’ return 
scened as a show, the Government stopped other militants’ return process.  520
Kurdish political party, DTP, was banned in December 2009 as mentioned. 
However, AKP Government’s reforms on Kurdish issue continued with the 
arrangement about usage of Kurdish language on elections’ propaganda process in 
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March 2010.   Later on, in June 2010, lawsuit was opened against returned PKK 521
militants, and ten of them were arrested. With this arrest of ten militants, the rest 
of PKK militants went back to PKK’s camp in Iraq.   In June 2010, PKK broke 522
the cease-fire and returned its terrorist attacks. The most brutal one was on 14 
July 2011 during which PKK killed 13 soldiers.   Therefore, AKP’s efforts on 523
democratic opening process stopped. 
!
  Since the beginning of the democratic opening process, the opposition 
parties accused the Government of negotiating with PKK, and in September 2011, 
a voice record was published in one of the news agency’s website. According to 
the record, the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey’s representatives had 
been in contact with PKK representatives in Oslo/Norway under the supervision 
of an unknown foreign country representative.   There were no mentions to the 524
date of the meeting, however; according to the record, that meeting was not the 
first one. Therefore, except the sides, nobody knows the exact date of the 
beginning of Oslo meeting. For the start date of the Oslo meetings, Murat 
Karayılan, PKK’s leader in the field, pointed out 2008.   Therefore, common 525
belief on the subject was that the State officials had been talking to the PKK 
representatives for a while. 
!
 PKK’s attack which resulted with the death of 13 soldiers, and the voice 
recording practically finished the democratic opening process, and another 
unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem was noted on the history of Turkey. 
!
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 In summer 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated 
that Kurdish language would become an optional course in middle 
schools.   Necessary regulations were made and Kurdish language became an 526
optional course for the educational year of 2012-2013. According to Hürrtiyet 
Daily News’ article on the subject, by 6 February 2013 total numbers of students 
who chose the optional language course was 18.847.   527
!
 In 2012, PKK’s attacks increased in Turkey. A part from PKK attacks, 
another action was started on 12 September 2012; 63 Kurdish inmates began 
hunger strike. They demand that the cruelty against Kurds should stop 
immediately; Abdullah Öcalan’s prison conditions should be improved, and he 
should be accepted as the interlocutor for the Kurdish problem; Kurds should 
defend themselves in Kurdish in trails. On 60th day of hunger strike some BDP 
MP’s also joint the strike.   On 17 November 2012, Abdullah Öcalan’s brother 528
visited him in prison, then made a statement that Abdullah Öcalan made a call to 
stop the hunger strike. As his brother indicated that Abdullah Öcalan considered 
the hunger strike as in important act, and said that the act fulfilled its duty, they 
could stop.   The hunger strike was a civil-disobedience action of imprisoned 529
Kurds and MP’s to force the state to talk with Abdullah Öcalan. With Abdullah 
Öcalan’s call, hunger strike finished on 18 November 2012. It was kind of a show 
to put Abdullah Öcalan at the center of both Kurdish and terrorism problems and, 
as Andrew Finkel states in his piece for International Herald Tribune, Abdullah 
Öcalan did play his part well and finished the hunger strikes by a demonstration 
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of power.   Öcalan showed public that he was still in power not just over the 530
PKK militants but over the Kurds as well. 
!
 During the last days of 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the 
National Intelligence Organization officials have been in talk with Abdullah 
Öcalan with the intention of finishing terrorism problem. He also noted that the 
State of Turkey had done these talks before and in necessity would do 
again.   After Prime Minister’s statement, three Kurdish politicians visited 531
Abdullah Öcalan in prison on 3 January 2013. In this visit, Abdullah Öcalan 
stated that he was in contact with state officials since 4-5 months.   First meeting 532
was the beginning point of a new initiative and series of visits to Abdullah 
Öcalan. Until 21 April 2013, Kurdish politicians visited Abdullah Öcalan five 
times, and each time Öcalan wrote letters both for the PKK’s wing in Europe and 
its leadership in Kandil, Iraq. This time, the initiative was named as ‘resolution 
process’ by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.  
!
 One week after the Kurdish politicians’ meeting with Abdullah Öcalan, 
three PKK militants were found death in PKK’s office in Paris.   For the 533
assassination of three militants, PKK accused Turkish Intelligence services,   and 534
Turkish Government stated that groups in PKK, which were against the 
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‘resolution process’ might be responsible of these killings.   The assassinations 535
created a small scale crisis in the resolution process; however, meeting and talks 
with Abdullah Öcalan continued. In the month of January, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
said “I do not know ‘Kurdish Problem’, I know that my Kurdish brothers and 
sisters have problems.”   With this, AKP put all its efforts to solve the problems 536
of Kurds in Turkey. In other words, AKP tried to demonstrate that the 
Government did not do reforms because the State was in talk with Abdullah 
Öcalan; however, public opinion in Turkey often accepted the reforms as 
compromises against PKK. Later in January, AKP Government did necessary 
changes for the usage of Kurdish language in trials.   This was the first positive 537
outcome of resolution process. Following days, the atmosphere in Turkey 
changed and everyone started to talk about the resolution and peace. The talks 
with Öcalan stopped PKK’s attack, and Governments statements made the room 
for talks on Öcalan’s role, ideas and so on. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
said “to solve the problems, we consider every way. Even if I need to poison 
myself to solve the problem, I would do it” to demonstrate how dedicated he was 
for the resolution process.   538
!
 The positive atmosphere raised the expectation of another unilateral cease-
fire announcement from the PKK. Even PKK’s attacks have stopped, PKK’s 
leadership in Kandil, Iraq waited to see and to understand Abdullah Öcalan’s 
position first. At the end of February 2013, second committee, which was formed 
by BDP MPs, visited Abdullah Öcalan, and in their return they stated that Öcalan 
said that PKK should treat well its captives, he was also expecting to see them to 
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return their families soon.   After Öcalan’s call about captives, on 13 March 539
2013, PKK released 8 public servants who had been kidnapped and held by PKK 
for two years.   BDP party co-chairmen considered this as PKK’s gesture for 540
resolution process, and government officials stated that this was the outcome of 
the resolution process. Abdulah Öcalan’s call for a cease-fire was expected to be 
heard on the celebrations of Nowruz in Diyarbakir. 
!
 On 21 March 2013, during the celebration of Nowruz in Diyarbakir, 
Abdullah Öcalan’s message was read both in Kurdish and Turkish. In his message 
Öcalan made references to the history of Turkey, the foundation of Turkey and 
called the day of 21 March 2013, as the starting date of a new period. Full text of 
his message was as followings;  
!
 "Greetings to all peoples of Middle East and Central Asia who celebrate Nowruz, the 
day of revival and rejoice, with the greatest participation in the world... 
 Greetings to all other peoples of the world who celebrate Nowruz, the landmark of a 
new era and sunshine, with enthusiasm and a democratic tolerance. 
 Greetings to all who take democratic right, freedom and equality as their guides... 
 Greetings to all Kurdish people, a folk that mothered one of the 
most  ancient rural and urban civilizations at the lands of Mesopotamia and Anatolia 
from Zagros and Taurus Mountains to Tigris and Euphrates Rivers... 
 For Kurdish people, who coexisted peacefully and co-created this civilization with 
other peoples from different racial, religious, ethnic backgrounds; Tigris and Euphrates 
are siblings with Sakarya and Maritsa rivers. Mount Ararat and Cudi Mountain are 
friends of Kachkar and Erciyes Mountains. Haley and Delido dances are relatives with 
Horon and Zeybek dances. 
 This great civilization, these sister entities have been separated from each other by 
political oppressions, external interventions and group dynamics; they have been 
compelled to build entities ignoring justice, equality and freedom.   
 For the past 200 years, conquest wars, western imperialists interventions and 
oppressive mentalities have urged Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Kurdish entities to form 
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index.html>, site visited on 13 March 2013. 
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York Times, 13 March 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/world/europe/kurdish-rebels-
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UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
artificial states, borderlines, problems. 
 The era of exploiting, oppressive ignoring mentalities is over. The peoples of Middle 
East and Central Asia are waking up. They are returning to their own. They are saying 
'no' to the clashes that aim to provoke and harm each other.   
 Millions of people who are enthusiastically crowding for Nowruz today speak of 
peace and fraternity, and demand a resolution. 
 The struggle I initiated against our collective desperation, ignorance and slavery was 
aiming to form a consciousness, mentality and spirit albeit all challenges.   
 Today, I see that this scream came to a certain point. 
 Our fight was never against a particular race, religion, sect or group, and it can never 
be. 
 Our fight was always against oppression, ignorance, injustice, lack of development 
and all sorts of pressures. 
 Today though, we are waking up to a new Turkey, Middle East and future.   
 To all youngsters who bless my call, to all women who add my message to their 
hearts, to all friends who consider my sayings, to all people who pay attention to what I 
am saying; 
 We have a new era starting upon us. 
 A door is opening from a process of armed resistance to a process of democratic 
politics. 
 A new process emphasizing on political, social and economic aspect is starting, a new 
mentality on democratic rights, freedoms and equality is developing.   
 We have sacrificed decades for this people, we have suffered great consequences. But 
all the sacrifice and struggle did not go unwasted. Kurdish people regained their true 
self-identity. 
 We have come to a point where we say "let the arms silence, opinions and politics 
speak". The ignorant modernist paradigm has been deconstructed. The blood is dripping 
from this geography, regardless of Turkish, Kurdish, Laz, Circassian origin.   
 I, myself, am declaring in the witnessing of millions of people that a new era is 
beginning, arms are silencing, politics are gaining momentum. It is time for our [PKK] 
armed entities to withdraw from the [Turkish] border. 
 I strongly believe that whoever opens their heart to me, whoever believes in our 
struggle, will certainly consider the sensitivity of the ongoing process.   
 This is not an end, this is a beginning. It is not the end of our struggle, it is the start of 
a new sort of struggle. 
 Forming geographies based on a single ethnicity and nation is an inhuman invention 
that the modernity created to alienate us from our true selves. 
 Everybody is responsible for the creation of a free, democratic and egalitarian country 
that suits well with the history of Kurdistan and Anatolia. On the occasion of this 
Nowruz, I am calling all people with Armenian, Turkic, Assyrian, Arabic and other 
backgrounds to see the light of freedom and equality as much as Kurdish people do. 
 To people of Turkey; 
 Turkish people who know ancient Anatolia as Turkey should know that their 
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coexistence with Kurdish people dates back to a historical agreement of fraternity and 
solidarity under the flag of Islam. 
 In the real sense, this spirit of solidarity does not and must not contain conquest, 
denial, forced assimilation and annihilation. The politics of oppression, annihilation and 
assimilation represent the effort of an isolated elitist government that deny the existing 
history and fraternity agreement. 
 I am inviting everyone to build the democratic modernity together, as two prominent 
strategic powers of Middle East, departing from our culture and civilization to 
emancipate ourselves from the vicious cycle of cruelty which looks obvious to 
contradict our history and fraternity agreement. 
 It is time not for opposition, conflict or contempt towards each other, it is time for 
cooperation, unity, embracing and mutual blessing. 
 During World War I, Turkish and Kurdish soldiers have fallen martyrs together in 
Çananakkale [Dardanelles], they have fought together in Turkey's Independence War, 
and opened together the 1920 National Assembly. 
 What our mutual past points out is our mutual necessity of forming our future 
together. The spirit of 1920 National Assembly era also enlightens the upcoming era of 
now.  
I am inviting all representatives from oppressed peoples, classes and cultures; women 
who have been the most exploited class of all times, oppressed religious groups, cults 
and other cultural entities, worker class representatives, and other individuals who are 
excluded by the [capitalist] system to take part, understand and acquire the democratic 
modernity system.   
 Middle East and Central Asia is currently seeking a contemporary modernity and 
democratic order that would address its historical context. The search for a new model 
where everyone could live freely and in fraternity has become one of basic human needs 
- like bread and water. It is inevitable that Anatolian and Mesopotamian geography, and 
the cultural momentum in there will build this model. 
 We are currently experiencing a much more complex, contemporary and profound 
moment than Turkish and Kurdish people experienced almost hundred years ago during 
the foundation of modern Turkey with the National Pact (Misak-i Milli). 
 This time, we are building a model on the lesson of what we learned from the 
mistakes of our predecessors - embracing all devastated peoples, classes and cultures. I 
am calling all these people to realize an organization through a more egalitarian, 
independent and democratic method. 
I am also calling all the Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian and Arabic people in today's Syria 
and Iraq who have been left wrongly out from the borders of the National Pact to 
discuss, become aware and decide on their realities on the platform of a "National 
Solidarity and Peace Conference".  
 The broadness and inclusivity of saying "we", an important pillar in the historical 
context of this geography, has been narrowed to a "singularity" under the arms of elitist 
administrations. It is time to give "us" its old sense spirit and practicality. 
 We will unite against whom are trying to divide and conquer us. We will unite against 
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who are trying to tear us apart. 
 The ones who are unable to read the spirit of time will inevitable end up at the junk of 
history. The peoples of the region are witnessing a new dawn. War-tired peoples of the 
Middle East want to be reborn and get up on their feet. This Nowruz is a precursor to all 
of us.   
The prophecies uttered by Moses, Jesus and Mohammed are becoming true now, the 
humanity is regaining its dignity again. 
 We are not in a position to reject all the values of Western civilization. We are taking 
the values of enlightenment, freedom, equality and democracy, and synthesizing them 
with our own norms. The basis of our new struggle is ideas, ideology and democratic 
politics, and to launch a democratic movement. 
 Greetings to all who give life to this process and support democratic peace! 
 Greetings to all who take responsibility for the fraternity, equality and democratic 
freedom of people! 
 Long live Nowruz, long live the fraternity of peoples!   541!
 With his message, Abdullah Öcalan made more than a cease-fire call. He 
ordered PKK’s militants to leave Turkey and, for the future of the Kurds, he 
indicated that politics would take place of weapons. Öcalan’s message made its 
scene on international media also.   The President of Council of Europe 542
Parliamentary Assembly, Jean-Claude Mignon, stated that Öcalan’s message was 
an important step on the resolution process between PKK and the Turkish 
authorities.   The next day all Turkish mass media was talking about Abdullah 543
Öcalan’s message. Turkish Daily newspaper, Radikal, printed its front cover with 
a photo of the Nowruz area in Diyarbakir, and a Kurdish slogan over it: ‘Biji 
Türkiye‘ (Long Live Turkey).   Putting a Kurdish slogan in the front page of a 544
national newspaper was not even thinkable ten years ago. Radikal’s act was not an 
evidence of courage, but an evidence of how far Turkey have evolved on Kurdish 
problem. 
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!  Pieces about the subject:  542
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<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25430398/>, site visited on 21 March 2013.
!  For the frontpage of Radikal, please see page Appendix VII.544
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 For many years, PKK tried to demonstrate that they were the 
representatives of Kurds, they had no goals for themselves but a goal for all 
Kurds. PKK’s intention was to merge the Kurdish problem and terrorism problem 
together, and as Öcalan’s aforementioned message had references to common 
history of Kurds and Turks, he made the call to Kurds but not just the PKK 
militants; the Kurdish problem and terrorism problem literally become one. 
!
 On 23 March 2013, Hasan Cemal did an interview with Murat 
Karayılan.   As Hasan Cemal cited, Murat Karayılan gave his support to 545
Öcalan’s message and said that this time was different from previous ones. 
Following hours to that interview, Murat Karayılan announced that PKK declared 
unilateral cease-fire. As Abdullah Öcalan’s message’s first part was put in action 
by PKK, the discussions in Turkey focused on the second part; the withdrawal of 
PKK militants from Turkey. For the withdrawal process, Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan said that the militants should give-up their weapons and leave as 
unarmed. The counter statement to Prime Minister’s demand came next day, on 
30 March 2013 from PKK, they indicated that in PKK militants would not give 
up their weapons and the Government should construct the legal base for 
withdrawal.   546
!
 For the withdrawal process, Abdullah Öcalan proposed that two 
commissions, ‘wise men commission’ and ‘investigation commission’ among the 
MPs should be organized and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey should 
involve to the process as supervisor. During the first week of April 2013, AKP 
Government formed the ‘wise men commission’ but not from the MPs, instead 63 
well known people were selected to work for two months time. Among them, 
there were academics, columnists, movie stars and singers who found place.  547
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www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=1127377&categoryid=78>, site 
visited on 30 March 2013. 
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The ‘wise men commission’ made their first meeting with Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, then started to work. As Turkey has seven geographical areas, 
these 63 ‘wise men commission’ were divided into seven groups of nine people. 
They did not become designated State servants; however, the Government stated 
that the ‘wise men commission’ was a public initiative, which was formed by the 
Government, to report to Prime Minister. Same week, AKP MPs gave motion to 
the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for the formation of an 
investigation commission among MPs.    548
!
 “El Pais”, Spanish newspaper, published an interview with Murat 
Karayılan in Kandil about the resolution process.   According to the interview, 549
Murat Karayılan repeated that PKK militants would not give up their weapons 
during the withdrawal process, and stated that giving up weapons should be talked 
as final step of the process. Murat Karayılan also claimed that 90% of PKK’s 
activities were political, while only 10% were military and there were no terrorist 
activities among them. However, PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by 
Turkey, the United States of America and the European Union. As journalist José 
Miguel Calatayud said in his piece and also as explained in previous parts of this 
thesis, PKK is known for its attacks against Turkish security forces, civilians, 
professors, public servants, and even tourists in Turkey. As already cited in the 
first part of this thesis, if an armed attack kills soldiers of a State, affects civilians 
and frighten to population, it is commonly considered as terrorist action. 
Therefore, Murat Karayılan’s statement to El Pais is just the usage of international 
media to project PKK as a just organization, which serves for favor of Kurds. 
!
 As the resolution process put PKK under the spotlights, Murat Karayılan 
gave another statement to New York Times, US newspaper, a week after El Pais 
 179
!  “Meclis ‘Sürece’ Araştırma Komisyonuyla Dahil Olacak”, Radikal, 3 April 2013, <http://548
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interview.   In addition to what he said to El Pais, he stated, “if this [resolution 550
process] does not happen, there will be a great war”. He also mentioned his desire 
for the aftermath of the process as he would like to play a political role in Turkey. 
  
 Murat Karayılan’s two statements to different countries’ newspapers show 
how hard he was trying to project the PKK as a political organization. Turkish 
journalists and columnists made interviews with him before; however, he did not 
state his desire of political role for the aftermath of the problem before. In this 
sense, Murat Karayılan tried to conduct an international pressure over the State of 
Turkey for a possible demand for amnesty not just for militants of PKK, but also 
for the leadership. 
  
 On 18 April 2013, TIME’s list of 100 most influential people in the world 
was published and Abdullah Öcalan found a place in the list.   Abdullah Öcalan’s 551
message on Nowruz, following statements, and his role in general paved the way 
for him to the TIME’s list. As in the list of TIME, every personality was described 
by another famous person in the World; Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, wrote 
down the following for Öcalan;  
  
 “The Irish peace accord known as the Good Friday Agreement is 15 years old this 
month. For almost all that time, Abdullah Ocalan, a founder of the Kurdistan Worker’s 
Party, has been in prison in Turkey.  
 Despite this, he has become a voice for peace, a leader willing to offer the hand of 
friendship to those he has fought against for most of his life. 
 Persuading enemies that there are alternative ways to resolve long-standing 
differences takes patience and a willingness to engage in dialogue, but most important, 
it requires leadership. 
 Ocalan has demonstrated that leadership. Despite incarceration, he has forged a road 
map to peace that commits the Kurdish people to democracy and freedom and tolerance. 
He argues that it is time to “silence the weapons and let the ideas and politics speak.” 
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Ocalan wants a “new beginning” that will bring the Kurdish people’s struggle into a 
new phase — a political phase in which they seek through negotiation to create an 
equal, free and democratic country for “all peoples and cultures.” 
 I commend him for his leadership and vision and urge the Turkish government to 
release him.”    552
    
 As this thesis took the British Experience as a reference point, putting 
Gerry Adams’ comments on Abdullah Öcalan was important in order to 
demonstrate how Gerry Adams and the Sinn Fein saw Abdullah Öcalan. 
  
 On 25 April 2013, Murat Karayılan held a press conference in Kandil, in 
which international media and Turkish media representatives participated. During 
the press conference, Murat Karayılan declared that the withdrawal process of 
PKK militans from Turkey to Northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) would begin on 8 
May 2013 and will be finalized as soon as possible. For a possible encounter with 
Turkish Security Forces, Murat Karayılan said the following;  
!
 “It is a must for Turkish military forces to display the same sensitivity and seriousness 
during the withdrawal which will be stopped in the event of any kind of attack, 
operation and bombing to which guerrillas will respond on the basis of necessary 
defence. The forces of the Turkish state should also avoid provocative and opportunist 
attitudes that may lead to any kind of military activity and clashes in Kurdistan. Apart 
from that, a healthy and accomplished progress in the process could be ensured by 
paying attention to the points we have highlighted in the letters we sent to Öcalan and 
are known to the state as well.”   553!
 According to Murat Karayılan’s statement, the process would take three 
steps, and with the withdrawal of PKK militants, first step would be completed. 
On the second step, Karayılan demanded that the State of Turkey and the 
Government should do necessary changes on regulations on the constitution and 
state should abolish village guard system, special forces, etc. And for the third 
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step, Murat Karayılan named the step as ‘normalization’ and  establishment of 
freedom for everyone, including Abdullah Öcalan.  
!
 According to Kurdish politicians and newspapers, the withdrawal process 
of PKK militants started on 8 May 2013 as planned. Following days, various 
photos of PKK militants on rural areas were published on newspapers, and they 
were considered as evidences of PKK`s withdrawal from Turkey. During the 
month of May, the resolution process and the PKK militants` withdrawal were at 
the center of the agenda of Turkey. However, on the day of 31 of May 2013, street 
protests started in Turkey, which consequently pushed down the resolution 
process in the agenda.  
!
 During the second half of May 2013 in Istanbul, a group of people was 
protesting against the Government’s plan to destroy the Gezi Park in Taksim and 
to build a replica of Ottoman Barrack (name of the barrack was Topçu Kışlası). 
PM Erdoğan promoted the plan of the Ottoman Barrack as re-establishing the 
history where it belongs. Ecological protests to protect the Gezi Park from 
destruction evolved after the police intervention towards protesters early in the 
morning of 31 May 2013. After that moment, thousands of people gathered in the 
Taksim Square against police brutality. However, police forces tried to disrupt the 
crowd with tear gas and water cannons. The harsh attitude of police sparked 
multiple demonstrations in multiple cities all over Turkey. The protests started 
with Gezi Park, then turned into anti-government protests. BDP supported the 
protests by taking its place in the Taksim Square with pennons. BDP MP Sırrı 
Süreyya Önder was the first man who stood up against municipality vehicles and 
stopped the destruction of the trees in the park. Many Kurdish people also 
participated individually. Many columnists stated that Gezi Park protests were 
organized against the resolution process. Even PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said 
that the protests targeted the resolution process and the development of Turkey in 
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general.   With the Gezi Park protests, the agenda of Turkey shifted from the 554
resolution process. 
!
 On 13 June 2013, Mehmet Öcalan, Abdullah Öcalan`s brother, visited 
Abdullah Öcalan in İmrali Island. After the visit, Mehmet Öcalan said that 
Abdullah Öcalan stated that the first step of the resolution process was nearly 
over.   The statement of Mehmet Öcalan about the withdrawal of PKK militants 555
was considered as a message to the Government to start the second step of the 
process. In the meantime, Kurdish politicians started to organize multiple 
conferences in Turkey and in Europe in order to inform people about the process. 
During the conference in Diyarbakir between 15-17 June 2013, many demands 
were listed by participants including release of Abdullah Öcalan, self-
determination right for Kurds, release of all convicts on political crimes, remove 
of PKK from list of terrorist organizations etc.   Some of these demands were 556
listed publicly for the first time, and considered as Kurdish demands from the 
Government in the second step of the process. However, one can see that extreme 
demands, like release of Abdullah Öcalan, could not be fulfilled in the conditions 
of Turkish society. Kurdish politicians were aware of this reality; however, they 
put demands at very high point in order to gain more and more in the negotiations 
with state officials. 
!
On 26 June 2013, Selahattin Demirtaş, co-chairman of BDP, stated that 
resolution process was affected by the Gezi Park protests. He said that for ten, 
fifteen days the process was in hold and Abdullah Öcalan and leaders of BDP 
made statements to continue the process and tried to create the atmosphere for the 
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start of second step of the process.   One can see that as the resolution process 557
needed the dedication of all efforts from both sides, a change in Turkish agenda 
affected the dialogue between sides and jeopardized the resolution process. On the 
other hand, it is possible to say that with the aforementioned statement, Selahattin 
Demirtas tried to use the Gezi Park protests in their favor and promoted the role of 
Abdullah Öcalan again as `peacekeeper` in the process. As the resolution process 
is very fragile, each side tries to empower his position by daily statements. Same 
day PM Erdoğan hold a meeting with members of `wise men commission` as the 
commission finished its two months of fieldwork around Turkey. According to 
wise men commission's reports a high percentage of Turkish population supported 
the resolution process. Members of the commission stated the demands of the 
society to PM Erdoğan and Erdoğan stated that the Government of Turkey will 
examine each report on the issue and will conduct a map for the future of process. 
PM Erdogan also stated that despite the statements coming from BDP leaders that 
PKK militants withdrawal was nearly completed, only 15% of PKK militants left 
the territory of Turkey. Some members of the commission tried to make 
connections between Gezi Park protest and the resolution process; however, PM 
Erdoğan stated that they were different subjects.   Even the PM Erdoğan tried to 558
distinguish Gezi Park protests from resolution process, one can say that they were 
related in multiple ways, as one easily could affect the other. 
!
On 28 June 2013, a protests took place in Lice against the construction of 
a military station. Turkish Gendarme Forces intervened the protesters by tear gas 
and opened fire in the air, which caused the death of one person and seven 
injured.   As this incident happened during the Gezi Protests, people took streets 559
 184
!  “Demirtaş: Çözüm süreci Gezi’de gitti geldi”, Radikal, 26 June 2013, <http://557
www.radikal.com.tr/politika/demirtas_cozum_sureci_gezide_gitti_geldi-1139202>, site visited on 
26 June 2013.
!   “Erdoğan`dan akil insanlara: Lütfen Gezi Parki olayını buraya taşımayın”, Radikal, 26 June 558
2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/
erdogandan_akil_insanlara_lutfen_gezi_parki_olayini_buraya_tasimayin-1139299>, site visited on 
26 June 2013.
!  “Lice’de protestocu köylülülere müdahale: 1 ölü 7 yaralı”, Radikal, 28 June 2013, <http://559
www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/licede_protestocu_koylulere_mudahale_cok_sayida_yarali-1139575>, 
site visited on 28 June 2013.
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to show their support to people of Lice in major cities like Istanbul. It is possible 
to say that one of the results of Gezi Protests was the rising awareness of people in 
Western part concerning the issues of Kurdish problem and what was happening 
in the eastern part of the country. 
!
On 3 July 2013, Abdullah Öcalan’s brother visited him in prison once 
again and declared that Abdullah Öcalan stated that as 1 June 2013, first phase of 
the resolution process was over and the sides were preparing themselves for the 
second phase.   Despite the inconsistent statements from the sides of the talks, 560
public opinion believed that the resolution process was on track. 
!
During the months of June and July, in official circles of Ankara, there was 
statements about a ‘democratization package’, which contained several juridical 
chances that would provide certain rights to Kurds, and in general more 
democracy in Turkey. More democratic rights were also demands of PKK/KCK 
for the second phase of the resolution process. Many rumors suggested that this 
‘democratization package’ could be announced by PM Erdoğan during July; 
however; all protests caused s delay. On 19 June 2013, PKK/KCK made a public 
statement that they were expecting concrete acts from the Government on the 
issue of democratization as soon as possible, otherwise the resolution process 
would not proceed.   One can see that while Governments are negotiating and 561
conducting talks with terrorist organizations, organizations make public threats 
via media channels in order to force the Government to act.  
!
On the 31 July 2013, Cemil Bayık, who was elected as co-leader of KCK/
PKK during their last congress in July, declared 1 September 2013 as a deadline 
to Government. Bayık, publicly stated that if the Government would not act 
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concretely until the 1 September, KCK/PKK would start to defend itself.   While 562
PKK was threatening the Government publicly, it would not be easy to brake-out 
the talks on the resolution process. Hence, the long-talked ‘democratization 
package’ was declared on 30 September 2013. Once can see that, PKK was 
making threats in order to empower their position publicly and  they did not brake 
the talks as the Government delayed the declaration of democratization package 
after 1 September 2013, which was the decline indicated by PKK. 
!
On 30 September 2013, PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the 
democratization package by a press conference. The package brought many new 
implementations and chances. Public opinion expected that the package would be 
Kurdish issue centric; however, its contained many regulations about religious 
minorities, etc. With the democratization package, mother-tangues other than 
Turkish could be used as language of instruction in private schools, the usage of 
letters Q, W, X were allowed in public services and education, names of villages 
and towns, which were changed after the military coup of 1980, could be changed 
to old names, political parties law would change and the threshold for receiving 
financial aid from Treasury funds would be decreased to %3, (was %7 before) 
which pave the way for more parties to receive financial aid. In addition to these, 
the package expand the usage of languages other than Turkish in political scene. 
In 2010, the Government made necessary changes and let the usage of other 
languages during election period; with the democratization package, political 
parties could use other languages in any of their activities regardless of election 
period.   With the democratization package, PM Erdoğan also started the 563
discussion on electoral system in Turkey. Erdoğan proposed three options; 
preserving the actual one, which has %10 threshold for political parties, lowering 
the threshold to %5 and implementing a narrowed constituency system in groups 
of five deputies for each constituency, and lastly, removing the threshold and 
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implementing the single-member district system, which is to say, creating 550 
elections districts all over Turkey.   At the writing time of this thesis, no change 564
took place regarding the electoral system; however, other announced changes 
started to be implemented in Turkey. Right after the announcement of the 
democratization package, Government officials stated that it was just a beginning 
of series of packages. 
!
Even-though the package brought many chances regarding the Kurdish 
issue, the members of BDP criticized the package and considered the acts of the 
Government as non-sincere. According to them, the Government was trying to 
present itself as if they cared about the problems of Kurds; however, allowing the 
usage of Kurdish as instruction language only in private schools was an example 
that the Government’s act was for show. On 7 October 2013, Cemil Bayık made 
statement to Firat News Agency and considered the package as empty. He stated 
that this empty democratization package did not help the resolution process.  565
Ten days later, Cemil Bayık made another statement and said that as PKK/KCK 
did not consider the efforts of Government sufficient, they stopped the withdrawal 
process of PKK militant from Turkish territories; however, this would not change 
PKK’s cease-fire decision.   566
!
After the announcement of the package, public opinion believed that the 
package was below the expectations. As before the announcement, PM Erdoğan 
oftenly said that the package would change life of every single ciziten in Turkey, 
people were expecting more. Especially, Kurds, PKK/KCK and BDP were 
expecting to see more concrete acts regarding the resolution process, like amnesty 
for the members of PKK/KCK. Kurds expected much more, and eventually got 
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disappointment. However, it is clear that the package opened the way for future 
acts on democratization regarding the Kurdish issue and also the political 
presence of Kurdish parties in electoral system. If one takes into account that the 
resolution process is very sensitive, expecting deep changes regarding the Kurdish 
issue like amnesty might not be logical. As the sides are still in talks of 
negotiations, public opinion should be prepared for any deep chances in order to 
avoid the rise tension among Kurds and Turks. 
!
As this thesis observed the resolution process until 1 November 2013, at 
the writing time of this thesis, statements were still coming from both sides 
regarding resolution process. Even all militants of PKK did not leave Turkey, one 
can say that the second phase of the process was started with the announcement of 
the democratization package. 
!
5.2.3. What Can Be Done More? 
  
 Kurdish problem in Turkey has its roots throughout history of the region 
of Turkish Republic. From the early days of the Republic, the founders tried to 
build a nation state, which required somehow a definition of the new nation under 
the Republic’s flag. First the term ‘People of Turkey’ was used to define the new 
nation, but then it replaced by ‘Turkish Nation’. The idea was to call everyone as 
‘Turk’, consequently, create a new nation under the name ‘Turk’. Even though the 
term Turk used as a common name of the all people, it was understood as an 
ethnic reference by others, especially by Kurds.  
!
 After years, the Republic of Turkey’s policies was formed around the 
Turkish language, and the term ‘Turk’ was started to be accepted as ethnic origin 
more and more. As the state structure of Turkey did not give any space for other 
ethnic backgrounds to live, the problem evolved from the definition problem to 
political crisis. With military interventions, the State’s solid position on the 
identity question was strengthened; as a consequence with the Constitution of 
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1982, the State started to deny the existence of others in Turkey. The feeling of 
denial made Kurds more conscious about their ethnical background.  
!
 The State’s wrong policies over Kurds, especially during1980 military 
intervention and its aftermath, gave opportunity to PKK to make propaganda 
against the State. PKK’s brutal terrorist attacks were not legitimate in any 
meaning; however, they put the Kurdish problem on the State’s agenda.  
!
 In Turkish politics, the main problem was the duality on the governance of 
Turkey. The military held equal power as the elected government, - even some 
times more than government -, and that caused political instability, powerless 
Governments before military and even military interventions. The most obvious 
example of this duality problem occurred in 1990s regarding terrorism problem; 
while high level government officials accepted the Kurdish reality, the existence 
of the Kurdish problem, and its relevance to the terrorism problem, the military 
officials did not accepted political side of the terrorism problem, and saw the 
problem as whole, which required only military measures to solve. 
!
 On the merger of two problems, terrorism and Kurdish problems, the 
State’s policies played important role. PKK was founded in late 1970s as a small 
organization and State of Turkey did not consider them as a threat back then. Over 
the years, PKK strengthened its organization and eliminated rivals on the way to 
become the representative of Kurds. The Constitution of 1982 put the 10% 
national threshold rule in action, basically to keep Kurds away from the 
parliament. Kurds were forced to be in politics in other ways, which gave space to 
PKK to involve the political actions of Kurds. All of these caused the sentiment of 
hatred among Kurds against the State.  
!
 When AKP Government came into power in 2002, it was to late to solve 
one without touching the other. First, AKP Government passed reform packages 
which contained certain positive regulations for Kurds; however, PKK’s attacks 
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did not stop. After 2004, PKK showed that they were not going to accept any 
solution in which they were not involved. During the democratic opening process 
in 2009, the Kurdish politicians and PKK acted irrationally on the return of PKK 
militants from Kandil to Turkey. The democratic opening process started as 
premature, without any concrete action plan. The public opinion of Turkey was 
not ready to see such scenes and could not accept it. As the public support was 
missing, the process could not go far.  
!
 The resolution process; however, was different from previous ones. Recent 
public surveys show that over %60 percent of the population supports to process 
already. This time, AKP projected itself more ready and more in control than the 
previous one. Direct talks with Abdullah Öcalan put pressure over PKK militants 
in the field; although Öcalan’s position was not welcomed. While the resolution 
process still goes on, ‘what to do more?’ question is on the table. It is evident that 
a solution to the problem is more than a necessity for Turkey. 
!
 The resolution process continues with talks between sides. The National 
Intelligence Organization of Turkey representatives are in direct contact with 
Abdullah Öcalan, and Abdullah Öcalan communicates with PKK leadership via 
letters. Within this chain of communication, nobody knows anything except high 
rank state officials. Certain secrecy is essential on these kinds of talks; however, 
public opinion should also be informed about the process step by step. The main 
critics coming from people and opposition parties are regarding this situation. 
Main opposition party, Republican People’s Party, do not openly support the talks 
by claiming that they do not know what PKK wants from the Government. Also, 
considerable amount of people among population of Turkey criticize the talks 
with same arguments. Government officials claim that nearly 60% of the 
population supports the talks; however, this percentage should be rised more and 
more by convincing the rest of the population. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s leadership is a key element on the support of the population. As he 
knows that, he often says, “Trust Me!” against any questions related the process. 
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As already said before, secrecy is essential; however, Government officials should 
give information about the process for a sustainable support from population of 
Turkey. 
!
 The main goal of the resolution process was to find a democratic solution 
for the problems of Kurds and to complete the dissolution of PKK. By April 2013, 
PKK has prepared itself for the withdrawal which was expected to be over before 
winter of 2013. After PKK militants’ withdrawal, certain reforms were expected 
to put in power by the Government regarding Kurdish problem. On the changing 
regulations and laws, Turkey has an opportunity, as a new constitution project 
came into country’s agenda after the elections of 2011. With a new constitution, 
many problems could be solved with a maximum backing from population. For 
instance, the Article 66 of the Constitution of 1982 claims that ‘Everyone bound 
to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.’. As referring 
everyone as ‘Turk’ considered as an imposition of a single ethnic identity by 
Kurds, this article should change with a common reference. Eventually, there is 
no need to give a special name to the constitutional citizenship.  
!
 As the last two constitutions of Turkey had been written after military 
interventions, the idea of writing a new civil constitution created an excitement 
among society. However, the political parties on the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey are not in collaboration in writing the constitution. On this subject, Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan often says that if the Assembly could not agree 
on articles of the new constitution, AKP would introduce its own draft to the 
Assembly. On going talks with PKK, and Prime Minister’s statement create 
question marks in people’s mind. Day by day, people start to think that the new 
constitution might be a joint outcome of AKP and BDP/PKK. AKP wants to 
change the political system of Turkey, from the parliamentary to presidential. On 
the other side, BDP, as well as PKK leadership, talk about the regional autonomy 
or even federation. These two suggestions regarding to political structure of 
Turkey, reduce the resolution process to the state’s regime problem. This situation 
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causes fear among the population that AKP as a party in power, and BDP, as a 
Kurdish party, propose to form a ‘new’ State, which would exclude some of the 
population and would create new ‘other’ notion. As AKP has Islamic background, 
and Abdullah Öcalan gave a reference to Islam by saying that Kurds and Turks 
have been living together for 1000 years under the flag of Islam, even BDP MP 
Altan Tan declared that Kurds are against the nation-state, and the state structure 
formed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s ideas should be changed with people’s 
desire, and he believes that the Sheria law should be adopted.   At this point, 567
reducing the new constitution process to regime discussion will harm the 
resolution process, and reduce the support of the laic population. The new 
constitution should be a social contract for everyone and should provide the 
freedom for every ethnic background as well as every religion. The Government 
should find a way to work with other political parties to create a consensus on 
writing the new constitution, which would provide democratic rights to every 
citizen of Turkey. 
!
 Another main obstacle is Abdullah Öcalan’s position. Even the last 
surveys show a high percent of support of the population, people are not content 
to see that Abdullah Öcalan keep making statements from prison, and putting 
himself at the center of the problem. Within this context, Abdullah Öcalan started 
to become the main person who carries out the resolution process by himself. It is 
true that direct talks with Abdullah Öcalan put pressure over PKK militants in the 
field; although, Öcalan’s role and position in the process was not welcomed by 
significant part of society. Even Abdullah Öcalan himself and Kurdish politicians 
try to project him as ‘peace-maker’, public opinion will not be able to accept that 
in near future. Hence, the Government should show that they are in control of 
process. 
!
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 Territory of Turkey is larger than most of European countries. Up until 
now, it has been ruled from the capital, Ankara. The governance is centralized, 
and central government decides everything. In this system, decision-making 
process takes time, and slows down the development in areas, the investments, 
infrastructural constructions etc. Kurds propose regional autonomy, which is 
commonly interpreted as ‘division‘ of the country by people, is not the only 
solution; however; is true that the power should be decentralized. At this point, 
central authority should provide more rights and responsibilities to the local 
municipalities. Eventually, the State of Turkey already signed the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government; however, it declared nine reservations. If 
Turkey lifts reservations from the said charter, local municipalities will have more 
powers to decide on certain subjects, like infrastructure and investments. Lifting 
the reservations will not divide the country; however, this fact should be 
explained to the public in details. The State of Turkey could do necessary 
implementations of the charter to the new constitution, which will be easy to 
adopt other laws. 
!
 Another post-process problem will be the village guard system. If at the 
end of the process, PKK will dissolve itself, there will be no need for the village 
guard system. However, the dissolution of village guard system will bring another 
question to the political agenda. Right now, many Kurds are public servants who 
have weapons provided by the State, and serve as village guards on Kurdish 
populated areas against the threat of PKK. For many years, these Kurds have been 
considered as ‘traitors’ by other Kurds. Therefore, with the dissolution of village 
guard system, there is a possibility that hatred of Kurds would turn toward to 
these village guards. At this point, the State of Turkey should integrate these 
village guards to the normal life with proper measures and somehow should 
provide their safety. 
!
 The usage of Kurdish language as instruction language in education is 
another topic to solve. Kurds demand that Kurdish language should be accepted 
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as instruction language in every level of education. Although, Kurdish language is 
an optional course in middle schools and language of instruction in private 
schools, the idea of having Kurdish as language of education in public schools has 
been highly debated by opposition parties. Main argument is that as the State of 
Turkey’s official language is Turkish, another language cannot be accepted as 
instruction language in public schools. At this point, Spanish system can be the 
solution for the language issue. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 explains the 
language by following;  
!
“Article 3 
1. Castilian is the official Spanish language of the State. All Spaniards have the duty 
to know it and the right to use it. 
2. The other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective Autonomous 
Communities in accordance with their Statutes. 
3. The wealth of the different language modalities of Spain is a cultural heritage 
which shall be the object of special respect and protection.” 
  
 As one can see that, the Spanish Constitution indicates the official 
language and in the meantime recognizes other languages, such as Catalan, 
Basque, and Galician, and that paves the way for the education in these 
languages. Education in other than the official language is not a threat to the unity 
of Spain or the language of Castilian, as the Article 3 already obliged all Spaniard 
to know Castilian. In the case of Turkey, Spanish case may be an example to 
explain to public opinion that education in other languages will not be a threat.     
!
 Briefly, the State of Turkey has evolved during last ten years regarding 
Kurdish problem. Turkey reached the resolution process from the denial policies 
of 1980s and 1990s.  It is evident that a solution to the problems is more than a 
necessity for Turkey. The Republic of Turkey has to solve this problem to 
strengthen its position in the region. As the Middle East is already in crisis, 
Turkey’s role on many issues will be vital in near future. To act more affectively, 
Turkey needs to solve its own problems first. By the writing time of this thesis, 
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high level of hope is visible among the society. Forming more democratic system 
and providing more democratic rights will be beneficial not just for Kurds but 
everyone in Turkey.  
!
!
5.3. Spanish History on Solving the Terrorism Problem 
!
 Political position and problem of Basque people have deep roots in the 
history of Spain. However, the creation of ETA put the problem in other 
perspective as ETA launched an armed campaign against the central authority of 
Spain. ETA’s way of intervening the problem changed the frame of the Basque 
problem from rights of Basque people to terrorism problem. After ETA’s terrorist 
attacks, Basque political parties which supported these attacks became player of 
the Basque politics. As ETA had and still has, at some level, goal of creating an 
independent Basque Country, and leftist Basque political parties fight in political 
sphere for the same goal, ‘political terrorism’ found its place in the Spanish 
political discourses and problems. From its creation to up to today, a search for 
the solution to the ETA problem has been in process. Since its first years, Spanish 
central power applied military measures to finish the terrorist organization; 
however, with the transformation of Spain to democracy, talks were also carried 
out between parties.  
!
5.3.1. Unsuccessful Attempts !
 As already mentioned, ETA was founded in 1959 against the suppression 
of Dictator General Franco regime. With its attacks, ETA wanted to have public 
support. Against ETA’s attacks, Franco Government applied heavy security 
measures to control the Basque Region and to find the source of ETA’s attacks 
and leadership. Following the Franco’s death in 1975, King Juan Carlos I acted 
against ETA by sending his representative to the Basque Region of France in 
order to establish an atmosphere to talk. The representative visited a bookshop in 
Biarritz, which run by two Basque refugees and bookshop was known as a place 
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to reach-out ETA leadership. According to Robert P.Clark, the representative 
explained King’s plan regarding the liberalization of the regime, with which ETA 
would benefit if they could declare a ‘political truce’ in order to give space to 
King for planned changes. However, ETA did not respond positively to the plan 
and next day, carried out an attack to the mayor of a Basque City by saying that 
he was working as a spy for Franco regime. After the attack, ETA published an 
announcement, which is already explained in previous parts, to declare that ETA 
would continue its armed campaign against King Juan Carlos’s regime as 
well.   With the announcement headlined as ‘ETA against Juancarlismo’, King’s 568
initiative to talk with ETA finished even without actually started.  
!
 P.Clark notes that after the unsuccessful attempt to talk with ETA in 1975, 
other talks were carried out in 1976 and 1977 between ETA and Spanish 
representatives. ETA (m) refused the idea of giving up armed struggle and pointed 
the Basque socialist political parties as a counter-part for further 
talks.   However,  ETA(pm) declared a cease-fire in 1977 for the elections. 569
Meanwhile, the transition from the late-Franco regime to democracy started with 
regulations on political parties and social organizations. Even the talks were 
carried-out between 1976 and 1977, the death of journalist Jose Maria Portell in 
1978 stopped the talks. Meanwhile, ETA had its own struggle with internal 
problems between two fractions ETA (m) and ETA (pm). However, in 1978, ETA 
(m) declared its desire for possible cease-fire talks by publishing its five point 
demands, which were also known as ‘KAS Alternative’. ETA (m) demanded; total 
amnesty, legalization of all political parties, Spanish police forces retrieval from 
Basque Region, improvements on living and working conditions for masses, 
autonomy statue for Basque Country, which would recognize the national 
sovereignty of Basque people and would make the Basque language as principal 
language.   Meantime in 1978, Spain’s transition process was continuing and 570
 196
!  Florencio Domínguez Iribarren. “El Enfrentamiento de ETA con la Democracia”, La Historia 568
de la ETA, Antonio Elorza, et al., (eds.), Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2006,  pp. 273-275.
!  Clark, op. cit., p. 78. 569
!  Dominguez Iribarren, op. cit., p. 287. 570
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
special courts that established under the Franco’s regime for the trails of terrorists 
were being abolished.  
!
 As ETA had internal problems within two fractions, Spanish central 
authority faced with different demands from different parts of ETA, and that 
ultimately made the further talks impossible to pursue. There were rumors that 
sides continued on talks over KAS Alternative, while ETA (pm) attacked in 
Madrid in order to force the Spanish Government for the return of prisoned 
members to the prisons in Basque Country.   As a consequence of these attacks 571
carried by ETA (pm), Spanish Government agreed to discuss the return of some 
prisoners, and bombings attacks stopped.  
!
 After their success on forcing the Government for the return of prisoners 
in 1979, ETA (pm) listed four demands for a possible cease-fire decision in 1980. 
The demands were; Basque autonomy; referendum to be hold in Navarra for its 
integration to Basque Autonomous Community, ETA prisoners’ return to Basque 
region, withdrawal of Spanish security forces from Basque Region.   The 572
demands were similar to the demands of ETA (m) in 1978. Nevertheless, these 
demands and any negotiations about them were rejected by the Spanish 
authorities. Spanish Government was expecting the cease-fire decision of ETA 
unconditionally.  
  
 In 1981, ETA (pm) declared a cease-fire; however, ETA (m) continued its 
attacks. ETA (pm) kept its position on observing the situation in Spain, they did 
not attack the Spanish forces; however, they continued robberies and other actions 
in order to maintain their economic condition.   As already mentioned in 573
previous parts, the cease-fire decision of ETA (pm) caused an internal splits of the 
group as septimos  (ETA pm-VII) and octavos (ETA pm-VIII). Later in 1982, 
septimos made contacts with Spanish authorities, which led to dissolution of the 
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group and return to the society in 1983.   With the dissolution of a wing of ETA 574
(pm), one actor of the terrorism problem exited the equation; however, ETA (m)’s 
terror attacks continued. Already explained HB’s intention to become 
intermediary between sides for the negotiations did not give any outcome as the 
Spanish Government refused to negotiate with ETA (m) in 1982. Another attempt 
for the negotiation, mesa de la paz, which was also explained in previous part, did 
not gave any outcome in 1983, either.  
!
 In August 1984, a representative from Ministry of the Interior gave an 
interview to El Pais and stated that Spanish Government was ready to negotiate 
with ETA in condition that ETA would stop its attacks and give-up all weapons at 
once. According to the interview, as a counterpart, Spanish Government would 
facilitate the integration of ETA members into society. However, this declaration 
raised the tension in the Government and many members from the Government 
denounced the announcement by saying that Spanish Government could not 
negotiate with ETA in political frame. Also the representatives from HB declared 
that the offer was unacceptable and stated that ETA would only talk about true 
political negotiations. Meanwhile, ETA (m) declared that they were not in 
position of any negotiation unless the five point demands, KAS Alternative, were 
the basis of talks.   Another chance for the end of terrorism was missed.  575
!
 The year 1985, witnessed the change of ETA discourse on their goal of 
creating an independent Basque Country. One of the ETA leaders, Antxon 
Etxebeste, who was living in Dominican Republic in exile, gave an interview to a 
French magazine and stated that ETA would give up their weapons if central 
authority of Spain “recognize Basque sovereignty and grant a real autonomy to 
Euskadi, that is a state within a state”. Right after his interview, HB leader also 
stated that Basque Country could be independent within the Spanish 
State.   These two statements were considered as ETA’s change of discourse as 576
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they shifted from a total independence to real autonomy for Basque Country. As a 
response to these statements from ETA and HB, Spanish Government declared to 
public that they were not in position to negotiate and ETA should lay down 
weapons. However, even the Spanish Government made the aforementioned 
announcement to the public, they were trying to approach ETA secretly. 
!
 Another attempt to talk with ETA occurred with another ETA leader in 
exile. In 1986, one of the ETA leaders, Txomin Iturbe, started to live in Algeria in 
exile. With his arrival, Algerian Government contacted with both parties to 
become intermediary between them. Starting in 1986, Algeria became the place 
where the talks between ETA and Spanish authorities took place until 
1989.   The talks lasted three years; however, it did not give any positive 577
outcome. While the talks were taking place in Algeria, HB continued to promote 
idea of negotiations based on KAS Alternative. According to press reports of 
1987, the talks between sides were in good conditions. As the rumors were spread 
out about negotiations, during a press conference Spokesperson of Spanish 
Government, Javier Solana, confirmed the talks between ETA and Spanish 
Government by saying “there have been, there are and there will be” contacts 
with ETA in order to finish the terrorism problem of Spain.   It was the first time 578
that a government official of Spain spoke openly about talks between ETA and 
Spanish Government. First in 1988, then in January 1989,   ETA declared a 579
cease-fire periods during Algerian talks. However, in April 1989, ETA went back 
to the terrorist attacks against Spanish security forces and Algeria started to expel 
ETA members who were living in the country in exile.   580
!
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 As exiled ETA leaders were still in control over ETA, Spanish 
governments tried to talk with them in neutral territories. However, as one can see 
above the secret talks with intermediaries take long time and lack of public 
support make talks delicate. 
!
 Another cease-fire period was declared by ETA in 1992 for the Olympic 
Games, which were held in Barcelona.   With the cease-fire declaration, ETA 581
stated its desire to talk with Spanish Government. However, Spanish Government 
considered ETA’s position weaker than before and did not accepted ETA’s talk 
proposition. The cease-fire period lasted until August and the Olympic Games 
ended without any major events or casualties.   
  
 In 1996, after the general elections, a new government was formed by the 
José María Aznar. After Aznar took the office of Prime Minister, ETA declared 
cease-fire for a week with a hope to engage to talks with the new Government. 
However, as explained in related part of the thesis, during Aznar’s period, Spanish 
Government shelved all talks with ETA and applied military measures in order to 
fight against ETA’s terrorist actions. ETA resumed its attacks, including the Reus 
Airport bombing. 33 people, mostly tourists, were wounded by the Reus Airport 
attack.   As ETA did not get any answer for its call for negotiations from the 582
Spanish Government, another chance to solve the terrorism problem was missed. 
Consequently, the clashes between sides continued.  
!
 In 1998, ETA declared indefinite cease-fire, and also stated that they 
decided to be in political scene of Spain by giving-up their weapons. However, as 
they broke up the cease-fire period in 1999, ETA’s so-called indefinite cease-fire 
did not produce any positive outcome to solve the terrorism problem, either.  
!
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 After a long time, ETA declared another so-called permanent cease-fire in 
March 2006, again with the hope to negotiate with Spanish Government.   There 583
months after the cease-fire decision announcement, Spanish Government declared 
that they were in contacts with the organization. However, nine months after the 
declaration of permanent cease-fire, ETA attacked Barajas Airport in Madrid, 
which broke up the cease-fire decision and the positive atmosphere over Spain.  584
It is still a secrecy why the talks ended negatively. With so-called indefinite and 
permanent cease-fire decisions and broke up, ETA lost its credibility both in the 
eyes of Spanish authorities and public opinion.  
!
As attack in Madrid raised questions about ETA’s credibility, security 
measures re-entered Spanish Government’s agenda. ETA’s attacks continued in 
small scale; consequently, both Spanish and French security forces made 
operations against ETA and many ETA leaders captured. As a result of heavy 
operations against ETA, the terrorist organization declared cease-fire in 
September 2010. Nevertheless, political parties and the government of Spain 
declared that the cease-fire decision was insufficient and demanded that ETA 
should give up weapons permanently.   ETA declared that cease-fire as 585
permanent in January 2011. Then in October 2011, Peace Conference, which was 
organized by international and local actors - including former United Nations 
secretary-general, Kofi Annan; leader of Sinn Fein, Garry Adams; former Irish 
Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern; former French Minister of Interior and Defense, 
Pierre Joxe; former Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland 
- gathered in San Sebastian in Spain to talk about a possible solution for terrorism 
problem. After the Peace Conference, a final declaration of the gathering was 
announced to public by Bertie Ahern and the Peace Conference demanded to 
announce the definitive end of its armed activities from ETA.   As a result of 586
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public and political pressure, three days after the Peace Conference, 20 October 
2011, ETA broadcasted a video message and declared that the cease-fire was 
definitive and organization finished its armed struggle against Spanish security 
forces. They also stated that ETA was ready to engage dialogue with both state of 
Spain and France.   ETA’s last decision on declaring permanent cease-fire and 587
finishing armed attacks were welcomed in Spain and also international media. 
With the video message of 20 October 2011, a new era started on Spain’s 
terrorism problem. 
!
After ETA’ declaration to end the armed struggle, ETA leadership started 
to live in Norway under the protection of the State of Norway and The 
International Verification Commission took place on the disarmament process of 
ETA and hope to become intermediary between ETA and Spanish Government. 
However, the idea of The International Verification Commission was rejected by 
Spanish Government.  Spanish Government wanted an unconditional dissolution 
of the organization. According to multiple press reports, the International 
Verification Commission members met with ETA leaders in Oslo / Norway and 
other cities to talk about the disarmament process of ETA.  
!
In November 2012, ETA proposed an ‘agenda of dialogue’ for the talks in 
Oslo with Spanish and French governments. ETA listed topics as; prisoners, 
refugees, disarmament of the organization.   Spain rejected ETA’s call for talks 588
with their agenda publicly as Minister of Interior Jorge Fernandez Diaz stated 
“They know we have not negotiated and won’t negotiate at all with a terrorist 
organization”  . However, supposedly the talks continued trough the beginning 589
of 2013 in secrecy. By March 2013, Norwegian Government expelled three ETA 
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members, and started to warn others to move forward on peace process.   In mid-590
March 2013, The International Verification Commission issued a statement about 
the process and declared that ETA had six months to disarm totally, if not 
remaining ETA members in Norway would lose their political protection.   In 591
late March 2013, ETA published a press release about talks in Oslo. The 
organization criticized Spanish and French Governments and stated that Spanish 
Government’ attitude might cause a delay and make the resolution of the conflict 
more complicated.   As an answer to ETA’s press release, Spanish Prime 592
Minister Mariona Rajoy declared that he would like not to think about ETA’s 
critiques about Spanish Government, and the Minister of Interior stated that only 
acceptable solution for Spanish Government was the unconditional dissolution of 
ETA.   593
!
As sides in talks in Norway could not move forward, and ETA made 
unclear announcement to blame Spanish Government, EUROPOL (European 
Police Office) issued a statement that if Spanish and French Governments could 
not manage to continue the talks, the extremists ETA members might re-activate 
the organization to return the armed attacks to force both governments.   The 594
warning of EUROPOL showed grave doubts about the talks and the attitude of 
ETA. As mentioned earlier, in the history of the struggle with ETA, the 
organization declared cease-fire multiple times, even the permanent and indefinite 
ones, but returned to armed attacks when their demands were not fulfilled by the 
Spanish or/and French governments. Both Spanish and French governments 
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shared the doubts about ETA’s possible return to the terrorist attacks, which made 
the situation critical at the state security level.  
!
While press reports and public discourses were coming from sides about 
the unstable conditions of talks, Spanish and French police forces continued their 
operations against ETA members. In May 2013, six ETA members were captured 
in France by a joint operation of Spain and France.   The operation was 595
considered as a message to ETA to indicate that ETA was still under the radar of 
governments and their declaration of ending the armed campaign did not have any 
meaning without actual acts on disarmament.  
!
As the disarmament was important for a definitive end of ETA, public 
opinion and political leaders were expecting a concrete act from ETA. Basque 
politicians tried to assure the public opinion via public statements that ETA would 
move forward on the disarmament topic. On 5 August 2013, the leader of Sortu 
stated that the process was underway and more concrete acts were expected in 
coming months.    596
!
While the Spanish Government was in talks with ETA and expected more 
acts from the terrorist organization about disarmament, the discussion about 
ETA’s future was shifted with the release of one of ETA members. Ines Del Rio, 
was sentenced for 40 years of imprisonment in 1987 after the bombing of 1980. 
While she was in prison, she earned sentence reduction through prison work for 
early release in July 2008. However, Spanish High Court applied the Parot 
Doctrine to prevent her release. The Parot Doctrine ensures that remission for 
work done in prison is deducted from the total sentence rather than the 30-year 
limit under Spanish law. For the case of Ines Del Rio, this meant that her release 
was postponed until 2017 at that time. However, in October 2013, the European 
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Court of Human Rights decided that Parot Doctrine was against the human rights 
and demanded an immediate release of Ines Del Rio, which started a new 
discussion and caused disappointment among the families of victims of ETA.      597
!
As this thesis reflects the actuality of the process for ETA’s definitive ends 
until 1 November 2013, it is possible to say that there were no concrete 
advancement on the process. The early release of ETA’s member Ines Del Rio, 
rose the tension among public opinion that ETA could feel more comfortable and 
force government to accept their terms. Yet, one can see that even with the 
declaration of ETA to finish its armed campaign in 2011, the solution did not 
come with talks in Oslo via intermediaries. A declaration about giving-up armed 
campaign for certain terrorist organization does not mean that the struggle against 
terrorism has ended as the ultimate solution can be established in certain 
conditions. This is not a case just for ETA, but also other terrorist organizations. It 
is possible to say that, ETA’s decision to finish armed campaign created positive 
atmosphere among population and Spanish political area. However, as ETA’s 
credibility is not high enough to take their ‘words’ as evidence of their real 
agenda, the doubts about ETA’s ‘real’ plan is still at the center of the discussion to 
solve the terrorism problem. 
!
5.3.2. Background as an obstacle: Unpredictable Future of ETA's Dissolution !
ETA as a terrorist organization is effective Spanish both political scene 
and daily life since 1959. According to the Ministry of Interior of Spain, ETA 
killed 829 people between 1968 and 2010.    598
!
!
!
!
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The Guardian published following tables to give detailed informations 
about victims of ETA; 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Table IV:   ETA Victims by Year 599
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 206
!  Source: The Guardian, 10 January 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/599
10/eta-basque-sepratists-ceasefire-victims-over-time>, site visited 10 March 2013.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Gokhan Duman 
 
!
!
!
!
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!
!
!
                         Table V:   ETA Victims by Location 600
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
  Table VI:   ETA Victims by Type 601
!
Apart from deaths, many people were wounded and millions have lived 
under the fear of terrorism. As a general behavior of terrorist attacks, ETA 
succeeded to frighten millions with shadow of weapons, and use the fear to force 
Spanish Government to accept their demands. However, as explained in different 
parts of this thesis, throughout the years, ETA used terrorism to reach its political 
goal, the creation of an independent and united Basque Country; however, their 
dreams to create an independent state by weapons has faded away within the time. 
Historically, ETA adapted itself to every political change of Spain and tried to 
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keep its place in Spanish politics sometimes with attacks and sometimes via 
political parties.  
!
ETA’s original demands and the demands of Oslo talks were slightly 
different. As the organization was founded in Dictator Franco’s regime, their 
goals and ideas for the Basque people might be seen as legitimate at that time. For 
instance, during Franco regime, usage of Basque language was restricted like 
other languages in Spain and the regime only accepted the Castilian language as 
unique language. The historical rights of Basque, fueros, were not even a topic to 
talk under Franco Government. Freedom of expression, democracy, political 
parties and many other freedoms were taken away and Spanish nation lived under 
heavy dictatorship conditions. One can say that, within this atmosphere, ETA’s 
call for freedom, Basque language, human rights could make sense in Basque 
people’s minds. Consequently, as Franco’s regime did not give any freedom and 
permission to act in politics of Spain, armed campaign might be considered as a 
way to struggle for a limited period of time. 
!
With the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos I took the crown and become 
the new leader of Spain. As the king wanted to lead the nation for the transition 
from dictatorship to democracy, one of his first acts try to reach ETA. ETA had a 
chance to become an actor of Spain’s transition towards democracy; however, the 
organization chose to pursue its original goals, with their ‘way’, in other words; 
with continuous armed campaign. With their announcement “ETA against 
Juancarlismo”, which was already explained in previous parts, ETA declared their 
position as against Spanish State actor. This attitude of ETA made the Spanish 
transition to democracy more complicated, but in the meantime more necessary.  
!
Under the King Juan Carlos I’s rule, Spain started series of reform and 
writing process of the new constitution. By 1978, an autonomy was granted for 
Basque Country and Navarre. As the new government of Spain cleared the way 
for political acts and parties, Basque people had chance to be an actor in both 
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Basque and Spanish politics. Consequently, the separation within ETA, which 
started in 1972, grew up and ETA was divided into fractions. Some of ETA 
members who defended the idea of engaging in politics chose different part. 
Therefore, ETA’s position changed and different fractions started to act by 
themselves.  
!
With the autonomous statue of Basque Country and rights for historical 
peoples like Basques, Catalans and Galicians, Basque language was recognized 
by the Spanish central authority. With every reform done by Spanish Government, 
ETA needed to modify its demands. For instance, while back in the foundation 
time ETA was demanding independence or greater autonomy for Basque Region, 
after the approval of autonomous statue of Basque Country and Navarra, ETA 
started to demand the unification of these two. As one can see, ETA reconsidered 
its demands in order to be accepted as a player - an illegal one-, and to have 
support of the people. With the foundation of Herri Batasuna, ETA had a legal 
partner in Spanish political game, which gave them a chance to effect the political 
system of Spain with both terrorist attacks and elections.  
!
The adhesion of Spain to the European Union in 1986 affected the 
terrorism problem of Spain as well. While Spanish Government continued to do 
reforms on the European Union perspective, ETA continued its attacks in order 
not to lose public support. ETA’s main power was the support of Basque people 
who shared the ideas of ETA. Losing the public support could driven ETA out of 
the game. 
!
As mentioned earlier, from time to time in multiple occasions, Spanish 
authorities contacted with ETA and, even further, they sat down for talks. 
However, talks occurred via intermediaries in countries other than Spain and 
France. The difficulty of such talks was political change of Spanish government 
and also the change of ETA’s leadership. Even the state policy of Spain might be 
conducting the necessary contacts and talks for the solution, every government 
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had different perspectives on dealing with ETA problem. For instance, as 
explained earlier, during Aznar’s Government instead of conducting talks, 
military measures were applied to finish ETA. It is possible to say that with every 
government, the relation of authorities of ETA had shifted. 
!
Throughout the history of the problem, one can see that ETA declared 
multiple times cease-fires. However, after a while of each, the organization 
returned back to its armed terrorist attacks. It would not be wrong to claim that, 
sometimes ETA broke-up its cease-fire decision in order to empower its position 
in ongoing talks with Spanish authorities.  
!
Back in 2010, ETA declared another cease-fire, and after 2011 the 
organization announced that its armed campaign was over permanently. However, 
as already mentioned, ETA’s history with cease-fire paved the way to reasonable 
doubts over organization’s declarations. ETA declared the permanent end of its 
terrorist attacks, although the organization did not lay down weapons, which rose 
the question of their sincerity on ending the armed struggle.  
!
A part from ETA’s demands for disarmament, the complexity of reaching a 
permanent solution was also coming from ETA’s desire to talk both with state of 
France and Spain at the same time. It is true that the ETA problem is not just an 
internal issue of Spain or France. However, conducting talks with multiple sides 
at once would make the process of reaching a solution longer and harder.  
!
5.3.3. What Can Be Done More? !
At time of writing this thesis, ETA’s situation was same as back in 2011. 
The organization does not embark armed terrorist attacks anymore. However, the 
disarmament process of ETA was on the agenda with its complications. The 
International Verification Commission tried to persuade and to facilitate the 
disarmament of ETA; however, they did not reach any solution up until June 
2013. For the future of the process, both sides should reconsider their position. If 
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ETA returns to armed terrorist attack, the public reaction will be bigger then ever. 
ETA should realize that, the public support that they had, is over now. The 
relatively freedom of Basque people on execution of their rights, such as usage of 
language, Basque local elections and governments etc., decreased the importance 
of ETA’s ideas of independent and united Basque Country. Like other autonomous 
regions of Spain, people in Basque Country can govern themselves via local 
elections, can use Basque language in daily life, can rise their flag next to the 
Spanish one. It would not be wrong to assert that democracy can be evolved 
towards the local governments in Spain.  
!
On the other hand, Spanish Government should give up demand about 
unconditional dissolution of ETA. One can say that a movement, even the one that 
is using terrorism, would not give up their position without fulfilling some of their 
demands and having certain guarantees for the leadership of the organization or 
the members.  
!
As the Spanish political system has rooms for legal political parties for 
local elections and provides freedom of having relatively radical ideas within the 
unity of the country, terrorism is no more an option for the demands of rights, 
democracy, or freedom. Even some pro-separatist parties were closed back in the 
first decade of 2000s, today Basque parties like, Sortu and Bildu - which had or 
have similar ideas like banned Batasuna -, are legitimate political parties that can 
be active players in Spanish politics. As the Spain has 2% threshold for elections, 
more parties and people can be represented both in local and general parliaments 
of Spain. However, for a clear pluralist democracy, election threshold should be 
removed from the system. In any case, Spanish political system of today gives 
change to political parties to have public support and take seats on parliament; 
consequently, it is possible to speak-out demands legally within the perspective of 
democracy. 
!
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It would not be wrong to argue that the end of terrorism problem would 
provide more resources for other problems of Spain. In a condition that the 
terrorism is not an issue, Spanish Government should focus on other issues and 
could direct its sources for the prosperity of Spanish nation. ETA and Basque 
people should internalize the conditions of 2013, and divert their strength more 
and more in legal ways, in other words; within democracy. The democracy of 
Spain could be criticized in many ways; however, democracy is a game, in which 
only legal player could achieve their goals and demands.  
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!
!
!
6. CONCLUSION 
!
!
The cases of Spain and Turkey are different from each other in terms of 
socio-economical conditions with their own historical backgrounds. While the 
State of Spain was built over the historical Spanish Empire and still has the King 
on its political system, which makes her a constitutional-monarchy, State of 
Turkey was built over the Ottoman Empire`s heritage with an independence war 
against the Allies of World War I. The Republic of Turkey was formed around 
westernized policies and abolished both Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate. With 
respect to democracy, both countries have implemented it in their distinctive ways 
with different historical rhythms. As a common point, it is possible to say that 
both countries tried to have a common or upper identity for their diverse 
population; this is to say, nation state building process was taken place in both 
countries. However, while Spain took the Spanish citizenship as a tool to create a 
nation, Turkey shifted in between the terms of People of Turkey and Turkish 
People. By the hands of state, the term Turk was implemented as a common name 
of the nation; however, Turk also refers to the ethnic background of a certain 
group. On this point, being a Spaniard in Spain and being a Turk in Turkey do not 
have the same meaning. It is to say, the ethnicity, which is absent on Spanish case, 
is an issue on Turkish case. 
!
Within the history of Spain, Basque people's history goes back to fueros. 
According to the fueros, Basque people had historical rights in the Spanish 
Empire; in other words, they had some privileges, even, relatively autonomy 
during the history. On the other hand, Kurds had not have any clear rights like 
fueros within the history of the Ottoman Empire; however, they had some tribal 
rights and privileges. It would not be wrong to say that with the rights in historical 
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perception, Basques and Kurds have a similarity. Nevertheless, the historical 
transformation of both peoples and emergence of nationalisms have occurred in 
different ways. 
!
The Basque nationalism was created by Sabino Arana and Arana`s 
followers pursued his ideas after him. On the other side, it is not possible to name 
a single person for the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. It would not be wrong 
the say the Kurdish nationalism has been formed by multiple people with multiple 
events, which started by the first rebellion, and it is possible to say that it 
continues even today. It is also true that the nationalism of both people have 
historical roots in their region. Briefly, the idea of nationalism affected Basques 
and Kurds around the same time. If one takes into account that Sabino Arana`s 
magazine Bizkatarria, in which he explained his nationalist ideas, was first 
published in 1893, and first newspaper in Kurdish was published in 1898, it is 
evident that the idea of nationalism reached different territories around same time. 
Of course the effect of the nationalism was more than cited cases of this thesis.  
  
The idea of nationalism, which started to spread to Europe after the French 
Revolution, reached territories where empires were in control of different nations 
and ethnic groups. On this sense, the idea of self determination took the attention 
of people over Europe and many nationalist movements carried out the slogan of 
French Revolution; “liberty, equality and brotherhood”. After more than two 
centuries, it is possible to say that the idea of having liberty, equality and 
brotherhood is still effective on recent social movements. For instance, during the 
Gezi Park Protests in Istanbul, these three terms were written on the walls, and 
many protesters declared their support to the cause of protests by shouting the 
slogan of French Revolution. Among the public opinion in Turkey, majority 
believe that Turks and Kurds are brothers and sisters, and the true equality, which 
would be provided by the State, might solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey. 
Briefly, one can see that the strong ideas, like the French Revolution and 
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nationalism, do not lose their importance within time and still alive during clashes 
between people and the state. 
!
As a result of nationalism, Sabino Arana created the first Basque political 
party, PNV, in 1895. As the party is still active in Spain, it is possible to say that 
common consciousness has been carried out by the party throughout history. On 
the other side, the first Kurdish party was formed during the Ottoman Empire in 
1908. The creation of Sinn Fein was also in 1905. The foundation dates of 
political parties also verify the argument that nationalism reached different 
territories around same time. As Sinn Fein is also active like PNV, the continuous 
political consciousness is valid for Irish people. However, the first nationalist 
Kurdish political party was closed in a short period and a lot of others have been 
formed up until today. Because of this reason, it is not possible to talk about a 
continuous political consciousness for Kurds. However, it is true that Kurds have 
political knowledge, even it had many names under different conditions 
throughout history. Obviously, political knowledge of people goes back to the late 
19th and the early 20th centuries in all cases, and these characteristics make them 
historical players on politics of their region. 
  
 For the politics, it is possible to say that both Kurds and Basques have 
been suffered under severe policies of state. For instance, PNV was shut down 
with other political parties during the Franco Regime, and similarly, multiple 
Kurdish parties have been closed in the history of the Republic of Turkey. 
Additionally, Basque`s ethnic identity was denied and usage of Basque language 
in public and official spaces and even in schools was prohibited under General 
Franco Regime. The prohibition of the usage of language in official manners was 
not a case only for Basques, other historical peoples of Spain, like Catalans, who 
lived under the same conditions. Kurds faced with similar denial policies for their 
ethnic identity and prohibition of usage of Kurdish language starting with military 
intervention of 1980 and afterwards, in other words under the General Kenan 
Evren`s rule. In cases of Spain and Turkey, official denial of other languages 
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forced people to use their languages in private spaces in order to preserve it. One 
can see that, the ban of a certain language by the hand of state in official manners 
does not mean that people would give up their own language and accept the 
official language as sole one. 
!
The aforementioned conditions under military rules in both countries 
paved the way for creation of terrorist organizations. ETA and PKK were formed 
in different times but under similar circumstances. ETA started its armed struggle 
against the Dictator Franco`s Regime in 1968; and when PKK launched its first 
severe attack against security forces in 1984, Turkey was just left the military 
governance. In other words, in both countries, when freedom was suppressed with 
harsh state policies, terrorist groups had appropriate conditions for their armed 
terrorist attacks. Additionally, both ETA and PKK were formed around the 
Marxist ideas and had goals for the creation of independent states for Basques and 
Kurds. In any case, the usage of terrorism cannot be justified by any reason or 
action; however, the reality stands still that both ETA and PKK became active 
under states’ fascist discourses and implementations. Both of the organizations 
had the idea of gaining support of the people by armed attacks in order to create a 
“revolution” against the central authorities. ETA and PKK, took the Cuban 
Revolution case as a reference to their goals. As Cuba Movement led by Fidel 
Castro against the dictator Fulgencio Batista created the ‘revolution’; had the 
support of people; and had created ‘heroes’ as Che Guevara; PKK and ETA tried 
to create similar impact in Turkey and in Spain with the hope of reaching 
revolution and becoming the ‘heroes’ of their movements. Within this sense, it is 
possible to say that PKK and ETA were formed as organizations of armed 
nationalism; however, both became the last examples of armed terrorism within 
time. Neither of them reached their goal on creating a revolution backed by 
people; instead, they only brought death and fear to the territories where they have 
operated. 
!
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The cases of Spain and Turkey are different also in terms of territories, 
where the problems have occurred. Like IRA, ETA was formed in Europe and was 
sought to create an independent European State with western values. As the 
historical Basque Region has territories under the control of Spain and France, 
terrorism problem occurred and stayed limited in Europe. However, PKK based 
on mountains in Iraq and majorly operated in the southeastern Turkey, and 
according to the description of PKK, the historical Kurdistan has parts under the 
control of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. PKK tried to be operational in Europe via 
its branches in European countries; nevertheless, the geographical information 
that provided above makes PKK problem originated in the Middle East that does 
not have any direct connection with Europe. Although, it would not be wrong that 
the PKK and issue of Kurdish rights have become a major problem for Turkey in 
her quest for the admission process to the European Union.  
!
While the organizations were conducting terrorist attacks against states’ 
security forces, their main objectives were to have public support and to force 
states to accept their terms. In terms of gaining public support, both of them tried 
to force the states to act against civilians. In other words, they attacked the target 
on areas populated by Basques and Kurds with the hope that state security forces 
would act against civilians. One can say that, both PKK and ETA believed that 
with states security measures against civilians, local population would support 
their cause and organizations could create “public insurrections”. However, 
organizations` methods were slightly different from each other. While PKK based 
on mountains and attacked Turkish security forces by guerrilla tactics, in other 
words: hit-and-run tactics, ETA based itself inside the society and attacked the 
Spanish security forces clandestinely with high level of secrecy. On the other side, 
both of them often kidnapped state officials; however, while ETA was conducting 
kidnaps of state officials, military personal, leaders of civil society generally for 
ransom or release of imprisoned members,  PKK had the objective of using them 
as leverage against the Turkish State.  
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 On the economical assets of the organizations, both of them forced 
renowned businessmen to pay them for the protection. Additionally, both ETA and 
PKK applied taxes on the frontiers of their areas. For instance, PKK forced 
people, who wanted to cross over to Iraq or Syria, to pay taxes. However, their 
organizational structure was different. PKK formed organizations and opened 
branches in European countries like Greece, Germany and collected so-called 
donations for their cause. On the other hand, ETA`s organization was limited in 
Spain and France where the organization had goals of creating an independent and 
united Basque State. Additionally, while PKK was controlled by a single man, - 
Abdullah Öcalan was, and still is, in charge of PKK even he is in prison - ETA 
was controlled by multiple leaders of multiple cells, it is to say by a leadership. 
The biggest difference between ETA and PKK is about the casualties during 
terrorist attacks. From 1968 to 2010, 2400 people wounded and 829 people died 
because of ETA`s terrorist attacks. On the other hand, from 1984 to 2011, more 
than 40000 people died because of PKK`s terrorist attacks. 
!
 On propaganda methods, both of them paid significant attention on 
promoting their ideas via media tools. While ETA published the magazine“Ekin”, 
PKK published the magazine “Sexwebun” and later had, and still has, multiple 
TV channels under its control. One can see that both organizations used the same 
method in their early stages; however, PKK differentiate itself by having TV 
channels. 
!
 ETA and PKK have their own organizational structure, which 
differentiates them in terms of fractions inside the organizations. While ETA had 
splits within time among members around the ideas of continuing armed struggle 
or engaging into politics, which led the organization to create different fractions 
like ETA (m) and ETA (pm), PKK kept its unique strategy in clashes against the 
State of Turkey. The members, who had ideas different from armed struggle, were 
suppressed by the leader in order to keep the organization in one piece. One can 
see that IRA also faced with splits similar to ETA. On that point, it would not be 
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wrong to argue that while ETA and IRA have relatively democratic organizational 
structure, which gave chance to choose their own way to their members, PKK was 
controlled with strict rules, which did not even provided a chance to think 
differently.  
!
 As PKK and ETA, which are listed as terrorist organizations by their local 
authorities, international organizations and foreign states, dreamed to reach their 
political goals, they associated with political parties. While both of them were 
trying to affect the political structure of their countries by illegal methods, such as 
kidnapping, terrorist attacks, ambushes, bombings, they also used political parties 
in order to have an influence by legal organizations.   
!
 Political diversity of Kurds and Basques have also differences and 
similarities among them. In the case of Basques, the PNV was created with 
nationalist ideas and kept its position both in politics of Spain and Basques. In 
addition to PNV, various Basque political parties were formed, and provided 
chance to the Basque people to choose. Starting with Batasuna, Bildu and Sortu 
were formed also with nationalist idea; however, their perception of nationalism 
embraced the use of terror. As these parties accepted the usage of terror, they 
became the political parties of radical or extremist nationalism, which made them 
separatist political parties. In the case of Turkey, all Kurdish political parties those 
were formed after the formation of PKK went under the control of terrorist 
organization. Consequently, Kurdish people in Turkey had only one reliable 
option in terms of political party. It is true that the political sphere in Turkey has 
been under strict control of Turkish State. However, if one considers the strict 
control of PKK in addition to the Turkish State`s, its possible to say that Kurds 
have had no political freedom in terms of forming nationalist political parties and 
working for them. 
!
 The connection between political parties and terrorist organizations caused 
the bans of political parties in both counties. In the case of Spain, ETA`s relation 
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with Batasuna and others paved the way for the ban of political parties; however, 
Bildu and Sortu were legalized within time, even they were banned by legal 
institutions, as well. In the case of Turkey, PKK`s control and direct relation in 
terms of selection of candidates and economic aids paved the way for the ban of 
pro-Kurdish parties, and none of them were legalized ever, and took their places 
in the graveyard of banned parties in Turkey. It would not be wrong to argue that 
banning political parties finished the pro-separatist political movements neither in 
Spain nor in Turkey. Right after closure of one party, or even some cases before 
the decisions of closure, a new party was established over the same ideological 
base. The British experience, connection between Sinn Fein and IRA, shows that 
banning individual extremist politicians might be more useful and respectful to 
the democracy.  
!
 On the perspective of democracy, it is evident that Spanish system is more 
representative both with regional governmental institutions and with 2% threshold 
in election system, while Turkey has 10% election threshold, which decreases the 
representative feature of democracy. In the British experience, Sinn Fein became 
more effective then IRA, especially during the peace talks. In other words, after a 
while, Sinn Fein started to control IRA. However, in Spanish and Turkish cases, 
PKK and ETA always kept political parties under their control and tried to talk 
directly with state officials if it is possible. It would not be wrong to argue that, 
talks with political party for a solution is more reliable in terms of rule of law. As 
a similarity between cases, it is possible to say that Kurdish and Basque pro-
separatist political parties stayed under the shadow of terrorist organizations, 
which made them less effective players in the process.    
!
 On fight against the terrorism, neither of the countries managed to finish 
terrorist organizations by military measures. Both ETA and PKK knew that they 
could not beat their states with terrorist attacks; although, they had a strong belief 
on having public support with terrorist attacks and forcing states to talk with them 
under the shadow of weapons and with public pressure. Applied security measures 
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and tools on fight against terrorism show certain similarities between the cases of 
ETA and PKK. At the beginning, states considered terrorist groups as small 
groups of people, who were not capable of affecting the state heavily. Military 
measures often applied against them; and for many years, authorities kept their 
position at “no negotiation with terrorists” point. Both in Spain and Turkey, 
military forces had limitless power in politics, as they tried to do military 
interventions and even in some of their attempts they succeeded. Military officials 
considered themselves as “protectors of the state, unity of country and political 
structure”. Consequently, while central authorities did not pay enough attention to 
the socio-economic and human rights problems, which often cherish terrorist 
organizations, militaries considered the terrorism problem as a problem to be 
crushed by military applications. In the fights against terrorist organizations, 
Spain and Turkey have sometimes used illegal tools and secret organizations, 
which were supported by states. In Spain, secret organization GAL was created 
and supported by state funds to assassinate the members of ETA in Spain and 
more often in France. In Turkey, illegal and secret JITEM was created and 
supported by state with similar intentions to Spain. Hence, it would not be wrong 
to argue that the states, where the rule of law supposed to be fundamental, used 
tactics and organizations outside the law. In the Spanish case, the rule of law 
reacted to usage of secret organizations, members of GAL and responsible 
political leaders, even the Minister of Interior of that time, were sentenced for 
their actions. 
!
When the states decided to contact with terrorist organizations, they often 
chose to use intermediaries and met in territories, where the problem had not any 
effects. Hence, meetings in Oslo / Norway could be pointed out as a similarity 
between talks of ETA-Spain and PKK-Turkey. Spain and Turkey had series of 
talks in Oslo. It is possible to see that Oslo was and still is a common place for 
states to talk with terrorist organizations. If one takes the British experience into 
account in terms of talks between terrorist organizations and States, it would not 
be wrong to say that direct talks become more effective than the ones with 
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intermediaries. For a permanent solution to the terrorism problem, British 
example also shows that it takes many rounds of talks in long period of time. 
Hence, neither Spain nor Turkey should expect a solution in a day or two. Talks 
with terrorist organizations are not easy to manage and public support for the 
process is essential. For instance, in British experience, Tony Blair showed strong 
belief in talks and put his efforts to convince the public opinion. In Spain, José 
Luis Rodríquez Zapatero was the one, who publicly declared that Spanish 
Government could meet and talk with ETA; however, all his efforts gone down 
the drain when ETA broke up the cease-fire and returned to armed attacks. In 
Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan`s position was to deny any talks with PKK during 
the talks in Oslo, but later he changed his position and stated that the State of 
Turkey could contact with PKK, but the government cannot. With the last 
resolution process, he re-changed his position and declared that there had been 
contacts with PKK and there would be in order to solve the problem. This was the 
exact time when the public opinion in Turkey started to believe the possibility of a 
solution. After these three leaders’ examples, it would not be wrong to say that, 
when a leader backs the talks and contacts with terrorist organizations, public 
support starts to increase. 
!
On the perspective of any permanent solution to PKK and ETA problems, 
governments of Turkey and Spain should transform their governmental policies to 
state policies. Nevertheless, within all these years, governments have been 
changed and as each and every government has applied different policies, the 
terrorism problem kept its importance on countries` agenda. Talks conducted 
under one government has ended with another one, which did not give any 
outcome at all.  
!
It is true that negotiating with terrorist organizations is not easy to explain 
to public. For many years, people have suffered, died and wounded. Hence, 
governments should find an appropriate way to explain why they are negotiating 
with terrorists in order to answer the question of “why have we fought and died 
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for?”, which often comes to the minds of people. There is no unique solution for 
every terrorism problem. However, as terrorism problem has been cherished by 
socio-economical problem, lack of freedom, state policies against human rights; 
governments should solve these problems along with the terrorism problem in 
order to prevent the reappearance of separatist terrorist movements. Hence, 
governments should solve the socio-economic problems and provide more 
freedom within democracy for the common and greater good of their nation, not 
only in order to solve the terrorism problem.  
!
In terms of a probable solution, one can say that Spain has more chance 
than Turkey. As Spain has its upper-identity, being Spaniard, Turkey requires to 
form a new upper-identity based on common citizenship. Today’s common 
identity, being Turk, is obviously understood differently by different communities 
among the nation. On this point, while Spain has its territorial based common 
identity as “Spaniard; being from Spain”, Turkish common identity was built over 
the majority`s ethnic background as “being Turk”. It is true that some portion of 
Turkish society does not accept this “being Turk” notion as ethnical reference to 
any group and translate it as “being Turk equals to being from Turkey”; however, 
this understanding does not give any space to any identities to declare themselves. 
For instance, according to the Turkish Constitution of 1982, a Turk is a Turk in 
terms of citizenship, and a Kurd is also a Turk in terms of citizenship, as well. 
This is to say, taking one`s name as common name for a nation could harm the 
feelings of others. However, as one can see that in Spain, while one can be a 
Catalan, Castilian, Basque and Galician in terms of ethnic background, (s)he can 
also be a Spaniard in terms of citizenship, which is the name of the nation in 
Spain, and does not refer any ethnic background. Within its own complexity, even 
thought ethnicity is not the issue in Spain, Catalans and Basques are claiming 
sovereignty of their own. 
!
The terrorist organizations PKK and ETA were both formed in the 
conditions of military rules and around the ideas of revolution backed by people. 
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Their hope was to be supported by the people when they attacked security forces 
of central authorities. One can say that, although it is clear that using terrorism 
could not be justifiable in any case, at the beginning, their way of using terrorism 
against military rules and forces might be considered as only option at that time. 
However, both of them refused to become a legal player when the countries 
returned to democracy. After the Franco Period, during the transition, ETA chose 
to stay as an illegal organization and Batasuna took the place on political scene. 
Similar to the example of ETA, PKK operated as an illegal organization when 
Turkey returned to democracy in 1983. Until 1990s Kurds did not have any 
political party. Briefly, it is possible to say that both organizations’ leadership 
thought that the support of people under the military rule would last long within 
the democracy as well. However, as political system of countries become more 
and more democratic, terrorist organizations have radicalized themselves and lost 
their position in the mind of people. It is true that extremist members of ETA and 
PKK and even some portion of Basque and Kurdish people still want more than 
democracy for their desires, today. From 1977 and 1980s to today, Spain and 
Turkey have come a long way on democracy. Basques have an autonomous statue 
within the State of Spain; however, still the desire for an independent and free 
Basque country exists among the Basque people. In the case of Turkey, during the 
last decade, democratic rights of Kurdish people have started to be evolved in 
positive sense, although often extremist Kurdish politicians have stated their 
desires for independent and unified Kurdistan, which will have territories from 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. While the globalization takes place on World 
political system and unions like the European Union removes the borders within 
states, peoples like Basques and Kurds still have the desire of having a nation-
state of their own, which was the trend of the 20th century. On this manner, it will 
not be wrong to suggest that Kurds and Basques should catch the ideas of this 
century and try to be more effective players in the game of democracy.  
!
One can see that the idea of nationalism is re-emerging in recent years, and 
it will shape the future of countries in the Middle East, the United Kingdom, 
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Spain and Turkey. While this new nationalism takes the historical origins of the 
French Revolution and French understanding of nationalism, it is slightly closer to 
the idea of conservatism, in other words conservative nationalism. Conservative 
nationalism tries to avoid interactions with other states, in order to preserve their 
traditional institutions and traditions of daily life and considered themselves 
entirely different from others. For instance, in Iraq, Kurds already have their own 
authority on the Northern part of the country, while different communities, like 
Sunnis and Shias, trying to live together, a more conservative idea emerged 
among them. Because of this reason, Sunnis and Shias often talk about having 
their own state. Another example can be given from Europe regarding the new 
nationalism. In Spain, a portion of Catalan people have recently declared their 
desire for an independent state, in other words separation from Spanish State, and 
they are promoting the idea of having a referendum in 2014 within the perspective 
of self-determination. Like Catalans, people of Scotland are also preparing for the 
upcoming referendum in 2014, with which they will decide to stay within the 
United Kingdom or have an entirely independent state. If one takes the 
nationalism as a concept of 19th and 20th centuries, and considers that those 
groups, which rely on ethnic, religious or territorial differences, do not seek to 
create a nation state but a state for their nation, the term micro-nationalism might 
be more useful in the field of social sciences as a concept of 21th century´s 
nationalism. At this point, it would not be wrong to distinguish the idea of 
nationalism as creator and shaper. While the creator nationalism aims to create 
new states, shaper nationalism aims to create supranational organisations like the 
European Union. The idea of integration of different states under Unions does not 
mean the end of the idea of creating new states. Hence, one can say that Kurdish 
and Basque nationalism have also a conservative and creator approach to the idea 
of having an independent state. Even Kurdish politicians often declares that 
Kurdish people do not seek an independent state anymore, but their desire to self-
govern themselves stands still, it might evolve the idea of creating an independent 
state in the future. For the Basques, it is possible to say that, after the definitive 
end of ETA, the idea of nationalism might live among the Basque people and if 
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the Catalans separate themselves from Spain, Basques may try to do same thing 
also. 
!
For the future of progresses to solve terrorism problem in both countries, it 
is possible to say that, both of them will face challenges from nationalist part of 
their population. The fear of disintegration is wide spread among the societies of 
Turkey and Spain. Because of this reason, significant portion of the population 
have doubts about the on-going talks with PKK. And for the Spanish case, it 
seems there is no ongoing talks at all. As Turkey will have three elections between 
2014 and 2015, one can say that AKP Government will face with challenges on 
the way to elections about resolution process. Opposition parties may try to 
criticize AKP heavily. On the other hand, PKK still threatens the Government, and 
that attitude complicates both the process and government position before the 
public opinion. For Spain, under the economic crisis, dealing with ETA is harder 
than before. As ETA as already declared that they gave up armed actions forever, 
and public pressure over them is very intense, Spanish Government has more 
spaces before the public opinion to conduct direct talks with ETA. However, for 
both cases, it is possible to say that the end of their solution processes might not 
be reached in the near future. While the governments in both countries are dealing 
with real politics of daily life, they can only devote a portion of their efforts to 
their terrorism problem.  
!
As a final word, it is true that Basques and Kurds are coming from 
different pages of same history. The cases have aforelisted similarities in terms of 
nationalist ideas, terrorism problem, armed political movements, political history 
and so on; however, as one sees that there are differences, which can be seen in 
details, as well. This thesis shows that the arguments, which is Spanish political 
system and the autonomous statue of Basque Region could be applied for the 
solution both for Kurdish and terrorism problems, are worthy to analyze. With the 
acceptance of the similarities and differences between cases, it would not be 
wrong to say that the Spanish experience can be taken as an example rather than a 
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model to apply directly. No model solution for terrorism can be found to apply to 
all. This thesis also shows that usage of local language other than official one, 
having a flag along with the general one, having local parliament along with the 
central one within the democracy and so on, are not always against the unity of a 
country and nation. Therefore, the model of Spanish autonomous communities 
system might be applied to Turkey with some modifications in accordance to 
Turkish history and political structure. However, the question of whether Turkey, 
Turkish political system and even further Turkish society are ready or not, should 
be answered first.   
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!
!
!
6. CONCLUSIÓN 
!
!
 Los casos de España y Turquía son diferentes entre sí, tanto en cuanto a las 
condiciones socio-económicas como en los antecedentes históricos. Mientras el 
Estado Español fue construido durante la época del Imperio y conserva todavía el 
rey en su sistema político, si bien desde el siglo XIX tal monarquía se ha 
convertido en constitucional, el Estado de Turquía se ha construido sobre la 
herencia del Imperio Otomano, con una guerra de independencia contra los 
aliados de la Primera Guerra Mundial. La República de Turquía se formó en torno 
a las políticas occidentales y abolió tanto Sultanato Otomano y Califato. En lo que 
respecta a la democracia, los dos países la han puesto en práctica en sus 
respectivas formas con diferentes ritmos históricos. Como punto en común, es 
posible decir que ambos países trataron de tener una identidad común o una 
identidad superior a la diversidad de su población y territorios, tratando de 
construir un Estado nación. Sin embargo, mientras que España tomó la 
nacionalidad española como herramienta para crear una nación, con éxito bastante 
desigual, Turquía se pasó entre los términos del Pueblo de Turquía y del Pueblo 
Turco. En manos del Estado, el término Turco fue implementado como un nombre 
común de la nación, sin embargo, el Turco también se refiere al origen étnico de 
un grupo determinado. Es decir, incluye un concepto de etnicidad que está ausente 
en el caso español.  
!
 Para nuestro objeto de estudio en el caso español y para el caso vasco 
debemos remontarnos a los fueros. Según éstos, los vascos tienen derechos 
históricos que se remontan a la época del Imperio, o, mejor dicho, de la 
conformación de la monarquía unificada y ello conlleva el mantenimiento de 
ciertos privilegios, y cierta autonomía a lo largo de la historia. En cambio, los 
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kurdos no poseían derechos claros como los fueros dentro de la historia del 
Imperio Otomano, si bien mantenían algunos derechos tribales y privilegios. No 
sería erróneo afirmar que desde el punto de vista de los derechos, históricamente 
los vascos y los kurdos tienen ese punto en común. Sin embargo, la 
transformación histórica de ambos pueblos y la aparición del nacionalismo se han 
producido en diferentes maneras.  
!
 El nacionalismo vasco fue creado por Sabino Arana y sus seguidores de 
Arana siguieron sus ideas posteriormente. Por el contrario, no es posible nombrar 
una sola persona en el origen del nacionalismo kurdo. Más bien éste se ha 
formado a partir de las aportaciones doctrinales y políticas de diferentes personas 
y múltiples eventos, comenzando por la llamada primera rebelión, y ha 
continuado desde entonces. Por supuesto que, como hemos dicho, los 
nacionalismos de ambos pueblos tienen raíces históricas en su región. Y los une el 
hecho de que el nacionalismo afectó a vascos y kurdos en la misma época. Si 
tenemos en cuenta que la revista de Sabino Arana, Bizkatarria, donde explicó sus 
ideas nacionalistas, fue publicada por primera vez en 1893, y el primer periódico 
en lengua kurda fue publicado en 1898, es evidente que la idea del nacionalismo 
alcanzó diferentes territorios en torno a misma época, y por supuesto en un 
espectro de países y regiones mucho mas amplio que los casos citados. La idea del 
nacionalismo, que comenzó a extenderse en Europa después de la Revolución 
Francesa, llegó a los territorios en los que los imperios estaban en control de 
diferentes naciones y grupos étnicos. En este sentido, la idea de la 
autodeterminación llamó la atención de los pueblos de Europa y muchos 
movimientos nacionalistas inscribieron en sus banderas el lema de la Revolución 
Francesa de "libertad, igualdad y fraternidad”, iniciando trayectorias que 
culminaron, o no, con la consecución de estados propios. Después de más de dos 
siglos, es posible decir que el lema revolucionario de libertad, la igualdad y la 
fraternidad sigue estando vivo y en movimientos prodemocratización muy 
recientes en la propia Turquia -las protestas del Parque Gezi en Estambul- estos 
tres términos se escribieron en las paredes, y muchos manifestantes declararon su 
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apoyo a la causa de la protesta gritando el lema de la Revolución Francesa. Entre 
la opinión pública de Turquía, la mayoría cree que los turcos y los kurdos son 
hermanos y hermanas, y la igualdad verdadera, que sería proporcionada por el 
Estado, podría resolver el problema kurdo en Turquía. En resumen, se puede ver 
como ideas fuertes, como la Revolución Francesa y el nacionalismo, no pierden su 
importancia con el paso del tiempo, sino que siguen vivas en la medida que los 
problemas de inserción o relación entre estados y comunidades interiores. Y si 
Sabino Arana creó el primer partido político vasco, el PNV, en 1895, como 
expresión e instrumento para conseguir las reivindicaciones nacionalistas, este 
partido sigue activo en el país vasco y España. Es decir, que ha sido un 
instrumento creador de conciencia política nacionalitaria llevada a cabo por el 
partido a través de la historia. Por su parte, el primer partido nacionalista kurdo se 
formó durante el Imperio Otomano en 1908.Y el referente irlandés que 
utilizaremos también en nuestro análisis, el Sinn Fein, lo fue en 1905. Las fechas 
de fundación de estos partidos políticos son muestras que el nacionalismos ha 
llegado a diferentes territorios en mismo tiempo. Y el hecho es que tanto el Sinn 
Fein como el PNV siguen todavía activos, por lo tanto, la conciencia política 
continua también es válida para los irlandeses. En cambio el primer partido 
nacionalista kurdo fue cerrado tras un corto período de tiempo y aunque otros 
muchos se han formado hasta hoy. En el caso curdo, así pues, no es posible hablar 
de una continuidad en cuanto la permanencia de instrumentos politicos. Sin 
embargo, sí ha existido continuidad en la conciencia política, aunque con altibajos 
a traves de la historia, y diferentes expresiones. Obviamente, el conocimiento 
político de los pueblos se remonta a finales del siglo XIX y principios del siglo 
XX, en todos los casos, y estas características los convierten en actores históricos 
en la política de su región. 
!
 En cuanto a la respuesta política recibida desde los estados en los que se 
dan, se puede decir que tanto los kurdos como los vascos han sufrido con las 
políticas severas, si bien, al menos en el caso vasco, no de manera constante sino 
variable. Por ejemplo, el PNV se cerró junto con otros partidos políticos durante 
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el régimen de Franco, mientras que, de manera mas permanente, varios partidos 
kurdos se han cerrado en la historia de la República de Turquía. Además, la 
identidad étnica vasca se negó bajo el régimen franquista y el uso de la lengua 
vasca a nivel oficial, escolar y publico fue prohibido. La prohibición del uso de la 
lengua de maneras oficial no afectó sólo a los vascos, sino también a otros 
pueblos históricos de España, como los catalanes, quienes vivieron en las mismas 
condiciones. Por su parte, los Kurdos sufrieron políticas similares de negación de 
su identidad étnica y de prohibición del uso oficial de la lengua kurda a partir de 
la intervención militar del año 1980, es decir, bajo el gobierno del General Kenan 
Evren. En ambos casos, la negación oficial de otras lenguas obligó a la gente a 
utilizar sus lenguas en los espacios privados para preservarla, espacios en los que 
siempre habían tenido presencia aunque retrocediendo ante las políticas estatales. 
Los casos vasco y kurdo muestran como la prohibición del uso oficial de un 
idioma determinado por parte del Estado de manera oficial no significa que las 
personas renuncien a su propio idioma y acepten el idioma oficial como único. 
!
 Las condiciones represivas que acabamos de mencionar y mas en general, 
las negaciones de la autonomía por los regímenes autoritarios militares crearon las 
condiciones para la creación de organizaciones terroristas. ETA y el PKK se 
formaron en diferentes momentos pero en circunstancias similares. ETA comenzó 
su lucha armada contra el régimen del dictador Franco en el año 1968 y cuando el 
PKK lanzó su primer ataque grave contra las fuerzas de seguridad en el año 1984, 
Turquía estaba fuero del bajo el control del gobierno militar. En otras palabras, en 
ambos países cuando las libertades no existían y estaban en el poder regímenes 
politicos represivos, los grupos terroristas encontraron el cauce adecuado para su 
formación actividades armadas terroristas. Además, tanto ETA y como el PKK se 
formaron incorporando ideas marxistas, ideas que hacían compatibles con la 
luchas por las independencias respectivas. Por supuesto que el uso del terrorismo 
no puede justificarse de ninguna manera pero tanto ETA como el PKK 
comenzaron su actividad en regímenes autoritarios derechistas altamente 
represivos. Ambas organizaciones pretendían ganarse el apoyo del pueblo con sus 
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ataques armados con el fin de crear una "revolución" en contra de las autoridades 
centrales. ETA y el PKK, tomaron el caso de la Revolución Cubana como 
referencia a sus objetivos. Como el movimiento de Cuba encabezado por Fidel 
Castro contra el dictador Fulgencio Batista creó la "revolución" con el apoyo de la 
gente, y creó "héroes" como Che Guevara; el PKK y ETA trataron de tener un 
impacto similar en Turquía y en España con la esperanza de llegar a la revolución 
y convertirse en los "héroes" de sus movimientos. En este sentido, es posible 
afirmar que el PKK y ETA se formaron como organizaciones del nacionalismo 
armado. La realidad, fue, sin embargo, que ambos se convirtieron, junto a otros, 
en los últimos ejemplos del terrorismo armado en el tiempo. Ninguno de los dos 
alcanzó su objetivo, no crearon una revolución apoyada por la gente, y en cambio 
trajeron muerte y miedo a los territorios donde han operado. 
!
 Los casos de España y Turquía son diferentes también en términos en 
cuanto al y la ubicación. Como el IRA, ETA se formó en Europa y se buscó crear 
un estado europeo independiente. El País Vasco histórico tiene territorios bajo el 
control de España y Francia, problema de terrorismo ocurrido y quedándose 
limitado en Europa. Por su parte y de manera diferente el PKK tiene su base en las 
montañas de Irak y opera mayormente en el sureste de Turquía. El territorio que 
reivindica, el Kurdistán histórico tiene partes bajo el control de Turquía, Siria, 
Irak e Irán. El PKK trató de ser operativo en Europa a través de sus sucursales en 
los países europeos pero, la información geográfica que se ha expuesto en líneas 
anteriores evidencia el problema del PKK, puesto que se originó en el Oriente 
Medio y no tiene ninguna conexión directa con Europa. Ello contrasta, con que la 
realidad, el PKK y el tema de los derechos de los kurdos se han convertido en un 
problema importante para Turquía cuando se ha planteado la búsqueda del 
proceso de admisión en la Unión Europea. 
!
 En cuanto a los objetivos de ambas organizaciones uno de ellos era 
generar apoyo entre sus poblaciones respectivas. Mientras llevaban a cabo ataques 
terroristas contra las fuerzas de seguridad del estado, pretendían 
fundamentalmente obtener el apoyo del público para obligar al estado a aceptar 
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sus términos. Para ganarse el apoyo del público, trataron de obligar al estado a 
actuar en contra de la población civil. En otras palabras, realizaron sus ataques 
con la esperanza de que las fuerzas de seguridad del estado actuarían contra los 
civiles. Se puede decir que, tanto el PKK como ETA creyeron que con medidas de 
seguridad del estado contra la población civil, esta apoyaría su causa y las 
organizaciones podrían crear "insurrecciones públicas". También existieron 
diferencias: los métodos de las organizaciones fueron ligeramente diferentes unos 
de otros. Mientras que el PKK se basó en las montañas y atacó a las fuerzas de 
seguridad turcas en tácticas de guerrilla, en otras palabras, en tácticas de golpear y 
correr, ETA se basó en una táctica mucho mas urbana y desde el interior de la 
sociedad, atacando a las fuerzas de seguridad españolas clandestinamente, con un 
alto nivel de secreto. Por otro lado, ambos organizaciones han utilizado técnicas 
como el secuestro y otras. En el caso de ETA de funcionarios del Estado, 
especialmente altos cargos, militares, funcionarios de prisiones y también 
personajes de la sociedad civil, incluyendo por ejemplo deportistas conocidos. A 
cambio se exigían tanto sumas de dinero como reivindicaciones políticas o de 
liberación de presos. En el caso del PKK utilizándolos para presionar al Estado 
turco.  
!
 En concreto en cuanto activos económicos de ambas organizaciones, las 
dos han obligado a hombres de negocios a pagarles a cambio de protección o en el 
caso de ETA simplemente como modo de financiación. El PKK aplicó impuestos 
en las fronteras de sus territorios. Por ejemplo, obligando a la gente que quería 
cruzar a Irak o a Siria a pagar impuestos. Sin embargo, sus estructuras 
organizacionales eran diferentes.  
!
 Las estructuras internas, por su parte, eran diferentes. El PKK formó 
organizaciones interiores y exteriores y se extendió en países europeos como 
Grecia y Alemania, recogiendo donaciones para su causa. Por otro lado, la 
organización de ETA se limitó a España y Francia, donde la organización tenía el 
objetivo de crear un estado vasco independiente y unido. Además, mientras que el 
PKK fue controlado por un solo hombre, - Abdullah Öcalan, quien sigue a cargo 
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del PKK  aún estando en prisión - ETA fue controlada por varios líderes de varias 
células, es decir, tuvo un liderazgo conjunto. La mayor diferencia entre ETA y el 
PKK fue el número de víctimas que hubo durante sus ataques terroristas. De 1968 
a 2010, 2.400 personas resultaron heridas y 829 personas murieron a causa de los 
ataques terroristas de  ETA. Por su parte las acciones terroristas del PKK entre 
1984 y 2011 provocaron más de 40.000 muertos. 
!
 En lo que se refiere a los métodos de propaganda, ambas organizaciones 
pusieron una atención significativa en la promoción de sus ideas a través de 
herramientas de comunicación. Mientras que ETA publicó la revista "Ekin", el 
PKK publicó la revista "Sexwebun" y más tarde tuvo, y sigue teniendo, varios 
canales de televisión bajo su control. Se puede ver como ambas organizaciones 
utilizaron el mismo método en sus primeras etapas, sin embargo, el PKK se ha 
diferenciado por tener canales de TV.  
!
 ETA y el PKK han tenido una diferente evolución en cuanto a sus 
estructura interna. Mientras que ETA sufrió divisiones internas, traumáticas, fruto 
de discusiones sobre continuación de la lucha armada o a la participación en la 
política, lo que llevó a escisiones y a la aparición de varias ETAs ETA (m) y ETA 
(pm), el PKK mantuvo su estrategia única de enfrentamientos contra el Estado de 
Turquía y no sufrió fracturas organizativas internas. Los miembros del PKK que 
mantenían ideas diferentes a la lucha armada fueron eliminados por el líder para 
mantener a la organización unida. Por su parte, el IRA también se enfrentó a 
divisiones similares a las de ETA. A este respecto, no sería erróneo afirmar que 
mientras ETA y el IRA tienen una estructura organizativa relativamente 
democrática, lo que les dio la oportunidad de decidir internamente -al menos 
durante una etapa de su funcionamiento- el PKK fue controlado con reglas 
estrictas que ni siquiera proporcionan una oportunidad para pensar de forma 
diferente. 
!
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 El PKK y ETA, que están en la lista de organizaciones terroristas en sus 
respectivos países, otros más y organizaciones internacionales se plantearon 
además alcanzar sus objetivos políticos, asociándose para ello con partidos 
políticos. Mientras ambos estaban tratando de afectar a la estructura política de 
sus países mediante métodos ilegales -secuestros, ataques terroristas, emboscadas, 
colocación de bombas, etc.- utilizaron también los partidos políticos con el fin de 
influir en las organizaciones legales.  
!
 Diversidad política de los kurdos y los vascos también tiene diferencias y 
similitudes entre ellos. En el caso de los vascos, el PNV se creó con ideas 
nacionalistas y mantuvo su posición tanto en la política de España y la política 
vasca durante los años en que hubo libertades. Pero además de este precedente, se 
formaron otros partidos políticos vascos, proporcionando variedad  nacionalista en 
las elecciones de los vascos. En esta variedad de encuentran también los partidos 
o organizaciones del entorno de ETA, Batasuna, Bildu y Sortu aunque en el caso 
de los dos últimas ya plantearon una línea propia, en parte independiente de ETA. 
Estas organizaciones aceptaban el uso del terrorismo y de hecho como decimos 
fueron expresiones de ETA. A medida que estos partidos aceptaron el uso del 
terror, se convirtieron en los partidos políticos del nacionalismo radical o 
extremista, convirtiéndolos en separatistas. De manera parecida, en cambio, en el 
caso de Turquía, todos los partidos políticos kurdos que se formaron después de la 
formación del PKK lo hicieron bajo el control de esta organización terrorista. En 
consecuencia, los kurdos en Turquía tuvieron sólo una opción confiable en 
términos de partido político. Es cierto que la esfera política en Turquía ha estado 
bajo el control estricto del Estado pero si se tiene en cuenta el estricto control del 
PKK, además del control del Estado turco, se puede decir que los kurdos no han 
tenido libertad política para formar partidos políticos nacionalistas y trabajar por 
ellos. 
!
 La conexión entre los partidos políticos y las organizaciones terroristas 
tuvo como consecuencia la prohibición de los partidos políticos que amparasen o 
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no condenasen el terrorismo explícitamente en ambos países. En el caso de 
España, la relación de ETA con Batasuna y otros allanó el camino para la 
prohibición de los partidos políticos de este signo, sin embargo, Bildu y Sortu se 
legalizaron con el tiempo, habiendo sido anteriormente prohibidos por las 
instituciones jurídicas también, lo que fue muestra de una progresiva aceptación y 
adaptación al marco democrático que no se ha producido en Turquía.  En ésta, el 
control del PKK y la relación directa en cuanto a la selección de candidatos y las 
ayudas económicas, allanó el camino para la prohibición de los partidos pro-
kurdos, y ninguno de ellos fue legalizado nunca, ocupando una plaza el 
cementerio de los partidos políticos prohibidos de Turquía. No sería erróneo 
afirmar que la prohibición de los partidos políticos no ha terminado con los 
movimientos políticos pro-separatistas ni en España ni en Turquía. 
Inmediatamente después del cierre de una parte, o incluso en algunos casos antes 
de las decisiones de cierre, se establece un nuevo partido político sobre la misma 
base ideológica, aunque en el caso español se ha observado una evolución. En la 
experiencia británica, la conexión entre el Sinn Fein y el IRA, muestra que la 
prohibición de los políticos extremistas individuales puede ser más útil y 
respetuoso con la democracia.  
!
 Desde la perspectiva democrática, es evidente que el sistema español es 
más representativo, tanto con las instituciones gubernamentales regionales como 
con el umbral del 2% en el sistema de elección, mientras que Turquía tiene el 
umbral electoral del 10%, lo que disminuye la función de la representación 
democrática. En la experiencia británica, el Sinn Fein se hizo más eficaz 
especialmente durante las conversaciones de paz. En otras palabras, en el caso 
británico también se produjo una evolución y el Sinn Fein acabó controlando del 
IRA.  
  
 En los casos español y turco, el PKK y ETA siempre mantuvieron los 
partidos políticos bajo su control y trataron de hablar directamente con las 
autoridades estatales si es posible. No sería erróneo afirmar que las 
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conversaciones con los partidos políticos para hallar una solución son más fiables 
en términos de estado de derecho. Como una similitud entre los casos, es posible 
decir que los partidos políticos pro-separatistas vascos y kurdos quedaron bajo la 
sombra de las organizaciones terroristas, que hizo que los jugadores fueran menos 
eficaces en el proceso. 
!
 En la lucha estricta contra el terrorismo, ninguno de los países logró 
acabar con las organizaciones terroristas con medidas militares. Tanto ETA y el 
PKK sabían que no podían vencer a sus Estados con los ataques, creían que al 
tener el apoyo del público, o de una parte de la población, obligarían al Estado a 
dialogar con ellos bajo la sombra de las armas y bajo la presión de ese mismo 
público. Las medidas y acciones aplicadas por los Estados en la lucha contra el 
terrorismo muestran ciertas similitudes entre los casos de ETA y del PKK. Al 
principio, ambos grupos terroristas fueron considerados como pequeños grupos de 
personas que no eran capaces de afectar el estado fuertemente. Los estados 
aplicaron medidas policiales o militares contra ellos, y durante muchos años, las 
autoridades mantuvieron su posición en el punto de "ninguna negociación con los 
terroristas". Tanto en España como en Turquía, las fuerzas de orden público y el 
ejército tenían influencia política, el el caso español especialmente en el 
Franquismo y durante una parte de la etapa democrática y aspiraron a, o en el caso 
turco realizaron intervenciones militare. Los ejércitos se consideraban a sí mismos 
como "protectores del estado, la unidad de los países y la estructura política". En 
consecuencia, mientras que los marcos constitucionales vigentes, sectores de los 
ejércitos no prestan suficiente atención a la situación socio-económica y ven el 
problema terrorista como una cuestión a ser resuelta mediante métodos 
expeditivos. 
  
 De hecho, en la lucha contra las organizaciones terroristas, España y 
Turquía han utilizado a veces las herramientas ilegales y secretas, apoyadas por 
los propios estados o por sectores de sus aparatos. En España, la organización 
secreta los GAL se creó con el apoyo de fondos del estado para asesinar a los 
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miembros de ETA en España y con más frecuencia en Francia. En Turquía, la 
JITEM, organización ilegal y secreta, fue creada y apoyada por el estado con 
intenciones similares a las de España. Por lo tanto, no sería erróneo afirmar que 
los estados, donde el estado de derecho se supone que es fundamental, han usado 
en momentos determinados tácticas y organizaciones fuera de la ley, si bien hay 
que decir que, en el caso español, el propio Estado de derecho ha reaccionado y ha 
juzgado y condenado a los GAL y sus responsables politicos conocidos, 
incluyendo a un ministro del interior. 
!
 Por otra parte, cuando se intentó por el Estado la via de la negociación por 
los dos Estados, y se pusieron en contacto con las organizaciones terroristas, a 
menudo optaron por utilizar intermediarios y se reunieron en territorios donde la 
problemática no tuviera ningún efecto. Por lo tanto, las reuniones en Oslo / 
Noruega podrían ser señaladas como una similitud entre las conversaciones de 
ETA-España y Turquía-PKK. Tanto España como Turquía mantuvieron una serie 
de conversaciones en Oslo. Es posible ver que Oslo era y sigue siendo un lugar 
neutral común. Pero si se toma en cuenta la experiencia británica en términos de 
las conversaciones entre las organizaciones terroristas y los estados, no sería 
incorrecto decir que las conversaciones directas son más eficaces que las que 
tienen intermediarios. Para una solución permanente del problema del terrorismo, 
el ejemplo británico también muestra que se necesitan muchas rondas de 
conversaciones durante un período de tiempo prolongado. Por lo tanto, ni España, 
ni Turquía deberían esperar una solución en un día o dos. Las conversaciones con 
las organizaciones terroristas no son fáciles de manejar y el apoyo público para el 
proceso es esencial. Por ejemplo, en la experiencia del Reino Unido, Tony Blair 
puso su convicción en las conversaciones y puso todo su empeño para convencer 
a la opinión pública. En España, el Presidente José  Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 
declaró públicamente que el gobierno español iba a sentarse a hablar con ETA, 
pero sus esfuerzos acabaron fracasando cuando ETA rompió el alto al fuego y 
volvió a los ataques armados. En Turquía, la posición de Primer Ministro Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan fue negar que hubiera mantenido conversación alguna con el 
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PKK durante las conversaciones en Oslo, pero luego cambió de posición y afirmó 
que el Estado de Turquía podría ponerse en contacto con el PKK, pero el gobierno 
no puede. En el último proceso de resolución, volvió a cambiar su posición y 
declaró que había habido contactos con el PKK para resolver el problema del 
terrorismo. Este fue el momento exacto en que la opinión pública en Turquía 
comenzó a creer en la posibilidad de una solución política. A través de tres 
ejemplos de líderes, podemos afirmar que cuando un líder apoya las 
conversaciones y contactos con organizaciones terroristas, el apoyo público 
comienza a aumentar.  
!
 En la perspectiva de una solución permanente a los problemas del PKK y 
de ETA, los gobiernos de Turquía y España deberían transformar sus políticas de 
gubernamentales en estatales. Sin embargo, en todos estos años esto no ha sido así 
y cuando los gobiernos han cambiado también lo han hecho sus políticas, lo que 
no ha contribuido al fin del terrorismo. Las conversaciones iniciadas bajo un 
gobierno han terminado con otro, lo que no da ningún resultado en absoluto. 
!
 Por supuesto que la negociación con las organizaciones terroristas no es 
fácil de explicar al público. Durante muchos años, la gente ha sufrido y han 
habido muchos muertos y heridos. Por lo tanto, los gobiernos deben encontrar una 
forma adecuada para explicar por qué se está negociando con los terroristas para 
dar así respuesta a la pregunta de "¿por qué hemos luchado y muerto?", que a 
menudo viene a la mente del pueblo. No existe una solución única para todos los 
problemas del terrorismo. Sin embargo, como en algunos casos el problema del 
terrorismo ha sido apreciado por problemas socio-económicos, falta de libertades 
y de políticas estatales contra los derechos humanos, los gobiernos deben resolver 
los problemas socio-económicas junto con el problema del terrorismo para 
prevenir la reaparición de movimientos terroristas separatistas. Por lo tanto, los 
gobiernos deben resolver los problemas socio-económicos y proporcionar más 
libertad dentro de la democracia para su nación, no sólo para resolver el problema 
del terrorismo. 
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 En términos de una solución definitiva, se puede decir que España está 
más avanzada que Turquía. Como España tiene su identidad superior, siendo 
español, Turquía requiere formar una nueva identidad superior basada en la 
ciudadanía común. La identidad común de hoy, siendo turco, es, obviamente, 
entendida de manera diferente por diferentes comunidades dentro  de la misma 
nación. En este punto, mientras que España tiene su identidad territorial común 
basada en "el español, siendo de España", la identidad común de Turquía, está 
construida sobre antecedentes étnicos de la mayoría como "ser turco". Es cierto 
que una parte de la sociedad turca no acepta este "ser turco" noción de referencia 
a cualquier grupo étnico y lo traduce como "ser turco es igual a ser de Turquía". 
Sin embargo, este conocimiento no da ningún espacio para cualquier identidad de 
declarar a sí mismos. Por ejemplo, según la constitución turca de 1982, un turco 
es turco en términos de ciudadanía, y un kurdo también es un turco en términos de 
ciudadanía. Es decir, tomar  el nombre de uno como nombre común para una 
nación podría perjudicar a los sentimientos de los demás. Sin embargo, como se 
puede ver en España, mientras que se puede ser catalán, castellano, euskera y 
gallego en términos de origen territorial, se puede ser también un español en 
términos de ciudadanía, que se refiere al nombre de la nación en España, y no a un 
grupo étnico en particular. De todas maneras, si bien en España no existe una 
cuestión de etnicidad, hay que tener en cuenta su complejidad, con sectores de la 
población vasca y catalana que reclaman una soberanía diferente de la española. 
!
 Las organizaciones terroristas del PKK y ETA se formaron en las 
condiciones de regímenes militares y alrededor de las ideas de la revolución 
apoyados por la gente. Sus esperanzas eran que la gente les apoyara cuando ellos 
atacaran a las fuerzas de seguridad o que las acciones represivas de las fuerzas 
policiales o militares creasen rechazo e incrementasen el apoyo a los grupos 
terroristas. Se puede decir que, aunque es evidente que el uso del terrorismo no 
puede ser justificado en ningún caso, al principio, su forma de utilizar el 
terrorismo contra las imposiciones militares y fuerzas puede ser considerada como 
mas justificada en condiciones de dictadura o falta de libertades extremas que en 
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una etapa democrática. Sin embargo, las propias dinámicas terroristas les llevaron 
a no convertirse en organizaciones democráticas y participantes en el juego 
politico constitucional cuando tanto España como Turquía volvieron a ser estados 
constitucionales. Después del período de Franco, durante el período de la 
transición, ETA decidió quedarse como una organización ilegal y Batasuna tomó 
su lugar en la escena política. De igual manera, en Turquía, el PKK también optó 
por permanecer como una organización ilegal cuando Turquía volvió a la 
democracia en 1983. Hasta los años noventa, los kurdos no tuvieron ningún 
partido político. De hecho el liderazgo de ambas organizaciones pensaba que el 
apoyo de la gente bajo el régimen militar permanecería también en la democracia. 
Sin embargo, a medida que el sistema político de los países se tornó democrático, 
las organizaciones terroristas radicalizaron perdiendo buena parte de su apoyo 
entre el pueblo. A día de hoy, es cierto que los miembros extremistas de ETA y el 
PKK e incluso una parte de los pueblos vascos y kurdos todavía quieren mucho 
más que lo que la democracia les ha dado. Desde 1977 y 1980 respectivamente 
hasta hoy, España y Turquía han recorrido un largo camino de democracia. Los 
vascos tienen un estatuto de autonomía dentro del Estado de España, pero persiste 
el deseo de una Euskadi independiente y libre entre el pueblo vasco. En el caso de 
Turquía, durante la última década, los derechos democráticos del pueblo kurdo 
han comenzado a evolucionar en sentido positivo, aunque a menudo los políticos 
extremistas kurdos han reiterado sus deseos de independencia y unificación del 
Kurdistán, que contaría con los territorios de Turquía, Siria, Iraq e Irán. Mientras 
que la globalización se desarrolla así como uniones como la Unión Europea, que 
eliminan las fronteras interiores de los Estados, parte de las poblaciones vasca y 
kurda mantienen el deseo de tener un Estado nacional propio, que era la tendencia 
del siglo XX. De esta forma se podría sugerir que los kurdos y los vascos deberían 
adaptarse a las ideas de este siglo y tratar de ser los jugadores más efectivos en el 
juego de la democracia. 
!
 De hecho es factible observar que la idea del nacionalismo está 
resurgiendo en los últimos años, y en el futuro podrían aun aparecer más. Hoy es 
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una realidad en los países de Oriente Medio, el Reino Unido, España y Turquía. 
Mientras tanto, el nacionalismo lleva a los orígenes históricos de la Revolución 
Francesa y la comprensión del nacionalismo francés, acercándose un poco más a 
la idea del conservadurismo, en otras palabras, el nacionalismo conservador. El 
nacionalismo conservador trata de evitar las interacciones con otros estados, para 
preservar sus instituciones y tradiciones de la vida cotidiana tradicional y 
considerándose enteramente diferente a los demás. Por ejemplo, en Irak, los 
kurdos ya tienen su propia autoridad en la parte norte del país, mientras que las 
distintas comunidades, así como los sunitas y los chiítas, que tratan de vivir 
juntos, tienen una idea más conservadora. Por esta razón, los sunitas y los chiítas a 
menudo hablan acerca de tener su propio estado. Otro ejemplo se puede dar desde 
Europa sobre el nuevo nacionalismo. En España, una parte de la población 
Catalana muestra deseos de un Estado independiente, en otras palabras, la 
separación del Estado español, y están promoviendo la idea de tener un 
referéndum en 2014 con la perspectiva de la libre autodeterminación. Al igual que 
los catalanes, la gente de Escocia también está preparando para el próximo 
referéndum en 2014, con la que va a decidir quedarse en el Reino Unido o formar 
un estado totalmente independiente. Si se toma el nacionalismo como un concepto 
de los siglos XIX y XX, y considera que esos grupos, que se basan en las 
diferencias étnicas o religiosas o territoriales no buscan crear un Estado-nación, 
sino un estado para su nación, el término micro-nacionalismo podría ser utilizado 
en el campo de las ciencias sociales como concepto de nacionalismo del siglo 
XXI. En todo caso habría que distinguirlo del nacionalismo creador y confirmador 
de estados. Mientras que el nacionalismo creador pretende crear nuevos estados, 
el nacionalismo confirmador tiene como objetivo crear organismos 
supranacionales como la Unión Europea. La idea de la integración de los 
diferentes estados bajo Uniónes no significa el fin de la idea de la creación de 
nuevos estados. En este punto, se puede decir que el nacionalismo kurdo y el 
euskera de buscar la independencia, se parece bastante conservador y creador o no 
conectado con tendencias actuales. Incluso los políticos kurdos a menudo declaran 
que los kurdos no buscan estado independiente, pero su deseo de auto-gobernarse 
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sigue estando y podría evolucionar en la idea de crear un estado independiente en 
el futuro. Para los vascos, es posible decir que, después del fin definitivo de ETA, 
la idea del nacionalismo resurgir entre el pueblo vasco y que si los catalanes se 
separan de España, los vascos seguirían probablemente el mismo camino. 
!
 En el camino de resolver el problema del terrorismo en ambos países, es 
posible decir que ambos se enfrentarán a desafíos nuevos. El miedo a la 
desintegración está muy arraigado en las sociedades de Turquía y España. Por esta 
razón, parte importante de la población turca tiene dudas acerca de las 
conversaciones en curso con el PKK, y por el caso español se parece que no 
existen en absoluto conversaciones ni parece que las vaya a haber. Como Turquía 
tendrá tres elecciones entre 2014 y 2015, se puede decir que el Gobierno de AKP 
se enfrentará a retos en el camino a las elecciones sobre el proceso de resolución. 
Los partidos políticos de la oposición pueden intentar criticar a AKP ferozmente. 
Por otro lado, el PKK sigue amenazando al gobierno, y esa actitud complica el 
proceso y la posición del gobierno ante la opinión pública. En España, bajo la 
crisis económica, todo lo que se refiere a ETA resulta es más difícil que antes. 
Como ETA ya declaró que renuncia a las acciones armadas para siempre, y la 
presión pública sobre ello es muy intensa, el gobierno español tendría más 
espacios ante la opinión pública para llevar a cabo conversaciones directas con 
ETA. Sin embargo, para ambos casos, es posible decir que el final de sus procesos 
de solución no podrá ser alcanzado en un futuro próximo. Mientras que los 
gobiernos de ambos países se enfrentan a la política real de la vida cotidiana, sólo 
pueden dedicar una parte de sus esfuerzos a sus problemas del terrorismo. 
!
 Como conclusión final, es cierto que los vascos y los kurdos vienen de 
diferentes páginas de la misma historia. Los casos mencionados anteriormente 
tienen similitudes en términos de ideas nacionalistas, movimientos políticos 
armados, historia política y así sucesivamente, sin embargo, también tienen 
marcadas diferencias. En esta tesis se ha tratado de demostrar que los argumentos, 
que son el sistema político español y el estatuto de la región autónoma vasca, o 
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posibles cambios constitucionales podrían aplicarse para la solución de la 
problemática de los kurdos y así como del problema del terrorismo, y son por ello 
cuanto menos, dignos de analizar. Con la aceptación de las similitudes y 
diferencias entre los casos, no sería erróneo decir que la experiencia española 
puede ser tomada como un ejemplo en lugar de un modelo para aplicar 
directamente. No existe una único modelo de solución para el terrorismo que se 
pueda aplicar a todos los casos. Esta tesis también muestra que el uso de la lengua 
oficial en el territorio, la aceptación de una bandera propia junto a la estatal, la 
existencia de un parlamento territorial compatible con el central, y así 
sucesivamente, no siempre están en contra de la unidad de un país y la nación. el 
modelo de sistema de las comunidades autonómicas españolas podría aplicarse a 
Turquía, con algunas modificaciones de acuerdo a la historia y la estructura 
política de Turquía. Sin embargo, la cuestión de si Turquía, el actual sistema 
político turco y la sociedad turca están preparados o no, debe ser respondida 
primero. 
!
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!
APPENDIX I 
!
President Wilson’s Statement on 8 January 1918  
“Gentlemen of the Congress: 
 Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires 
have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis 
of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between 
Russsian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the 
attention of all the belligerents have been invited for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with 
regard to terms of peace and settlement.  
!
 The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite 
statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace 
but also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those 
principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an 
outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal 
interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added. That 
program proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to 
the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a 
word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed 
forces had occupied -- every province, every city, every point of vantage -- as a 
permanent addition to their territories and their power.  
!
 It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which 
they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and 
Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own people's thought 
and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military 
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leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations 
have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. 
They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.  
!
 The whole incident is full of significances. It is also full of perplexity. 
With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the 
representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the 
majorities of their respective parliaments or for the minority parties, that military 
and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and 
controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan states which have felt obliged to 
become their associates in this war?  
!
 The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in 
the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding 
with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, 
doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we 
been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions 
of the German Reichstag of the 9th of July last, the spirit and intention of the 
Liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit 
and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in 
fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very 
serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the 
world. 
!
 But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the 
confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the 
Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their 
objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their 
objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. 
There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and 
responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again 
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and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in 
general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what 
sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the 
last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable 
spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain.  
!
 There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central 
Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of 
counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite 
statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of 
life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least 
conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue 
this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure 
beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of 
the very life of Society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right 
and imperative as he does.  
!
 There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of 
purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of 
the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the 
voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but hopeless, it would 
seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting 
and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not 
subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception 
of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been 
stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal 
human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of 
mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that 
they themselves may be safe.  
!
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 They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our 
purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the 
United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and frankness. 
Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope 
that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people 
of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.  
!
 It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are 
begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth 
no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is 
gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of 
particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the 
peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man 
whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it 
possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace 
of the world to avow nor or at any other time the objects it has in view. 
!
 We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which 
touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless 
they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. 
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that 
the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for 
every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, 
determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other 
peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the 
world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very 
clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program 
of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only 
possible program, as we see it, is this:  
!
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I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private 
international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always 
frankly and in the public view.  
!
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike 
in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by 
international action for the enforcement of international covenants. 
!
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment 
of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace 
and associating themselves for its maintenance. 
!
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced 
to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 
!
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, 
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such 
questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have 
equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
determined. 
!
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions 
affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations 
of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity 
for the independent determination of her own political development and national 
policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under 
institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of 
every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded 
Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their 
good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own 
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interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.  
!
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, 
without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all 
other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore 
confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and 
determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this 
healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever 
impaired.  
!
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and 
the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, 
which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be 
righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.  
!
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality. 
!
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to 
see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to 
autonomous development.  
!
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories 
restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the 
several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along 
historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international 
guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of 
the several Balkan states should be entered into.  
!
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XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a 
secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule 
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be 
permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations 
under international guarantees.  
!
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a 
free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence 
and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.  
!
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for 
the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and 
territorial integrity to great and small states alike. 
!
 In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right 
we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples 
associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or 
divided in purpose. We stand together until the end. For such arrangements and 
covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; 
but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace 
such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this 
program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is 
nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or 
distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very 
bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her 
legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with 
hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the 
other peace- loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair 
dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the 
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world, -- the new world in which we now live, -- instead of a place of mastery.  
!
 Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of 
her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a 
preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know 
whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag 
majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.  
!
 We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further 
doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have 
outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their 
right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be 
strong or weak.  
!
 Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of 
international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no 
other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote 
their lives, their honor, and everything they possess. The moral climax of this the 
culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put 
their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to 
the test.” 
!
Source: Brigham Young University The World War I Document Archive - <http://
wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Fourteen_Points> 
!
!
!
!
!
!
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APPENDIX II 
Treaty of Lausanne  
Part I 
Section III. 
Protection of Minorities 
“Article 37 
Turkey undertakes that the stipulation's contained in Article 38 to 44 shall be 
recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action 
shall conflict or interfere with these stipulation's, nor shall any law, regulation, nor 
official action prevail over them. 
Article 38 
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life 
and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, 
language, race or religion. 
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise whether in public or 
private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be 
incompatible with public order and good morals. 
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, 
subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all 
Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for 
national defence, or for the maintenance of public order. 
Article 39 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil 
and political rights as Moslems. 
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All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before 
the law. 
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish 
national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for 
instance, admission to public employment's, functions and honours, or the 
exarchate of professions and industries. 
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any 
language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in 
publications of any kind or at public meetings. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be 
given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own 
language before the Courts. 
Article 40 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same 
treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, 
they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own 
expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other 
establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own 
language and to exercise their own religion freely therein. 
Article 41 
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns 
and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are 
resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction 
shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of 
their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from 
making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish 
nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured 
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an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may 
provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for 
educational, religious, or charitable purposes. 
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the 
establishments and institutions concerned. 
Article 42 
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, 
in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the 
settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities. 
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of 
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the 
minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish 
Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement 
an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, 
synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-
mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious 
foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities 
at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the 
formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary 
facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature. 
Article 43 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to 
perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religions 
observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal 
to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of 
rest. 
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This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such 
obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the 
preservation of public order. 
Article 44 
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-
Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of 
international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of 
Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the 
Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan 
hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles 
which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of 
Nations. 
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall 
have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of 
infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take 
such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the 
circumstances. 
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of 
fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of 
the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the 
League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under 
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government 
hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, he 
referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the 
Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an 
award under Article 13 of the Covenant. 
Article 45 
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The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem 
minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem 
minority in her territory.”  
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website on Treaty of 
Lausanne, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-political-
clauses.en.mfa> 
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APPENDIX III 
Hürriyet Daily Newspaper’s cover on 17 February 1999 
" !!
Source: Ankara Ticaret Odası Website - <http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/files/
_files/UNUTULAN_MANSETLER/1997-1999.pdf> 
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!
APPENDIX IV !
Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper’s Cover on 7 November 1991 !
" !!
Source: Ankara Ticaret Odası Website <http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/files/_files/
UNUTULAN_MANSETLER/1989-1993.pdf> 
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APPENDIX V 
The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 
Preamble  
In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced 
by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the 
unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the 
Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish state, 
embodies; 
The determination to safeguard the everlasting existence, prosperity and material 
and spiritual well-being of the Republic of Turkey, and to attain the standards of 
contemporary civilization as an honourable member with equal rights of the 
family of world nations; 
The understanding of the absolute supremacy of the will of the nation and of the 
fact that sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the Turkish nation and 
that no individual or body empowered to exercise this sovereignty in the name of 
the nation shall deviate from liberal democracy and the legal system instituted 
according to its requirements; 
The principle of the separation of powers, which does not imply an order of 
precedence among the organs of state, but refers solely to the exercising of certain 
state powers and discharging of duties which are limited to cooperation and 
division of functions, and which accepts the supremacy of the Constitution and 
the law; 
The recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to 
Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of 
Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the 
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nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required 
by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred 
religious feelings in state affairs and politics; the acknowledgment that it is the 
birthright of every Turkish citizen to lead an honourable life and to develop his or 
her material and spiritual assets under the aegis of national culture, civilization 
and the rule of law, through the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Constitution in conformity with the requirements of equality and 
social justice; 
The recognition that all Turkish citizens are united in national honour and pride, 
in national joy and grief, in their rights and duties regarding national existence, in 
blessings and in burdens, and in every manifestation of national life, and that they 
have the right to demand a peaceful life based on absolute respect for one 
another’s rights and freedoms, mutual love and fellowship and the desire for and 
belief in “Peace at home, peace in the world”. 
This Constitution, which is to be embraced with the ideas, beliefs, and resolutions 
it embodies below should be interpreted and implemented accordingly, thus 
commanding respect for, and absolute loyalty to, its letter and spirit. 
Is entrusted by the Turkish nation to the patriotism and nationalism of its 
democracy-loving sons and daughters. 
Source: Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, <http://
www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/
THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf> 
!
!
!
!
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!
APPENDIX VI 
PKK Militants’ tour 
!  
Source: Haberaktüel, <http://www.haberaktuel.com/pkklilar-kahramanlar-
gibiydiler-video-haberi-230931.html> 
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!
APPENDIX VII 
Front page of Radikal Daily Newspaper on 22 March 2013 
!  
Source: Radikal, <http://i.radikal.com.tr/480x325/2013/03/22/
fft64_mf1382577.Jpeg> 
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